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INTRODUCTION 
 
“At last a wolf's whelp will be a wolf  
Although he may grow up with a man” 
This couplet is a well-known Iranian proverb whose first 
creator was the wise famous Iranian poet, Muslih Al Din Saadi 
Shirazi, who lived in the seventh lunar century-Hijri Ghamari- 
13th century. It was used in the content of a story which was 
about a group of bandits who were captured after hard efforts 
of the King’s soldiers and the King ordered their death. Among 
them was a very young man towards whom the King’s vizier 
felt pitiful and asked the King to forgive him because of his 
juvenility and requested to be granted his care in order to 
train him and familiarize him morals and raise him with 
worthy behaviour. At first, the King did not agree however due 
to the persistence of the Vizier, the king finally surrendered to 
his request and forgave that young person’s sin and left his 
training and reformation into the Viziers hand. 
The Vizier endeavoured to educate the Young person for a 
while however eventually as Saadi says: “After two years had 
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elapsed a band of robbers in the locality joined him, tied the 
knot of friendship and, when the opportunity presented itself, 
he killed the vizier with his son, took away untold wealth and 
succeeded to the position of his own father in the robber-cave 
where he established himself.”  
(Sa’adi Shirazi, 1992, pp. 50-54) 
This story puts the theory of hereditary determinism forward 
based upon which the personage and behaviour of man is 
recognised through the restrictive deterministic factor and as 
a result education is ineffective before the heredity factor, and 
has no influential role in shaping the personage and behaviour 
of man.  
According to the theory of hereditary determinism, man has 
no freedom of will and decision against the hereditary factor 
since what shapes and directs the will of man is the very 
hereditary factor which nurtures certain motivations in man 
in a deterministic and infrangible way. These motivations are 
shaped alongside the hereditary factors and will be the 
primitive and deterministic causes of creation of man’s will 
and voluntary actions.  
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If this theory is accepted, the routes to training man will close 
and there will be no other choice but for all men to fully 
surrender to whatever hereditary factor received from 
generations before them. This is because any effort to avoid 
the influence of the hereditary deterministic factor, according 
to the saying of Saadi, would be a useless and futile effort. 
Consequently, in accordance to the example presented in the 
former tale, man’s characteristics are preconfigured, which 
entails invariability of man’s inherited model of personality 
and thus resulting in the fruitlessness of training and 
education. 
There is another theory confronting this theory which 
considers the will of man independent of the hereditary factor 
and believes that although the hereditary factor can influence 
the will of man, the choice of getting influenced by the 
hereditary factor or any other external factor is the man’s, and 
using his free will power, it is him who can choose his will and 
voluntary act, and as a result, shape his personage and destiny. 
This other theory has been stated and emphasised in various 
ways in the Holy Quran among which, are the verses that 
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describe Allah (S.W.T) using the description “He brings out the 
living from the dead, and He brings out the dead from the 
living”  
(Verse 19, Chapter 30 [room]) 
Here the narrations obtained from the pure Imams interpret 
the word “Hayy” (the living) to mean the faithful and “Mayet” 
(the dead) to mean the infidel (Al-Qommi, 1983, Vol 1, p. 211) 
This is the same in Islamic religious sources, in the story of 
“Buddha” where his father is introduced as a tyrant, anti-
religion person who put his utmost effort on killing pious and 
religious people. (Al-Sadooq, 1991, pp. 521-579)  
Explaining the Islamic view regarding man’s freedom factors 
like environment, hereditary and others Martyr Allamah 
Mutahhari says: 
“Whilst man cannot entirely cut off his relations to hereditary, 
natural environment, social environment, history and time he 
can rebel against these barriers. Man by his power of wisdom 
and knowledge on one hand and his faith and free will on the 
other hand, can change the received influences of these factors 
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modifying them according to his desires and wishes. He could 
own and control his life and his destiny”  
(Human in Qura’n, 1991, p. 39) 
Therefore the theory of hereditary determinism of moral and 
behavioural characters has definitely been rejected in the 
religious and philosophical resources originated from Islamic 
religious sources.   
 On the other hand, confronting the deterministic hereditary 
factor, some of the ancient and modern social philosophies 
believe in the theory of “the determinism of social 
environment” as the main factor in shaping the personage and 
will and behaviour of man and have strongly defended it. 
Based on this way of thinking, the will of man which is the 
foundation of his behaviour and personage, is restricted to the 
“social environment” deterministic factor.  
According to Martyr Allamah Mutahhari: 
“One of the fundamental problems discussed by philosophers, 
particularly in the last century, is the problem of determinism 
and freedom of individual as against society, or in other words, 
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determinism and freedom of the individual spirit vis-a-vis the 
social spirit.” 
After the short explanation of four theories regarding the 
nature of society, he then concluded: 
“If we accept the idea of the absolute essentiality and 
primariness of the society, there will be no place left for the idea 
of the freedom and choice of the individual.  
Emile Durdkheim, the famous French sociologist, emphasizes the 
importance of society to the extent of saying that social matters 
(in fact all the human matters, unlike the biological and animal 
urges and needs like eating and sleeping) are the products of 
society, not the products of individual thought and will, and 
have three characteristics: they are external, compulsive, and 
general.”  
(Mutahhari, 1997, pp. 20-21)  
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Among the most famous social determinism theories is the 
historical materialism theory of Karl Marx who considers the 
thought and will of man to be the deterministic product of 
social production relations and the social production relations 
to be a deterministic consequence of production factor. Based 
upon historical materialism, the “free will of man” is a 
meaningless term since the will of all men is the deterministic 
result of a form of production relation that is created through 
production factors. Based upon the determined dialectical 
process and as a result of the inner contradiction of 
production relations, the new production factors will break 
apart the old production relations and replace them with 
modern social production relations. The thoughts, reflections, 
the feelings and affections of man have been derived from the 
new production relations. 
Since the dialectical progress of production tools is an always 
active and definitely unavoidable law, a new contradiction will 
be emerged between the new production tools and the old 
production relations. The social reflection of this contradiction 
will be emerged in the contradiction between the old social 
class who supports the old production tools and relations with 
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the new social class who support the modern production tools 
and relations. This social contradiction is followed by struggle 
and war between the two old and new classes which will end 
in a modern social revolution in which the new social class 
who supports the modern production tools and relations is the 
always winning frontier of this social struggle: 
“When the dialectical method is applied to the study of economic 
problems, economic phenomena are not viewed separately from 
each other, by bits and pieces, but in their inner connection as 
an integrated totality, structured around, and by, a basic 
predominant mode of production. This totality is analysed in all 
its aspects and manifestations, as determined by certain given 
laws of motion, which relate also to its origins and its inevitable 
disappearance. These laws of motion of the given production are 
discovered to be nothing but the unfolding of the inner 
contradiction of that structure, which define its very nature. The 
given economic structure is seen to be characterized at one and 
the same time by the unity of these contradictions and by their 
struggle, both of which determine the constant changes which it 
undergoes. The (quantitative) changes which constantly occur 
in the given mode of production, through adaptation, 
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integration of reforms and self-defence (evolution), are 
distinguished from those (qualitative) changes which, by sudden 
leaps, produce a different structure, a new mode of production 
(revolution).”  
(Karl Marx, 1990, Vol 1, p. 18) 
According to the text above the determined production motion 
laws are the basic foundation of economic relations and 
structure, and according to Marx’s thesis of  “materialist 
conception of history” the economic relations and its relevant 
structure are the basic source of social structure containing all  
social phenomena such as thought, religion, art, politics, ethics, 
etc. 
Bertrand Russell says: 
For Marx, the driving force is really man’s relation to matter, of 
which the most important part is his mode of production. In this 
way Marx’s materialism, in practice becomes economics.  
The politics, religion, philosophy, and art of any epoch in human 
history are according to Marx, an outcome of its methods of 
production, and, to a lesser extent, of distribution. (Bertrand 
Russell, 1995, p. 750) 
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Plekhanov says: 
“The social environment characteristics are formed by the level 
of production power in every age which means that when the 
level of production powers are fixed, they subordinate all social 
environment characteristics, its relative psychology and mutual 
relations between environment on one hand, and ideas, and 
behaviours on the other hand.” 
(Plekhanov, 1969, p. 42) 
As a result of the materialist conception of history, individual 
characteristics are nothing but a reflection of the social 
structure which derived from the determined laws of 
dialectical production movement. 
Consequently, every agent’s action is not a result of an 
independent free will created by the agent himself, and 
separated from social structure. Rather it is a determined 
effect, resulted from social production relations, by the 
predominant dialectical production motion laws.     
 
 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
13 
 
The theory of Hegel about the absolute spirit dominating the 
history and the world, must also be counted among the social 
deterministic theories. In Hegel’s view:  
“God is managing the world, the plan and form upon which He 
manages the world is the history.” (Hegel G.W.F, 1991, p. 36) 
According to Hegel’s explanation of the world, the history is 
nothing but the provided chain of occurrences determined by 
the Providence of God which presides over the events of the 
world. The essence of the world and history is the absolute 
spirit of god, which exists and guides everything including 
human actions through the determined law directed to the 
determinate goal. 
States, societies and individuals are a part of the provided 
connected chain of history, then its actions and behaviours are 
not spontaneous or accidental, but they are predominated by 
the Providence of God under determined law. 
Martyr Allamah Mutahhari insisted that the two theories of 
Hegel and Marx with respect to philosophical interpretation of 
history lead to the same result of historical determinism 
which absolutely negates the human free will, he says: 
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“There are some who, on the basis of the principle of causation 
and the principle of universality, negate freedom and choice. 
They maintain that whatever is accepted in the name of freedom 
is not actually freedom. Contrarily, there are others who 
approve the principle of freedom and negate the view that 
history follows certain laws. 
Many sociologists accept the incompatibility of causality and 
freedom, and, therefore, they accept causality and negate 
freedom. 
Hegel, and Marx following him, accept historical determinism. 
According to Hegel and Marx, freedom is nothing but 
consciousness of historical necessity. In the book Marx and 
Marxism, the following passage of Engels is quoted from his 
work Anti-Duhring: 
Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between 
freedom and necessity. To him freedom is the appreciation of 
necessity. Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood. 
Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence from 
natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws and in the 
possibility this gives of systematically making them work 
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towards definite ends. This holds good in relation to the laws of 
external nature and those which govern the bodily and mental 
existence of man themselves. (Andre Peter, Marx and Marxism, 
Persian translation by Shuja al-Din Diya’iyan, p.249)” 
(Mutahhari, 1997, p.53) 
 
Also in Psychology, there are various theories that support the 
deterministic factors and psychological reasons. One of the 
most famous determinist theories in the field of Psychology is 
the “sexual theory” of Freud.  
Freud believed that the will and personage of man originates 
from thoughts and affections which are the result of sexual 
deprivations that originate from sexual restrictions. The 
Oedipus complex will cause the advent of sexual desires 
following which the feelings and affections and thought of man 
will strive and endeavour to compensate for the sexual 
deprivation and will shape the structure of personage of man. 
By the formation of the psychological personality of man, his 
requests and desire will orientate parallel to his psychological 
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personality and will shape the will and voluntary actions of 
man. 
Edgar Pesch says:  
It appears that it is necessary to sketch the general lines in the 
Oedipus complex, the complex which is not only the foundation 
of the child’s sexual desires but is also the creator of the social 
and sexual life of mature people. (Pesch, 1993, p. 64) 
Freud states that the scientific inquiries show that the 
beginning of religion, the spiritual values, social customs and 
Art will all join one another in the “Oedipus complex” point:  
“At the conclusion, then, of this exceedingly condensed inquiry, I 
should like to insist that its outcome shows that the beginnings 
of religions, morals, society and art in the Oedipus complex.” 
(Freud, 2001, p. 182) 
Moreover, the freedom of the will of man constitutes the main 
base of laws. The long disputes regarding the basis of law, the 
meaning and the source of natural law, common Law, civil law 
specially the law of contracts, the criminal law, and other 
forms and fields of law all are rooted in the principle of the 
freedom of the will of man. The accountability and 
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responsibility of man towards his words and actions whether 
in the civil laws or criminal laws all depend on the scale of 
freedom of man in decision making and the scale of 
involvement of the free will of man in shaping his words, 
actions, and personality. 
“Modern theorists following Machiavelli suggested that 
natural law (rights and principles held to be common to all 
humankind and derived from the nature of man rather than 
from social customs or contracts, religion, etc.) originated not 
in the heavens but in man himself. Nature supplies no pattern 
for the good state. In fact, in the state of nature there is no law 
at all, only individual desire and freedom.” (Ezzati A. 2002, p. 
26) 
The main field of the civil law is the law of contracts which is 
founded on the basis of human freewill. For that the man’s 
responsibility towards his words is entirely meaningless, 
without his own deliberation and freewill. 
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With respect to the criminal law, a cardinal principle of 
criminal law is embodied in the maxim “an act does not make 
a man guilty of a crime unless his mind is also guilty” (Card R. 
2004, p. 2.2) and it is obvious that the guiltiness of mind 
depends on its deliberation and intention which derives from 
the agent’s freewill.      
One of the main subjects related to the criminal law and 
criminal psychology is education and training in forming the 
personality of the convict. The theory that considers the 
personality of the convict to be the definite consequence of his 
education will direct the main responsibility of the crime of 
the convict towards his trainer and see the way to reform the 
society and reduce or eradicate crime in the society 
exclusively in the educational factors and environment of the 
society.  
The social political crises which cause very vast and deep 
social problems rather the criminal political events like global 
wars, massacres, transgressions and social violence and etc., 
stem from human volition, and its previous prerequisites.  
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These subjects and all the issues that are related to the 
voluntary actions of man which cover a vast area, which is as 
vast as all of the social sciences, is related to the subject of the 
freedom of man’s will and the connection of this freedom with 
the causal deterministic law or the deterministic causality. The 
connection of the deterministic causality with the freedom of 
man and the intellectual justification of the power of man over 
free decision making and the scale of involvement of the free 
will of man in shaping the actions, the personality and the 
destiny of man is the main subject of this research. The prime 
foundation of all the discussions is related to social sciences.    
This study tries to reflect the problem of compatibility 
between general causal law and the free will of human being, 
and whether or not the general causal law is compatible with 
the freedom of man; I will examine the different theories in 
contemporary Islamic and Western philosophy comparing 
them with each other and criticising them, and finally I will 
present my theory of ‘moral obligation’ which I think is able to 
give a new solution to this problem. In the first chapter I will 
give a short explanation of the background of this problem in 
the Islamic philosophy, in chapter two I will reflect upon the 
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contemporary Islamic perspective. In the third chapter I will 
look at the contemporary Western theories regarding the 
problem and in the last chapter I’ll present my view with 
respect to the free will and its compatibility with the general 
causal law.  
According to my suggested theory, which was called “moral 
preponderant”, the main source of the free will of the human 
act stems from deliberation and reflection. The real meaning 
of this freedom is that the act must arise from deliberation and 
reflection of man; what he is going to do, what the possibilities 
of the different choices are, which one of them is good, which 
one of them is bad, which one is the best, and which one is the 
worst. 
To consider the different possibilities and to deliberate upon 
them, and the decision-making which arises from this 
deliberation and reflection, and then to choose what to do or 
not to do, is the very foundation and the mere core of the 
freewill and is actually the basis of the freedom of mankind. 
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The most important result of this theory is that it is impossible 
to have free individuals or free societies without having 
enough opportunity for reflection and deliberation. 
The most important responsibility of education systems, mass 
media systems, economic, and political systems is to prepare 
the adequate environment for the people to think about their 
life, and to deliberate about the different types of life-styles, 
kinds of actions, lanes of movement, and consequently choose 
which one is the best.  
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PART (1)  
THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM IN 
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the earliest problems in philosophy that has occupied 
minds of great philosophers and has been debated in different 
philosophical ages is the problem of causality and its relation 
to freedom. 
On one side, the depth of philosophical issues related to 
causality and freedom and the close relationship between 
these two issues and the intellectual and practical systems of 
The philosophical problem between causality and freewill is that there 
are two very obvious facts, the first is that we, as mankind, feel that we 
are free to choose what we are going to do, and we can do or not do 
what we want. The second fact is that every possible thing that exists 
needs a determining factor or cause which means that the human free 
act is dominated by the determined cause, here the paradoxical conflict 
arises between our feeling of free action and the determination of the 
factors which influenced us to do what we do.  To have a clear idea of 
this philosophical debate in the Islamic thought, we need to know the 
real meanings of the main terms in this discussion and to know a brief 
history about the main sources of this debate in the history of Islamic 
thought. In the first part of this study the main terms of this discussion 
will be clarified, and the short story of the source of this philosophical 
debate in the history of Islamic thought will be presented. In the history 
of Islamic thought, there were several currents and many thinkers. It 
was not possible to mention all of them, here my attempt is to focus 
upon the main current and the main thinkers who brought about a new 
theory or established a new school of thought. 
 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
23 
 
man and also the many philosophical and theological issues 
that exist has made this issue in the field of philosophical and 
theological discussions especially important.  
The fundamental role of this subject in the field of social 
sciences is also prominent and noteworthy. On one hand, the 
field of law and crime prevention and discernment and 
determination of the real criminal and also the determination 
of the involvement of the will of the criminal in the 
accomplishment of crime on the other hand as well as the role 
of the society and the inherited factors and the family and 
educating environment in the formation of the personality of 
the criminal and the shaping of his criminal will, all have a 
close relationship with the issue of man’s freedom and its 
connections with causality.   
In the field of sociology, the influence of group spirit in the 
formation of the individual character of man and his will and 
also the effect of various geographical and historical factors 
and etc. in the emergence and shaping of the group spirit and 
will are all issues that have a close relationship with the 
freedom of man’s will.  
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There are some psychological and sociological theories that 
regard the will and personality of man- in both social and 
individual aspects- the product of deterministic factors. The 
theory of Freud on the influence of sexual instinct in shaping 
the personality and behaviour of man and the theory of Karl 
Marx on the influence of productive forces in shaping of the 
group spirit and intellect and then in the thought and 
personality of an individual, are among the theories that 
regard the personality and will of man to be denounced by 
factors beyond his personality and freewill and do not 
consider the freewill to be able to determine his destiny clear 
of these factors. 
There are also theories in the field of morals, education and 
economics that consider the deterministic forces beyond the 
will of man to shape the moral and economical character that 
direct the moral, educative and economical behaviours. 
It is for this reason that the topic of freedom of man and its 
relationship with other causes and with the principle of causal 
law are among the most important issues that must be 
carefully analysed and discussed.  
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The problem of “Causality” and its relation to “Freedom” has 
been discussed in ancient Greek, Indian, and Persian 
philosophy before the Islamic Age.  
After the emergence of Islam, one of the main philosophical 
and theological cases propounded by the Qur’an and the 
traditions of the Prophet and the infallible Imams was the 
creation of the world and man by God on one hand, and man’s 
freedom and responsibility on the other, which led the Muslim 
scholars and philosophers to long philosophical discussions 
that resulted in various trends of thought and schools.  
The argument about the relation between God and the 
creation led to the problems of causality and necessity, and the 
discussion about the relation between God and man led to the 
question of man’s responsibility and freedom.  
To clarify the philosophical problem of the outwardly conflict 
between causality and necessity on one hand, and freedom on 
the other hand, we need to point out the philosophical 
definition of the three main terms in our discussion which are: 
Cause, Necessity, and Freedom. 
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1. CAUSE 
The term “Cause” when used without any added condition, 
has two meanings in the Islamic Philosophical terminology: 
1. All elements needed for the existence of effect. This meaning 
of cause includes the whole four types of causes which are: 
agent cause, material cause, formal cause, and ultimate cause. 
Imam Fakhr Al Deen Al Razi (d.1209, 606 AH) says: “When we 
want to define The Cause as including these four causes we say: 
The cause is the thing needed for its reality and existence.” (Al 
Razi, 1966, Vol 1, p. 458) 
2. The Agent Cause which means the thing that grants the 
effect its existence, or in other words; the source of the 
existence of effect. Continuing the former expression, 
Fakhruddeen-al-Razi says: “What Sheikh (Avicenna) mentioned 
in his book Alhodood (Definitions) is that “The Cause is the 
thing that occasions the existence of another thing which its 
actual being derived from actual existence of the former, but the 
actual existence of the former is not derived from the latter” 
then –in fact- it doesn’t mean but the agent cause.” (Ibid) 
The agent cause in this term means an agent with full powers 
of agency. Therefore, it includes all implements needed by the 
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agent in the process of creating the effect. Moreover, it 
includes the Ultimate Cause as well, because the agency of 
cause has not been completed without the Ultimate Cause. 
 In his book “Ayn-ul-Qwa’ed” Katibi Qazwini (d. 1276, 675 AH) 
says: 
“It (The Ultimate Cause) is a cause for the causality of Agent 
Cause, and its being is later than the effect in object, but earlier 
in subject.” (Katibi Qazwini, 1959, p. 95) 
The ultimate cause is   a former in respect of the effect in 
subject, for it is a cause for the causality of Agent Cause in 
subject, because the Agent Cause needs an ultimate to move 
towards the action that results in the effect. And it’s being is a 
latter in respect of the effect in object, because it is a result of 
the effect in the reality.   
 Allamah Hilli in his book “Idhah-ul-Maqasid” describing the 
above expression says: 
“The Ultimate Cause has two aspects: The first is in respect of 
the agent, the second is in respect of the effect. When it is 
attributed to the agent it will be the agent of its attribution of 
agency, because the agent doesn’t do his action except by reason 
of the ultimate, and when it is attributed to the effect it will be 
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an ultimate in respect of it, which means that the effect existed 
due to that ultimate, then it has been a cause for the effect, 
because unless the ultimate, the effect has not been existed.”  
(Al Hilli, 1959, p. 95) 
 
[In subject]  →  The ultimate  →  The agent  →  The effect 
[In object]   →    The agent      →     The effect   →    The 
ultimate 
(Figure.1) 
 
According to Islamic philosophical terminology the term 
“Complete agent” can be used with two meanings; Some times 
what is meant by the term complete cause is its former 
meaning that includes whatever interferes within the 
existence of a being (which includes the four types of causes). 
Katibi Qazwini says: 
“Whatever the object needs within its existence is known as the 
cause, and this cause is either complete; which consists of 
whatever the existence of the object depends upon, or 
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incomplete, which is some of the elements that the existence of 
the object depends upon.” (Ibid p. 94) 
In the exegesis of the above Allamah Hilli says: 
“Be aware that the complete cause includes Material, formal, 
Agent and Ultimate plus Condition and non-obstacle. Each of 
these is a part of the meaning of the complete cause.”  
(Ibid p. 96) 
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                The complete cause 
 
 
                The agent cause 
 (Figure.2) 
Some times what we mean by complete cause is its second 
meaning. This means that the agent cause is in full agency, in 
which case although in some ways it includes the ultimate 
cause, but it does not include the material and formal causes. 
The complete agent cause includes all the elements which play 
a role in the agency of the agent, contrary to the partial cause 
which means the things that is necessary to create the effect 
but it is not sufficient. For this reason it includes all the tools 
and facilities which the agent would use for establishing the 
effect. However, it does not include equipments (Mo’iddaat) 
(i.e things that are needed to complete the capacity of 
effects to be existed by the agents like the water or 
sunlight for the growth of a plant that has been placed by 
the farmer agent) conditions and non-obstacles. This is due 
Agent + ultimate + 
material + formal 
 
Effect 
 
Agent 
 
Effect 
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to the fact that these three elements bear on the capability of 
the object (i.e. effect) and not the agency of the agent. 
Therefore they are counted as parts of the material cause.  
Fakhr Al Deen Al Razi says: 
“But conditions are truly a part of the material cause, because 
capable would only become capable if it complies with the 
conditions. But the equipments are truly a part of the agent 
cause, where its agency depends upon the equipments and it 
would not be completed without them. Therefore, if the agency 
of the agent would have been completed without equipments, 
the mediation of the equipments would become impossible.” (Al-
Razi, 1966, Vol. 1, p. 458) 
Finally it is useful to mention that the second meaning of the 
complete cause which was the agent cause with the full agency 
is equal to the sufficient cause in western philosophy‘s 
terminology, whilst necessary cause includes both the 
complete and partial cause.  
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2. NECESSITY OR THE NECESSITY OF EXISTENCE 
Necessity or the necessity of existence is absurdity of absence. 
Anything whose non-existence is impossible, its existence is 
necessary. The phrase Necessity or the Necessity of Existence 
has been used in a variety of different meanings within the 
philosophical terminology. At this stage we will discuss two 
important meanings in accordance to our discussion:  
1. The necessity simultaneous to the existence of being or 
conditional upon its existence, which is interpreted in 
philosophical terminology as predicated necessity. This means 
that whenever we take into account a being bounded by the 
state of existence, its existence within this condition would be 
necessary. This necessity which describes the existence is the’ 
Necessity Simultaneous to Existence’ or the ‘Necessity by 
Predicate.’ 
2. The necessity prior to existence: what is meant by priority 
in this type of necessity is not priority in the sense of time. 
What is meant is intellectual priority, which in philosophical 
terms is known as gradational priority (priority in terms of 
rank). 
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The necessity prior to existence within intellectual perception 
is described as: The object necessitated then existed. Here, the 
word then does not represent space of time. What it implies is 
Intellectual Graduation. This means from the point of view of 
intellect, the reason for existence is the necessity of its 
existence. And without the necessity of existence the existence 
of the object would be impossible and unjustified. Therefore, 
the necessity of existence here represents the reason 
justifying the existence of the object. So as a result of this, the 
existence of the object would be preferred to its non-existence 
and its non-existence becomes cancelled and its existence will 
be necessarily achieved. 
Mulla Sadra Sadrul-mota’alliheen Shirazi (d.1640, 1050 AH) in 
his book “Al-Asfar-al-Aqliyyah al-Arba’ah”, at the end of 
chapter fifteen, says: 
“And thereby was proved that any contingent nature or any 
contingent existence would not achieve existence, unless its 
existence would become necessary because of its cause. 
Therefore it is not conceivable that the cause is a cause unless it 
gives necessary preference to the existence of effect.” (Sadra, 
(ND), Vol. 1, p. 223) 
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After that at the beginning of chapter 16 he says: 
“What we discussed in the previous chapter was the prior 
necessity for the contingent, which has arisen from the full 
preferential cause (Al-Morajjih-u- taamm) of either existence or 
non-existence, before its occurrence, - until where he says: – 
after it has been occurred - the existence or non-existence of the 
object - it would find another necessity. This necessity at the 
time that the existence or non-existence attributed to the 
nature, with the aspect of describing the nature to one of the 
descriptions of existence or non-existence, and this is the next 
necessity which named the Necessity by Predicate.” (Ibid p. 224) 
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3. FREEDOM 
Freedom has also two meanings: 
1. Civil or Social Freedom: Freedom with this meaning is used 
in opposition to social limitations. Freedom in its social sense 
represents the freedom that the human possesses in the 
society. The boundaries of such freedom depends upon the 
amount of limitation that is exerted by the rulers of the society 
or other powerful elements – in a lawful or unlawful manner- 
and causes limitation upon the freedom of act and behaviour 
of Human. Due to the fact that the boundaries of such freedom 
– within lawful societies – is set out by law, and the fact that 
this type of law is one of the necessities of a civil society, this 
type of freedom is known as civil freedom. 
 
2. Philosophical Freedom: The term Philosophical freedom is 
used in contrast to Philosophical constraint. What is meant by 
freedom here is the fact that the human being or any other 
agent commits their act without any sort of external constraint 
or pressure or impediment, and solely by internal power. 
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The opposite side to this type of Freedom is Fatalism or 
Determinism (Jabr). Determinism or Fatalism means that the 
agent of an action is acting under the pressure of another 
agent or is being as a tool of another operator, and as a result, 
the superior operator sets out and determines the nature and 
the direction of the act which is carried out by the direct 
conductor or agent.  
In other words conductor and the agent do not possess any 
power or will to change the direction and the type of act which 
is set out by the superior operator. 
John Stuart Mill in the opening chapter of his book ‘on Liberty’ 
addressing the difference between the two types of freedom 
says: 
“the subject of this essay is not the so-called liberty of the will, so 
unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of 
philosophical necessity; but civil, or social liberty: and the 
nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately 
exercised by society over the individual.”  
(Mill J.S, 1947, p. 1) 
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Robert Kane in his book ‘Free will’ refers to the two types of 
freedom. He recognises the Civil or Social Freedom as the 
apparent surface of Philosophical Freedom, and the Real 
Freedom of humans to depend on their Philosophical 
Freedom.  
He says: 
“Nothing could be more important than freedom to the modern 
world. All over the globe, the trend (often against resistance) is 
towards societies that are more free. But why do we want 
freedom? The simple but not totally adequate, answer is that to 
be more free is to have the capacity and opportunity to satisfy 
more of our desires. In a free society we can walk into a store 
and buy almost anything we want. We can choose what movies 
to see, what music to listen to, whom to vote for. 
But these are what you call surface freedoms. What is meant by 
free will runs deeper than these everyday freedoms. To see how, 
suppose we had maximal freedom to make such choices to 
satisfy our desires and yet the choices we actually made were 
manipulated by others, by the powers that be. In such a world 
we would have a great deal of everyday freedom to do whatever 
we wanted, yet our free will would be severely limited. We would 
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be free to act or choose what we willed, but would not have the 
ultimate say about what it is that we willed. Someone else would 
be pulling the strings, not by coercing us against our wishes, but 
by manipulating us into having the wishes they want us to 
have.” (Kane, 2002, p. 2) 
From what we said so far it is clear that each of the following 
phrases: Causality, Necessity of existence or Necessity 
(wujoob), and freedom have all got two meanings and within 
our discussion the second meaning for these phrases is the 
substance of the subsequent discussion.          
 Cause is Agent cause, Necessity, or the Necessity of existence 
is the Necessity prior to existence, and Freedom is 
Philosophical freedom. The words will hereafter be used in 
this sense, unless otherwise stated. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY 
of 
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 
concerning 
CAUSALITY NECESSITY AND FREEDOM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussions regarding Monotheism of God from one side and 
discussions concerning Divine Decree and Destiny from the 
other, were the very first Philosophical and Theological 
discussions which manifested in the history of Islamic 
Philosophical Thought.  
In Nahjul-balaghah (A selection of Sermons by Imam Ali (The 
first of twelve Shia Imams, who are the successors of the prophet 
Mohammad according to the Shia belief, martyred 661, 40 AH) 
The main source of the philosophical debate in the relation between 
causality and free will in the history of the Islamic thought is the 
discussion about the monotheism of God’s action and the relation 
between his actions and creations including the act of mankind as part 
of his creations. If all God’s creations, including humans, emerged by 
God’s decision through the determined causal law it would result in the 
negation of both the human’s free will, and also the human’s 
responsibility towards his actions, which will then lead to the 
exoneration of all criminals in human society. There are three main 
schools of Islamic thought which interpret God’s action to justify the 
free will of human and his responsibility towards his action while 
considering the reasonable monotheism of God’s action: 
1. The school of theologians which are divided into two theories: 
a. The Ashariete’s theory of “Kasb” 
b. The Mo’atazeli and Imamiyyeh theologians’ theory of 
priority “Awlawiyyah” 
2. The school of Islamic Philosophers: “theory of necessity” 
3. The school of “Usooliyyon”, the experts of principles of 
jurisprudence which are divided into two theories: 
a. The theory of Ikhtiyar (to will) 
b. The theory of Saltanah (Sovereignty) 
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which is the earliest text that has propounded very important 
philosophical discussions) there has been set forth very 
important discussions regarding Divine Monotheism. To show 
an example we would point out the following passage: 
“The foremost in religion is His knowledge, the perfection of His 
knowledge is to testify Him, the perfection of testifying him is to 
believe in His oneness, the perfection of believing in His oneness 
is to regard Him pure and the perfection of His purity is to deny 
Him attributes, because every attribute is a proof that it is 
different from that to which it is attributed and everything to 
which something is attributed is different from the attribute. 
Thus whoever attaches attribute to Allah recognises His like, 
and who recognises His like regards Him two and who regards 
him two recognises parts for Him and who recognises parts for 
Him mistook Him; and who mistook him pointed at him and who 
pointed at him admitted limitations for Him and who admitted 
limitation for Him numbered Him. Whoever said in what is He, 
held that he is contained and whoever said that on what is He, 
held He is not on something else. He is being but not through 
phenomenon of coming into being. He exists but not from non-
existence. He is with everything but not in physical nearness. He 
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is different from everything but not in physical separation.” (Ibn 
Abi Taleb Imam Ali, 1998, Sermon 1) 
Amongst the philosophical discussions which have been 
propounded in Nahjul-balaghah, is the discussion regarding 
Divine Decree and Destiny.  
In the section of short-sayings and advices in Nahjul-balaghah 
it has been said: 
“A man enquired from Amirul-Momineen (Imam Ali): “was our 
going to fight with the Syrians (Shamees) destined by Allah”? 
Amirul-Momineen gave a detailed reply a selection of which is 
hereunder: Woe to you. You take it as a final and unavoidable 
destiny (according to which we are bound to act). If it were so, 
there would have been no question of reward and chastisement 
and there would have been no sense in Allah’s promises or 
warnings. (On the other hand) Allah the glorified has ordered 
his people to act by free will and has cautioned them and 
refrained them (from evil). He has placed easy obligations on 
them and has not put heavy obligations. He gives them much 
(reward) in return for little (action). He is disobeyed, not 
because he is over powered. He is obeyed, but not under force. 
He did not send prophets just for fun. He did not send down the 
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book for people without purpose. He did not create the skies, the 
earth and all that is in between for nothing. And he created not 
the heaven and the earth in vain. “That is the imagination of 
those who disbelieve; then woe to those who disbelieve – 
because of the fire.” (Ibn Abi Taleb Imam Ali, 1998, Advice: 78) 
These two passages very well reveal the matters regarding 
Monotheism and Divine Decree and Destiny which were set 
forth by the very first religious leaders of Islam. From these 
two main issues derived the philosophical debates in Islamic 
thought and it gradually spread and developed amongst 
Muslims.  
The truth is that the arguments concerning divine destiny 
derive from Divine Monotheism debates. Divine Monotheism 
and the questions relating to it were the starting point of 
Philosophical and Theological thoughts in the history of Islam. 
Difference of opinion in the matters related to Monotheism 
brought about different tendencies, and different schools of 
philosophy and theology, resulting in different theories about 
the relation between causality and freedom.  
Islamic thinkers divide the Divine Monotheism into three main 
stages outlined as follows. 
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1. Divine Essence Monotheism (Unity In God’s 
Essence) 
This means oneness of the essence of the creator, and negation 
of dualism and all kinds of multi cause in the origin of creation. 
Monotheism of the Essence was agreed upon by all the Islamic 
thinkers. Apart from the difference of opinion which was 
created later between mystics (Urafa’a) and other Islamic 
scholars such as Philosophers and theologians 
(Motakallemeen) on the interpretation of Monotheism of the 
divine Essence, there was no further difference of opinion 
between the Islamic thinkers in this respect. The main roots of 
this disagreement refer to the arguments of divine acts 
Monotheism. 
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2. Divine Attribute Monotheism (Unity In God’s 
Attributes) 
Divine Attribute Monotheism means the unification of 
Attribute and Essence, and rejection of complexity in the 
Essence of God the Almighty, and to assert the merely 
simplicity of God the Almighty. Allamah Tabatabai says: 
“Considering that God’s essence is unlimited, actually His 
perfections (i.e. His attributes) are united with his essence, 
meaning that His essence is merely simple and one, and His 
attributes are alike and its variation is just conceptional” 
(Tabatabai, 1967, pp. 73-74) 
 
In the subject of Divine Attribute Monotheism of God the 
Almighty two issues were discussed: 
1. Unification of Attribute and Essence: Imamiyyah and 
Mo’tazilah believed in the unity of attribute and essence. On 
the other hand Asha’erah believed in the separation of the 
Attribute from the essence of God the almighty. (Lahiji, 1892, 
pp. 172-173) 
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2. The Particularity of the Attributes of God the Almighty: In 
this respect it was discussed that, what is the meaning of 
attributes such as knowledge, power, will, word, and as such 
which have been mentioned for God the Almighty in the Holy 
Qur’an and by the Holy Prophet of Islam? Does the knowledge 
of God include every single object and every part of this world 
from eternity to forever? Or is it that the divine knowledge is 
knowledge of generalities? Some of the Islamic philosophers 
came to the belief that the Eternal Knowledge of God is the 
knowledge of generalities of the objects and realities. The 
same question was applied with regard to the Divine Power; 
what is the meaning of the Divine Power? Is the meaning of 
the Divine power the ability to do or not to do, as Theologians 
(e.g. Al Malahimi, 1992, p. 184) have said? Or does it mean “If 
he wanted, he would act and if he wanted not, he would not 
act,” as the Philosophers (e.g. Sadra, (ND), Vol. 6, p. 307) 
believed in? 
And there was set forth other questions concerning the Divine 
Will and Divine Word. The disagreement between Asha’erah 
who believed in the eternity of Divine Word, and Mo’tazilah 
who believed in temporality of the Divine Word, should be 
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accounted as one of the most important ideological conflicts of 
the Muslim Society in the second century after Hijrah 
(approximately the eighth century). 
One of the branches of the discussion related to Divine Power 
and Will was the discussion concerning causality and its 
meaning and the ascription of the Essence of God the Almighty 
to causality and the particularity of Divine eternal Will of God 
the Almighty. 
Causality with the meaning described by the Philosophers - 
that includes the prior necessity of effect - was not accepted by 
the Theologians. This is due to the fact that they find the 
causality with such meaning to be in contradiction with the 
Power and Free Will of God the Almighty. For this reason the 
Islamic Theologians provided a new interpretation of causality 
in which cause would not give necessity to the existence of 
effect, but as a matter of fact it would give priority to the 
existence of effect. From this a new theory was developed 
known as theory of priority by the Islamic theologians against 
the theory of Causal Necessity. 
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Sadruddin Shirazi1 (d.1497, 903 AH) is amongst the 
distinguished theologians of the history of Islam. He is one of 
the most famous people who very strongly defended the 
theory of priority. And Sadrul-muta’alliheen Shirazi, famously 
known as Mulla Sadra who is the founder of Islamic 
transcendent- Philosophy strongly opposes his idea and 
rejects this theory based on strong philosophical arguments in 
his book Al-Asfarul-arba’ah. (Sadra, (ND), Vol. 1, p199) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1Sadruddeen Shirazi (D.1497,903 AH) is amongst the most famous theologians, and he shares similar 
title with Sadruddin Mohammad Shirazi who is a famous philosopher known as Sadra or Sadrul-
Muta’alliheen (D.1640,1050 AH) 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
48 
 
3. Divine Act Monotheism (Unity Of Divine Act) 
Divine action monotheism is the most disputed part of the 
discussion of monotheism. In Divine Action Monotheism the 
unity in the source of actions, movements and wills, and even 
notions and thoughts is argued. 
In accordance with Divine Action Monotheism, all the actions 
including actions based on will -such as the act of human- or 
internal acts such as thinking, love, anger etc., or actions which 
are not based on will such as the movements of planets and 
stars and the changes in the nature all arise from one source 
which is God the Almighty. As a matter of fact, the only 
independent agent is the Essence of God the Almighty. All 
other agents, including the natural agents and the agents who 
act on their will, are dependent to the main independent agent 
which is God the almighty. Divine Action Monotheism with 
such definition has been very much emphasised in the Holy 
Qur’an and the traditions narrated from the Divine Leaders of 
Islam. God the Almighty in the Holy Qur’an says: 
“Say (O’Muhammad PBUH) I possess no power over benefit or 
hurt to myself except as Allah wills.” (Verse 188, Chapter 7) 
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He also says in his Holy book: 
“But you cannot will unless Allah wills.” (Verse 30, Chapter 76) 
The Islamic Mystics have gone another step forward by 
believing not only in unity of agent but also unity of the Act of 
God the Almighty by referring to verses from the Holy Qur’an. 
Based on this, every act returns to God (Modarres, 1986, pp. 
124-129) and therefore his Act similar to its Essence is not but 
only one, “And is not our command but one.” (Holy Qur’an, 
Verse 50, Chapter 54) 
The philosophical school of Mulla Sadra which reconciled 
philosophy with mysticism has given a philosophical format 
unity for act and essence of God the Almighty. He tried to solve 
the philosophical problems related to the unity of Act, Essence, 
and Attribute of God the Almighty based on the theory of 
asalat al-wujud ‘ principality or originality of existence’.  
Asha’erah on the base of God’s acts unity believed that the 
Essence of God the Almighty is the exclusive agent cause in the 
living world (i.e. unity of agent). Based on this they explained 
the relation between Cause and Effect in the natural agent or 
unwilling agent using the theory of ‘Habit’ a’adah, and 
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between the willing agent such as human, using the theory of 
‘Acquirement’ kasb which is defined by Al Baghellani (1947, 
pp. 307-8) as follows: “to generate an action by a simultaneous 
power which makes the act unnecessary”. (Badawi, 1971, Vol.1, 
p. 616) 
Based on the theory of ‘Habit’ there is not any essential 
relation between cause and effect, but any effect which has 
come from a cause is due to the fact that the habit of God has 
over ruled upon it, so that it would create effect after the 
creation of cause. Therefore there is no true agent but the 
Essence of God the almighty, and the relation between effect 
and its natural cause is nothing but the pursuit relation on the 
basis of ‘Divine Habit’. 
Ghazi Adhododdeen Eyji (d.1355, 756 AH) narrates from Abul-
Hasan Al-Ash’a’ri (The founder of school of Asha’erah in 
Islamic theology, (d.935, 324 AH)) that in the explanation of 
the theory of Habit, he said: 
“There is no relation between pursuing events under any 
circumstances, unless habit has over ruled the fact that one is 
created after the other, such as burning after touching the fire 
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or satiety after having drunk water” (Al Eyji, (ND), Vol. 1, p. 
241) 
Asha’erah (i.e. Abul-Hassan Al-Ash’a’ri and his followers) after 
they explained the relation of natural Agent with its effect, in 
order to be able to explain the responsibility of the human for 
the acts that have been committed by him, they explained the 
relation between human and his acts or effects on the basis of 
the theory of ‘Acquirement’ kasb. 
In accordance to the theory of Acquirement kasb although 
whatever is committed by human based on the theory of Habit 
is created by God and is His creature, but human will play an 
important role in originating the act. The role of the will of 
humans, in committing an act is known as ‘Acquirement’ kasb. 
The conclusion of what can be understood from the sources of 
Asha’erah thought, is that the Acquirement kasb is nothing but 
human will. Therefore what Asha’ereah mean by the theory of 
‘Acquirement’ kasb is that whenever a human wills to commit 
an act, God the Almighty gives existence to that act. 
Shahrestani (d.1149, 548 AH) in the explanation of the Abul-
Hassan Al-Ash’a’ri‘s theory of ‘Acquirement’ kasb writes: 
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“God the Almighty has over ruled His tradition upon the fact 
that; after He gives a power to His servant, either under or 
accompanying that power he creates the act of that servant as 
the servant puts his will and prepares for that act. This 
procedure is known as ‘Acquirement’ kasb. Therefore the 
creator of the act is God Almighty, but it is obtained by the 
servant and it is under his control” (Al Shahrestani, (ND), Vol. 1, 
p. 130) 
If the Asha’erah are criticised for the fact that Human will is 
not God’s creation and is not under His power; and if human 
will is God’s creation what would be the role of human in 
originating his act? There is no clear answer at hand in reply 
to this criticism from Asha’ereah. 
Mo’tazilah and Imamiyyah theologians – opposite to Asha’erah 
– believed that the acts committed by the natural agents 
whether willingly or unwillingly are all creatures of the agent 
himself. Therefore there is an essential relation between 
causes and effects amongst the objects, and they interpreted 
the Divine Agent Monotheism (i.e. unity of agent) as God the 
Almighty being the only independent Agent in the living 
world, an agent that has not received His being and power 
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from any superior agent or power above Him. Whereas all the 
other agents including willing and unwilling agents have 
received their existence and power from God the Almighty 
who is the origin of the existence, and they are all dependent 
in their act and effect to the origin of the world that is the 
Essence of God the almighty. 
Despite the difference of opinion in interpreting the relation of 
causality between Asha’erah from one side and Mo’tazilah and 
Imamiyyah theologians from the other, what unifies the three 
groups (whom collectively in philosophical terminology are 
known as theologians) in direction (i.e. what brings them 
together) is the negation of the relation of necessity between 
cause and effect.  
Most of the theologians-including Asha’erah, Mo’tazilah and 
Imamiyyah- did not recognise the Agent who gives existence 
to necessitate the effect. They usually believed that every 
contingent effect possesses priority in existence. Some 
believed that the effect gets its priority of existence from its 
cause. This means that the Agent cause first provides its effect 
with priority of existence and then it provide it with existence. 
And some believed that the priority of the existence of effect is 
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within its essence, and every contingent effect possesses 
priority of existence by itself.  
The mystery behind the insistence of theologians –including 
Asha’erah, Mo’tazilah, and Imamiyyah – on rejecting the 
relation of necessity between cause and effect, was the conflict 
which they believe between the necessity of causal relation on 
one hand, and the power of God the Almighty and His free will, 
as well as human free will and responsibility –including 
accountability, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness and 
reword in this world and the next - on the other.  
Other than this, despite the fact that Mo’tazilah and 
Imamiyyah in opposition to Asha’erah shared the same view 
in the interpretation of Divine Action Monotheism (Unity of 
Divine Action), but Imamiyyah and Mo’tazileh did not share 
the same view in the way of attribution the acts to other 
agents-other than God-, this is because Mo’tazilah believed 
that the other agents are dependent to God the Almighty in 
their existence, but in their acts they are independent in their 
agency. Therefore the unity of act of God the almighty 
according to Mo’tazilah means that God the Almighty is the 
only being that provides the world of creatures with existence 
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and all the other Agents owe their existence to the origin of 
the world God the Almighty, but in their acts they are 
independent. (Al-Hamadani, 1965, p. 323)  
Due to this, Mo’tazilah are known as Mofawwidhah 
(indeterminists) in the history of Islam, Which means that God 
the Almighty has created the objects giving them the full 
authority and power of committing their acts and having their 
effects and consequences without any interference of God and 
He has provided them with complete liberty (tafweedh or 
indeterminism) of causation and agency. 
Imamiyyah believed in the theory of ‘Not determinism 
(fatalism)’ and ‘not indeterminism (absolute liberty)’ but 
something between the two, could be described as a moderate 
indeterminism. This theory was initially explained by their 
religious leaders (i.e. infallible Imams). 
 Kolaini (d.940, 329ah.) one of the great Imamiyyah scholars, 
in his book Usul-ul-Kafi, narrates (through the accurate chain 
of narrators) from Imam Baqir and Imam Sadiq, that they said:  
“Allah is more kind than forcing his servants to commit sins, and 
then punish them for those sins. And he is more powerful than 
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wanting something and it does not take place. After this they- 
Imam Baqer and Imam Sadiq- have been asked a question that: 
is there a third way to determinism and indeterminism? They 
replied: yes, wider than whatever exists between the sky and the 
earth.” (Al Kolaini, 1980, Vol. 1, p. 159) 
Also he narrates from Imam Sadiq that: 
“Not determinism and not indeterminism but an idea between 
the two, the narrator asked: what does something between the 
two mean? He replied: it is the example of a man that you find 
him committing a sin and you try to caution him and stop him, 
but that would not be effective and he would still carry on, so 
you would leave him by himself so that he would commit sin, so 
due to the fact that you prohibited him and it was not affective 
and he still committed sin and thereby you left him by himself, 
you were not the one who persuaded him into commit sin, in fact 
it was himself who got himself involved in sin.” 
According to this theory, Imamiyyah opposed both Mo’tazilah 
and Asha’erah. And as a result, they rejected the view of 
Asha’erah, which stated; that the only agent in the world of 
being is God, and the acts and the affects of all willing and 
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unwilling agents are created by Him. They said this view is a 
‘complete determinism and fatalism’ which is in contradiction 
with the power of the Almighty and the responsibility of the 
human being. Also they rejected the point of view of 
Mo’tazilah that; ‘God the Almighty gives existence to all the 
agents and has no role in the acts and affects committed by 
willing and unwilling agents’. And they found this to be in 
contradiction with the theory of Divine Act Monotheism, and 
the ultimate power of God and it also apposes His unique 
worldly governance. They believed in a concept between these 
two ideas, and they called it ‘ a matter between two matters’ 
which resulted in believing that all the agents including willing 
and unwilling agents not only do they owe their existence to 
God the Almighty, but also continuously owe their power of 
agency and effect to the Lord of the world. And the willing 
Agent not only do they continuously owe their existence and 
power to God but also they owe Him their power of will. This 
means that it is Him who has given them the power of having 
will, and he has also given them the ability and authority to be 
able to be willing, and to bring about whatever they have 
willed for. In contrast with theologians (including Asha’erah, 
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Mo’tazilah, and Imamiyyah) the Islamic philosophers 
described the relation of cause and effect on the base of 
(necessity).They believed that no any possible thing or 
contingent could be existed unless its existence has been 
necessitated by the agent, and this relation of necessity not 
only does it not contradict the power and the will of God the 
Almighty, but with the negation of necessity the power and the 
will of God the Almighty will also be negated, and also in the 
other willing agents such as human being the necessity given 
to the effect by the Agent cause is the base and the essence of 
the power and the will of the agent upon its effect.  
The Islamic philosophers are divided into two groups: Al-
Ishraqiyyoon (Intuitionists) The philosophers who follow the 
method of Ishraq Intuition, the most distinguished philosopher 
of which is Shahabuddeen Al-Sohrevardi (killed 1191, 587ah) 
and Al-Mashsha’iyyoon (peripatetics or argumentationists) the 
philosophers who follow the method of Argument, the most 
distinguished Philosophers of which are Farabi (d.950, 339 
ah) and Abu Ali Sina Avicenna (d.1037, 428 ah).  There is not a 
major disagreement between the Intuitionist Al-Ishraqiyyoon 
and Argumentationist Al-Mashsha’iyyoon(peripatetics) on the 
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origin of the theory of necessity (the interpretation of the 
relation between cause and effect based on the necessity of 
existence). But in the way of explaining the essence of the 
dependence of effects to the first origin, the philosophers of 
Mashsha’a have recognised the existence of effect as an 
independent existence in respect of cause. But the 
philosophers of Ishraq denied any independent existence of 
effect and believed that the essence of effect is not but a 
merely dependence to the cause and expressed that as an 
‘Ishraqi dependence (Emanative dependence)’. This theory was 
later reformed and improved by Sadrul-mota’allheen through 
his theory of Asalat-ul-wujud (the reality or principality of 
existence) backing it by strong philosophical arguments, that 
we shall go into more details, when we would explain the 
theory of Asalat-ul-wujud. 
After Khajeh Naseeruddeen Tousi (Tousi, ND [d.1274, 672 ah]) 
the school of Mashsha’a Philosophy in the Islamic thought 
became only restricted to Shi’a academic Seminary, and it was 
quite active until the time of Meer-damaad(d.1631, 1040 ah). 
The Ishraq Philosophy did not have a long life after 
Shahabbuddeen Shohrevardi. Whereas theology was quite 
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active amongst the Islamic thinkers until ninth and tenth Hijry 
(fifteenth and sixteenth A.C) century, and theologians such as 
– in Sunni school of thought – Fakhruddeen-al- Razi (d.1209, 
606 ah), Adhododdeen-al- Eyji (d.1355, 756 ah), Sa’addudeen-
al-Taftazani (d.1390, 792 ah), Mir Syed Shreef-al-Jorjani 
(d.1413, 816 ah), and in the shi’a school of thought theologians 
such as: Ibn Maytham-al-Bahrani (d.1279, 678 ah), Al-
Allamah-al-Hilli (d.1325, 726 ah), Al-Miqdad-al- See-u-ry 
(d.1423, 826 ah) and at last Mohammad Baqir-al- 
Majlesi,(1700, 1110 ah) can be mentioned as the most 
prominent theologian thinkers during the last centuries of the 
age of Islamic theology. (Mutahhari, 1991, pp. 467-661)  
The 11th century of Hijry (coincides the 17th century A.C) 
despite witnessing the last breaths of the classic Islamic 
theology, it accompanied some unique transformation of 
thoughts in Shi’a school of thought. On one hand –in the field 
of rational sciences-with the manifestation of Sadru-
lmota’alliheen Shirazi (d.1640, 1050 ah) and the 
establishment of his school of philosophy which called 
‘Hikmate Mota’aaliyeh The Transcendent Wisdom’, the field of 
Islamic Philosophical thought became over taken by this 
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philosophical movement, and philosophical currents of 
‘Masha’a’ and ‘Ishraq’ were gradually set aside. In this new 
philosophical thought Mysticism and philosophy on one hand, 
and the school of Ishraq and Mashsha’a on the other hand 
reconciled, and with an innovative philosophical plan of 
Sadru-lmota’alliheen the newly born school of ‘Hekmate 
Mota’aaliyeh Transcendent Wisdom’ took place. At the recent 
age the most well-known philosopher who defended and 
expended the Sadraian transcendant philosophy is Allama 
Mohammad Husain Tabataba’ei (d.1980, 1400 ah).  
On the other hand -in the field of narrative sciences- with the 
appearance of ‘Al-Akhbariyyoon Traditionist’ movement in the 
Shi’a school of thought by its founder Mulla Mohammad Amin 
Istaraabaadi (Istaraabadi, 1984 [d.1624, 1033 ah]) which 
opposed the rationalist method in the field of religious 
arguments, a new movement under the name of ‘Principlists 
Usooliyyoon’2 rose up and stood against Al-Akhbariyyoon 
Traditionists very strongly defending the rational method in 
                                                             
2The word Usooliyyoon is the plural of the word Usooli which means the expert in the principles of 
the Islamic jurisprudence .the knowledge of principles of jurisprudence discusses the method and 
principles of presumption and inference Islamic instructions and laws from its sources e.g. Qura’nic 
text and prophetic traditions. The current Usooliyyoon emerged in contrast with the current Al-
Akhbariyyoon who believed that there is no need of mediating any rational principles or method in 
the process of understanding Islamic instructions and laws. 
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religious arguments especially jurisprudence. Eventually the 
school of ‘Akhbariyyoon Traditionists was defeated by wahid 
Behbehani (Behbehani 1996 [d.1739, 1208 ah]) the leader of 
the Principlists Usooliyyoon Movement and the current of 
principlists Usooliyyoon who was a defender of rationalism 
completely took over the Shi’a school of thought (Al-Sadr, 
2000). 
With the domination of principlism over the Shi’a school of 
thought, and the spread of the science of ‘The Principles of 
Jurisprudence’ which resulted in exertion of the rational 
method, a new rival was appeared for the Philosophical 
current of thought in the Shi’a Islamic school. This new rival 
which was the science of ‘Modern Principles of Jurisprudence’ 
after the decline of Theologian thought was competently able 
to challenge the Modern Philosophical thought that had been 
manifested in Transcendent wisdom the ‘Philosophy of ‘Sadrul-
mota’alliheen’. The new science of ‘Principles of 
Jurisprudence’ was able to challenge the Modern Philosophical 
thought in various philosophical topics and also give a new 
warmth and mirth to the intellectual discussions.  
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One of the most controversial problems among Muslim 
philosophers and theologians that led to most heated debates 
between philosophers and theologians was causality, 
determinism, and their compatibility to freedom. With the 
decline of Theology, the intellectual discussion relating to 
these topics was close to being forgotten, until the appearance 
of the new science of ‘Principles of Jurisprudence’ and the 
‘Modern Principlists’ which caused a new controversial 
struggle in mentioned topics. The Modern Principlists started 
to criticise the philosophical views in many topics and 
suggested new ways to solve the philosophical problems in 
challenge to the philosophy of Sadrul-mota’alliheen ‘The 
transcendent Wisdom’.  
Among the modern usuliyyoon, Akhund Mulla Muhammad 
Kazim Khurasani (d.1911, 1329 ah) represents Sadraian 
Islamic thought. Defending the principles of ‘‘Sadraian 
philosophy’’, Akhund greatly supported the Sadraian view in 
the interpretation of causality and its relation to freedom. (Al 
Khurasani, 1992, pp. 337-8) 
On the other side, his intelligent and insightful pupil, i.e. Mirza 
Na’ini (d.1936, 1355 ah) was one of the strong critics of 
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Sadraian view. In a new way and method, he criticised the 
Sadraian philosophical thought and presented a new 
viewpoint on the relation between causality and human 
freedom. (Al Khoei, 1933, Vol. 1, pp. 91-92) 
Na‘ini’s idea was criticised by the great contemporary thinker 
and philosopher, the martyr Imam Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. 
Sadr established a new way to solve the problem of causality 
and freedom, through the theory of Saltanah, sovereignty 
(authority). (Al Hashimi, 1997, Vol. 2, pp. 32-37) 
On the ground of what I described, I will discuss the problem 
of causality and freedom in three parts: 
1. Freewill and causality in the contemporary Islamic 
philosophy3. In this part of my discussion, after 
explaining briefly the philosophical theory of Sadra on 
the relation between causality and freedom which I shall 
call later the theory of necessity (wujub) and also martyr 
Sadr’s theory of sovereignty (saltanah), I will compare 
these two theories with each other. I will also criticise 
and analyse them.  
                                                             
3 What I mentioned here are not all theories suggested by Muslim philosophers, but I mentioned only 
the theories which were adopted and followed by the recent most well-known Muslim thinkers and 
philosophers. 
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2. I will cover some viewpoints about the relation between 
freewill and causality in contemporary western 
philosophy compared with the mentioned theories in 
Islamic philosophy. 
3. Finally I will develop a further thesis about the solution 
of the problem between causality and freedom. 
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PART (2)  
FREEWILL AND CAUSALITY  
in  
THE CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are two main theories in contemporary Islamic 
philosophy that tried to solve the philosophical problem 
between causality and freewill in two different ways. The first 
theory, which is called the theory of (wujub) or necessity 
refers to the transcendent philosophy that was found by 
Sadrul- Muta’allihin (Sadra) and expanded by later 
In the contemporary Islamic thought regarding the debate of 
causality and free will, there are two different schools: 
1- The school of philosophers like Tabatabai and Mutahhari,  
2- The school of usooliyyoon like Na’ini who suggested the theory of 
Ikhtiyar(willing), and Al-Sadr who established the theory of 
Saltanah(Sovereignty).  
In this part of the study, I accounted the theory of Al-Sadr as a second 
philosophical theory conflicting with another philosophical theory of 
wojub (necessity) due to the following two reasons: 
1. Al-Sadr is a very famous philosopher in the recent era as well 
as having a high status among the usuliyyoon (the experts in 
principles of Islamic Jurisprudence). 
2. The rational and philosophical method used by Al-Sadr to 
support and prove his theory of Saltanah(Sovereignty). 
Also because the source of Al-Sadr’s theory, Saltanah(Sovereignty), 
was established by Na’ini(the main contemporary thinker in the field 
of principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) in his theory of Ikhtiar 
(willing), therefore it was important to discuss the theory of Ikhtiar 
as an entrance of the theory of Saltanah. 
 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
67 
 
philosophers, the latest being Allama Tabataba’ei (d.1980, 
1400 AH). 
The second theory, which is called the theory of (saltanah) 
refers to school of the martyr Al-Imam Mohammad Baqir Al-
Sadr one of the greatest contemporary Islamic philosophers 
and Jurisprudents. 
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A. THE THEORY OF NECESSITY 
(Sadra’s theory in the interpretation of 
causality and its relation to human freedom) 
 
Before explaining the theory of necessity, it is worth noting 
that the reason behind calling this theory the theory of 
necessity lies in the fact that according to this theory the 
relation between cause and effect is both the relation of 
existence and that of necessity. In other words: cause gives the 
effect not only existence, but it gives the effect both existence 
and necessity.  
The dispute between Muslim philosophers and theologians on 
all causes on the one hand and between philosophers and 
modern usuliyyoon on voluntary agent cause on the other 
hand does not concern bringing of the effect into existence by 
the cause, but rather granting necessity to the effect by the 
cause. According to the theory of necessity, the effect not only 
depends on the cause for its existence, but also for its 
necessity. 
The theory of necessity says that every possible object 
because of its possibility possesses essentially two equal 
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possibilities: to be and not to be, then it is impossible for any 
of these two to be the truth without being first the only 
possible option by its cause, and being the only possible 
option means negation of the possibility of any other option, 
which means the necessity of the only possible option. 
Therefore the cause has to first determine the effect by 
making it the only possible option that is to necessitate it, and 
then give it existence.  
Early theologians took the cause in a general sense and the 
mainstream of modern usuliyyoon take the voluntary agent in 
a particular sense just as the originator of the effect and not as 
the necessitating. 
To give a comprehensive account of ‘‘necessity’’ containing its 
philosophical grounds in Sadra’s view requires a long and 
broad discussion, which is beyond the scope of this short 
study. Here we are concerned with three subjects that we will 
study in the following order: 
3. Short explanation of “the theory of necessity’’ in Sadra’s 
thought. 
4. An account of the hypothesis of philosophical contradiction 
between this theory and the principle of freewill. 
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5. Method of philosophical solution of the above-mentioned 
contradiction according to Sadra and the theory of necessity. 
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1. Short Explanation Of The Theory Of Necessity 
 
According to the theory of asalat al-wujud (principality of 
existence) everything in our mind has two concepts: The 
concept of Nature or Quiddity, and the concept of 
Existence,(e.g. we can say: water is water and water is being, 
and because it is water we conceive it as a nature, and because 
it is being we conceive it as an existence) but in reality (in the 
world beyond our mind) we know that is not but one of two: 
either the concept of nature (e.g. water) or its being (e.g. its 
existence). Sadra approved that in contrast with these two 
concepts in our mind that is nothing in reality (in the world 
beyond our mind) but the existence, and the concept of nature 
(e.g. water) is just a concocted mental imagination, he 
concluded that the principality and reality is exclusively for 
the existence. According to that natures (quiddities) are 
conventions of our mind and what is really there is just 
‘‘being’’ or ‘‘existence’’. (Misbah, 1984, pp. 94-95) 
In other words, among all concepts and mental images, the 
only concept that can describe the external world and can 
genuinely represent the reality outside our mind is the 
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concepts of ‘‘being’’. Therefore, the key to know the universal 
laws and rules that can govern the universe is the universal 
principle of asalat al-wujud (The reality or the principality of 
existence). The general structure of philosophical knowledge 
of the world is based on this principle, from which the 
universal philosophical laws governing the world have to be 
derived.  
The most important philosophical principles of cosmology 
derived from asalat al-wujud are as follows: 
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A. Unmixed graduation (hierarchical structure) of 
being (tashkikul wujud) 
According to asalat al-wujud, the differences that we 
understand among things in the world are all rooted in their 
‘‘being’’ and can have no root other than the reality of being. 
Therefore, all things in the world differ in ‘‘being’’, just as they 
share ‘being’. 
The reality of being [in contrast to the concept of being] is a 
reality that admits differences and multiplicity of types, and 
every type of being is a level of being which is different from 
other beings in intensity or weakness, and unlimitedness or 
limitedness.  
 
Different types of being differ from each other in that one is 
weaker, that is, more dependent and more needy of causes 
and conditions to be existed and the other is more intense, 
that is, more independent and less needy. The differences of 
being in degrees of dependence on and need for the other 
which is the same as the difference in weakness and intensity 
is the source for all differences and varieties in the world. 
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The peak and the most intense being is the self-independent 
being, which is absolutely free from need, that is, the eternal 
self-necessary being. The self-necessary being has no need for 
any cause or condition and is the absolute being and enjoys 
the ultimate existential actuality. All other levels of being are 
manifestations of self-necessary being, on whom they entirely 
depend. Despite its total dependence on the self-necessary 
being, the first being created by the self-necessary being has 
no need to other levels of being and therefore in relation to 
other levels of being enjoys independence, freedom from need 
and absoluteness. Other levels of being depend for their 
existence on self-necessary being and on the first creatures as 
well, since through it the grace of being extends hierachially to 
other levels. Thus, the highest being is the completely actual 
independent absolute self-necessary being and the lowest is 
the being that has nothing other than potentiality of being – 
Which is actually yet to be created-. 
In his Mabda’wa Ma’aad, Mulla, Sadra says: 
“And beings do not differ in their essence except in intensity and 
weakness, perfection and imperfection, priority and post 
priority. But they subordinately differ because of those notions 
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that are subordinate to them, i.e. their different natures (He 
means that according to the theory of prinsipality of existence 
Asalatul-Wujud beings are not but existence, therefore there is 
no any essential deferent between them. Nevertheless they are 
subordinately deferent by their natures i.e. their notions” (1976, 
p. 194).  
Also in the discussion in potentiality and actuality in his Al-
asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arba’ah, Mulla Sadra says: 
“Surely the thing, which is liable to movement, is potential 
either in this aspect or in all aspects, and the mover is actual 
either in this aspect or in all aspects. Inevitably, those aspects 
of actuality will end in something, which is actual in all 
aspects; otherwise it would lead to vicious circle or infinite 
regress. Similarly, those aspects of potentiality will end in 
something, which is potential in all aspects except in being 
potential, since it has this potentially in actuality and this is 
what makes it distinguishable from absolute nothingness. So it 
is proved that there are two sides for the being: one side is the 
first real and the absolute being, May His name be glorified, 
and the other side is the materia prima. The former is 
absolutely good and the latter is bad and has nothing good 
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except subordinately. It is subordinately good; because it is 
the potentiality for all beings, in contrast nothingness, which is 
absolutely bad” ((ND), Vol. 3, p. 40). 
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B. Independent being and dependent being 
According to what was said earlier, the difference among 
beings is the difference in levels and degrees of existence 
starting with the self-necessary being and ending with the 
potential being. 
Reflection on the reality of ‘‘being’’ leads to the conclusion that 
apart from self-necessary being which itself is ‘‘the reality of 
being’’ and the peak of hierarchy of beings, other levels of 
beings have no reality other than belonging and relation to 
self-necessary being. Anything apart from the divine essence is 
nothing other than relation and belonging to him. 
Therefore, the universe of being consists in an independent 
and self-necessary being; other levels of being are His 
manifestations and belongings. Manifestations and belonging 
of necessary being or levels of dependent beings have no being 
without relation to the necessary being. If someone thinks that 
in addition to the source of the being which is the self-
necessary there are or may be other things that have reality 
more than belonging and relation to self-necessary being he 
has made a mistake and has not understood the reality of 
being and asalat al-wujud. 
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The being which essentially and by itself deserves existence is 
the self-necessary being which is the reality of being itself. 
From this necessary being, another being emerges which is 
His Amr (command) and is nothing other than relation to and 
dependence on him. This relational (dependent) and 
command-based being is just one, since it is originated by the 
Absolute One, it is not more than one (‘‘and our command is 
not but single’’- the Qur’an, chapter.54, verse.50), and since 
Divine grace is infinite and all relational (dependent) beings 
are simply relation (dependence), they have infinite degrees, 
each degree belongs to the upper one, and all of them (all 
degrees of relational (dependent) beings) are belonging and 
have pure relation to the One necessary being. Mulla Sadra 
says: 
“O, you who are seeking for the truth! The truth has 
appeared from this account that you have heard: the 
reality of being because of its simplicity and having no 
nature, no constituent and no limiting part, is the 
necessary being itself that appropriates ultimate and 
infinite perfection, since every other level of being lower 
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than that level in intensity is not absolute reality of 
being.” ((ND), Vol. 6, pp. 23-24) 
Else where he says: 
“Therefore, the effect by itself, since it is effect, has no reality 
other than pertaining and dependence and has no meaning 
other than being effect and subordinate, without having an 
essence subject to these meanings, as the absolutely 
originating cause has no essence and reality other than being 
the principle and source of everything and all relations and 
dependence go back to him. So if it is proved that the chain of 
beings -including both causes and effects- originates from an 
essence which a simple luminous primary existential reality 
free from multiplicity, deficiency, contingency, short coming 
and unclarity, free from anything accidental or additional to 
Him, internally or externally, and it is also proved that He is 
gracious by Himself and luminous by His reality and 
illuminating heavens and earth by His entity and the source of 
the universe of creation and command by His existence, the 
conclusion is that all beings have the same origin and are of 
the same kind which is reality and the rest is his affairs. He is 
the essence and the rest is His names and attributes. He is the 
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principle and the rest is His states and affairs. He is the being 
and the rest is His aspects and features.” (Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 300) 
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C. Cause and effect 
From what has been said before, the concepts of causation, 
cause and effect become clear. Cause is an independent being 
which has no need for its effect, originating and necessitating 
the effect. Effect is a totally dependent being which is nothing 
other than relation to and dependence on its cause and has no 
identity (i.e. independent reality) other than this. Causality is 
not apart from the essence of the effect and the cause. The 
essence of cause in the context of influence and origination is 
its causality and the effect itself is nothing other than causality 
in the context of receptivity. 
In a mental analysis, there are three concepts: 
1-the cause, i.e. the originator 
2- the effect, i.e. the originated 
3- causality, i.e. the origination. 
These three concepts can only be separated by a mental 
assumption or metaphor. They are not separable from each 
other even in the mind and with an intellectual analysis, 
except in an intellectual metaphor. In another word: these 
three concepts are not separable from each other. Any 
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separation is an intellectual construction for the purposes of 
understanding and not a statement about their reality.  
Cause, causality and effect are interrelated concepts that are 
not detachable from each other neither in reality nor in our 
understanding. Mulla Sadra says: 
“The effect by itself is a simple thing like the cause by itself and 
that is when the attention is limited to them. When we abstract 
the cause from what ever does not bear on its causation and 
influence, that is, when the cause is considered as such and when 
we abstract the effect from what ever does not bear on its 
causedness it becomes clear and certain that what is called as 
effect has no reality other than the reality of its originating 
cause so the intellect cannot refer to the entity of effect 
disregarding the entity of its originator. Therefore, the effect by 
itself has no reality in its causedness except that it is dependent 
and relational and has no meaning other than being an effect a-
subordinate without having an essence exposed to those 
meanings, just as in the case of the absolute originating cause 
being principle, source, origin and followed is the same as its 
essence.” (Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 229-300) 
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Causality in the way explained above implies certain 
principles and rules, whose denial would be equal to the 
denial of the principle of causality itself. The first principle 
implies that there is a necessary relation between cause and 
effect and that the cause necessitates the effect.. Mulla Sadra 
says: 
“Having proved that nothing contingent comes into existence 
without something making its existence outweighing its 
nothingness and does not become annihilated without 
something making its nothingness outweighing its existence, so 
both sides have to be preponderated by an external cause, now 
we say: that preponderator will not be preponderator unless its 
preponderance reaches the level of necessity. Therefore, unlike 
what most theologians have thought if the preponderance 
caused by an external cause does not reach the level of necessity 
it will not be sufficient for the existence of the contingent, 
because as long as the contingent conveys both possibilities it 
will not exist. Is this not the case that if its existence is not made 
necessary by something else its both existence and non-existence 
would be possible, so no side is determined and it would still 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
84 
 
need something to preponderate either existence or non-
existence.” (Ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 221-222) 
In this way, Mulla Sadra takes the principle of necessitation of 
effect as being a result of the principle of causality itself and 
consequently its denial to be identical with the denial of 
causality, because the principle of causality is based on need of 
the contingent for a cause that puts an end to the state of 
equality of both existence and non-existence, and as long as 
the cause does not necessitate its effect, it has not removed the 
state of equality. 
Principles such as (impossibility of separation of the effect 
from its cause) and (necessity of resemblance of cause and its 
effect in their generic reality) are some other important 
principles derived from the principle of causality. 
On the basis of asalat al-wujud, to conclude the above-
mentioned principles from the principle of causality is more 
obvious and more decisive. For example, to draw the 
necessary relation between cause and effect from the principle 
of causality on the basis of asalat ul-wujud a little reflection is 
enough to understand the concept of causality and necessity of 
originating effect by cause.  
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According to asalat al-wujud necessity is an inevitable 
implication of ‘being’ and all its levels, states and belongings. 
The essence of the first cause and whatever is created by it is 
being and necessity. The reality is nothing but the existence 
and the existed things are one of the two: either the essence of 
the existence itself that is the necessary existence, which is 
both self-subsistent, and the first cause, or the dependent 
existence, which is the dependence itself. Dependence on the 
self-subsistence is the essence of effect and also causation, 
influence generosity and graciousness of the first cause is its 
essence, so the necessity of the existence of the effect is the 
same as the essence on the one hand, and the same as the 
essence of the cause on the other hand. According to this fact, 
cause necessarily and essentially requires creation of effect 
and effect also necessarily and essentially requires 
dependence on cause and creation by cause. Thus, the 
principle of necessity of creation of effect by cause is a 
necessary and inevitable result of the principle of causality. 
(Ibid, Vol.2, pp. 229-300) 
Another important philosophical law, which is derived in the 
light of causality from asalat al-wujud, is the problem of 
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(criterion of need for a cause). This problem is one of the 
supreme problems discussed in Islamic philosophy and is 
exclusive to Islamic philosophy. Muslim theologians take non-
eternity (huduth) as the criterion of need for cause, that is, 
they believe the reason for having need for a cause is non-
being and then coming to be. Since the existence is preceded 
by non-existence, there must be a cause that led to this 
transition from nothingness into being.  
Muslim philosophers prior to Mulla Sadra developed strong 
arguments against the theory of theologians and proved that 
the non-eternity cannot be the reason for need, because it is 
possible to suppose a being which is eternal and at the same 
time in need of cause on which it eternally depends. 
Philosophers before Sadra held that the criterion is the 
contingency. In another words, the main reason for having 
need for a cause is the fact that the being by itself possesses no 
necessity for existence and no necessity for non-existence and 
has equal relation to both existence and non-existence.  
This logically results in the necessary relation of effect to 
cause, because as mentioned above as long as the main reason 
of need for cause is contingency (non- necessity of existence 
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and non- necessity of non-existence), what the cause of 
existence has to grant the effect is necessity of existence and 
what the cause of nothingness has to grant is the necessity of 
nothingness. 
Mulla Sadra in his excellent studies viewed the theory of his 
predecessors imperfect and appropriate for the universe of 
natures. In his studies, he proved that when we consider the 
relation between nature of something and existence or non-
existence the view of previous philosophers is true, because 
nature of a contingent being has equal relation to both 
existence and non-existence and none of them is necessary for 
it. Therefore, to become existent and non-existent it needs a 
cause that grants necessity of existence or necessity of non-
existence to it. 
However, according to asalat ul-wujud and subjectivity of 
nature, what is created by the cause is the existence of effect. 
Existence has no equal relation to existence and non-
existence, so the view of previous philosophers cannot be true. 
Therefore, the criterion of need of being of effect for cause is 
not the equal relation of existence and non-existence to the 
existence of effect or contingency. The criterion is (existential 
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poverty) or in other words (dependence or relationality of 
existence). If we reflect on the existence of effect we will find it 
dependent and subordinate. This dependence and non-self 
subsistence have made the effect in need of the cause. 
Therefore, need for cause is the same as the essence of effect 
and identified with its existence.  
As mentioned earlier, the essential dependence of effect on its 
cause results in the necessary relation between cause and 
effect. According to this philosophical analysis, the essence of 
effect is inseparable result and outcome of the essence of 
cause and impossibility of separation of effect from cause is 
another expression of (necessitation of effect) by cause. 
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2. An Account of Hypothesis of Philosophical 
Contradiction Between The Theory of Necessity 
and Freewill 
Early theologians and modern usooliyyoon who seriously 
oppose the theory of necessity or necessitation of effect by 
cause or in other words the necessary relation of cause and 
effect take this theory in conflict with freewill and believe that 
even if we accept its truth in respect of non-voluntary causes, 
it cannot be accepted in respect of voluntary causes, because 
voluntariness of an act in voluntary causes contradicts 
necessity of that act and since voluntariness of acts in 
voluntary causes is admitted necessity of effect in voluntary 
causes must be wrong.  
To explain the alleged philosophical contradiction between 
the theory of necessity and freedom or free-will in the case of 
voluntary agents we will clarify the main point of 
contradiction analysing briefly two sides of the alleged 
conflict: 
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A. Causality 
If we limit the principle of causality to need of effect in its 
existence for a cause and consider the effect as something that 
depends in its existence on the originator there seems no 
contradiction between causality and freewill, because in the 
first sight it seems possible to have something dependent on 
something else without any necessary relation between them. 
This means that cause would have equal relation to existence 
and non-existence of its effect and effect would remain 
contingent and unnecessary. This type of relation between 
voluntary cause and effect is in accordance with the viewpoint 
of early theologians and modern usooliyyoon. In this way, 
there would be no contradiction between causality of a 
voluntary agent and his freedom and free will.  
However, as discussed earlier, causality in the way presented 
by philosophers such as Mulla Sadra cannot be limited to the 
existential relation between cause and effect. It rather involves 
necessary relation as well. Existence and necessity of the effect 
are not separable. Cause cannot bring the effect into existence 
without necessitating it; otherwise it would lead to groundless 
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preponderance and we know that impossibility of such 
preponderance is the basis of the principle of causality. 
The core of the alleged conflict between causality and freewill 
is the very necessitation of effect by cause. It has been 
assumed that if the existence of effect is preceded by necessity 
of existence there would remain no place for freewill. In other 
words, freewill or freedom is only possible when the effect has 
the possibility of both being originated and not originated by 
the cause. Necessitation of effect is equal to determinism. And 
contingency and freewill in one side and necessity and 
determinism in another side are not separable from each 
other. 
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B. Freewill 
There are three elements involved in every voluntary (free) 
act: 
a. prerequisites of willing the act; 
b. willing the act; 
c. the act itself. 
There are two relations between these three: the relation 
between a and b and between b and c. 
It is usually assumed that after the completion of all factors 
bearing on the existence of voluntary act its existence 
becomes necessary as soon as the agent wills it. Thus, there is 
a necessary relation between willing the act and the act itself.  
Not only there is not conflict between this necessary relation 
(between act and will of the agent) and freewill, but also there 
can be no freewill without this necessary relation. To suppose 
that there can be will of agent and all requisites without 
having the act would contradict the free-will and power of the 
agent. For the same reason, it seems that the dispute between 
philosophers and modern usooliyyoon (and also some early 
theologians) mostly concerns the first relation, i.e. the relation 
between prerequisites of willing the act and willing the 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
93 
 
issuance of act from the voluntary agent and not the relation 
between act and the will. Modern usooliyyoon and some early 
theologians believe that if relation between willing the act in 
the voluntary agent and its prerequisites is necessary there 
would be no free-will and it would result in absolute 
determinism.  
In any case, the debate between the philosophers and their 
opponents on the necessary relation of cause and effect can be 
conceived in both aspects of the relation of a voluntary act to 
its prerequisites, i.e. the relation of the essence of act and will 
of the agent and the relation of will of the agent and 
prerequisites of its existence.  
Among modern usooliyyoon, Mirza Na’ini (d.1935, 1355 A.H) 
distinguished four main elements in a voluntary act: 
1- Prerequisites of will 
2- Will (iradah) 
3- Decision (ikhtiyar) 
4- Essence of the act. 
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He meant by ikhtiyar (decision) the instant movement of the 
soul towards the act (the embarking of the soul on the act) and 
took it as a result of iradah, will4.  
Mirza Na’ini takes the first two elements to be involuntary 
subject to the necessary relation of cause and effect, but he 
takes the third element, i.e. ikhtiyar which sits in between will 
and the act to be outside the domain of cause-effect necessity. 
He takes this to be the key point in voluntariness of act. (Al 
Khoei, 1933, p. 91) 
In any case, for Muslim philosophers, especially for Mulla 
Sadra, the relation of a voluntary act to its prerequisites 
(iradah (will) or ikhtiyar) and the relation of iradah (will) to 
its prerequisites is a relation of necessity and the principle of 
necessary relation of cause and effect is exceptionless. Mulla 
Sadra says: 
                                                             
4This sequence would appear to be similar to that outlined by some European writers on theology:  
A. Sufficient pre-requisites for the intention.  
B. Articulation of the intention. 
C. Sufficient circumstances to allow the intention to be effected. 
D. Effecting of the intention (the act). 
E. Consequence of effecting the act. 
Human will would seem to be a major factor in the movement a to b and from c to d. 
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“The criterion for willingness (voluntariness) is to have the will 
as the cause for the act or non-act. And surely a willing agent is 
the one that if he wills he act and if he does not will he does not 
act, even if the will [itself] is necessitated by itself or by the other 
or is impossible by itself or by the other”. ((ND), Vol. 6, p.319) 
Modern usooliyyoon believe that the relation between 
voluntary act and its prerequisites is by no means a necessary 
and determined one and that the cause-effect necessity does 
not include the relation between the voluntary act and its 
prerequisites. Therefore, even if all prerequisites of a 
voluntary act were available the act still would not be 
necessary to be issued by the voluntary agent and it still 
remains contingent. This contingency or the possibility of 
acting and not acting or the equal relation of the agent to act 
and non-act is the core of will and voluntariness in a voluntary 
agent.  
Na’ini says:  
“If you say: is the fourth idea on which you built al-amr bayn al-
amrayn (the state between two states) and the negation of 
determinism and made it something between the will and the 
movement of the muscles contingent or necessary? No way to 
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the last one, and on the first is its cause voluntary or non-
voluntary? The first one results in infinite series, and the second 
one results in determinism. I would say: No doubt, it is created 
and contingent, but it is the ikhtiyar itself, an act of the soul and 
the soul itself bears on its existence, so there is no need for a 
necessitating cause whose effect is never detached from it, 
because causality of this type is only there for non-voluntary 
acts” (Al Khoei, 1933, p. 91) 
Some modern usooliyyoon have noticed a problem here and 
tried to solve it. The problem is that if after completion of all 
prerequisites of a voluntary act including the will itself the act 
still remains unnecessary (i.e. possible to be or not to be) it 
would imply denial of power and will of the agents since the 
will of the agent would have no role in the emergence of the 
act and origination of the act falls out of agent’s power. 
Therefore, if ikhtiyar is taken to mean contingency and 
unnecessity of existence and non-existence it would imply 
negation of ikhtiyar. 
To respond to this problem usooliyyoon have distinguished 
between two types of necessity:  
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a. The necessity prior to ikhtiyar, i.e. the necessity which is 
source of decision or in other words necessity of cause of 
ikhtiyar. 
b. Necessity after ikhtiyar, i.e. the necessity whose source is 
ikhtiyar or in other words the necessary relation between 
ikhtiyar itself and its effect: the voluntary act. They maintain 
that the former is logically in conflict with ikhtiyar and they 
reject it (i.e. the necessity prior to ikhtiyar) but not only they 
accept the latter, but also they take it to be necessary, because 
there will be no ikhtiyar without it and there is no conflict 
between necessity which is caused by ikhtiyar and the ikhtiyar 
itself. 
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3. Philosophical Solution Of Contradiction Between 
(Necessitating Causation) And (Free-Will) 
According To Sadra And The Theory Of Necessity 
The solution relies on three main points: 
a. To distinguish between necessity and determinism and 
between contingency and free-will. According to Sadra, critics 
of the theory of necessity have failed to distinguish between 
ikhtiyar (free-will) and contingency or between determinism 
and necessity and therefore they have thought that necessary 
relation of cause and effect would lead to determinism, so to 
deny determinism which is against our intuition and rational 
arguments one has to deny the theory of necessity. However, 
necessity does not imply determinism and has no conflict with 
ikhtiyar (free-will), just as contingency does not mean ikhtiyar 
(free-will) and entails not voluntariness of the act. 
Necessity and contingency are two mental concepts that are 
abstracted by mind from the relation between the thing and 
existence, while determinism and free-will are two real 
qualities attributable to the act and existing outside of the 
mind. 
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Acts of a voluntary agent are characterised as necessary 
whether or not they are voluntary, because if the voluntary 
agent is a self-necessary existent (i.e. God) his acts also are 
necessary and if he is self-contingent he and his acts are 
necessary by the other. Therefore, voluntariness does not 
imply contingency, just as necessity does not imply 
determinism. 
 
b. The reality of free-will and freedom consists in choosing out 
of consent and not under an external force imposing a 
disagreeable choice. Accordingly, every act arising from 
agent’s consent that is not chosen because of an imposing 
external factor is a free and voluntary act. Therefore, the main 
criterion for voluntariness is not contingency or possibility; 
rather it is the consent of the agent and lack of an imposing 
external factor. 
Mulla Sadra says: 
“When the source of originating something is knowledge and 
will of the agent, whether knowledge and will are the same or 
different and whether knowledge and will are the same as the 
essence of the agent in the case of God or different in other 
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cases, the agent is voluntary and the act is issued from the agent 
because of his will, knowledge and consent. Such agent is not 
called by the public or by the elite ‘‘involuntary agent’’. Neither 
its act is said to be issued out of determinism, though it is 
necessarily issued from the agent out of his will and knowledge”. 
((ND), Vol. 6, p. 332) 
What was mentioned above was concerning the criterion of 
voluntary (free) act. The criterion for qualifying a voluntary 
agent as a free agent is that whenever he wills he acts and 
whenever he does not will he does not act. According to this 
definition, it makes no difference whether the agent 
necessarily or unnecessarily wills, because truth of conditional 
proposition is compatible with the necessity of the condition 
or the conditioned. Therefore, although will of the agent is 
subject to the principle of necessary relation of cause and 
effect and its realisation or non-realisation is necessary, the 
agent is still voluntary and enjoys complete freedom. 
When the voluntary killer fires a shot and kills a man we 
describe his action as a free action although his will or 
decision was necessitated by prerequisites, because the 
freedom of his action depends on his satisfaction and pleasure 
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which is manifested through his will, and it does not 
contradict the necessity of will and its prerequisites.  
Mulla Sadra rejects the theologians’ definition of the free agent 
as the one who may act or not (possibility of alternative). This 
definition implies the possibility of voluntary act. He says: 
“There are two well-known definitions for power, al-qudrah 
(freedom or willingness): First, possibility of act and its opposite, 
i.e. non-act, and second a state for the agent in which he acts if 
he wills and does not act if he does not will. The first 
interpretation belongs to theologians and the second to 
philosophers”. (Ibid, vol. 6, p. 307) 
He also says: 
“The criterion for willingness (Freedom) is to have the will as 
the cause for the act or non-act. And surely a willing agent is the 
one that if he wills he acts and if he does not will he does not act, 
even if the will [itself] is necessitated by itself or by the other or 
is impossible by itself or by the other”. (Ibid, Vol. 6, p. 319) 
c. A voluntary act is one, the existence of which derives from 
the free-will of the agent but free-will itself is voluntary in 
essence, that by definition. Voluntariness of free-will is not 
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separable from it, though the free-will may be caused by 
causes which are the origins of the necessity of its existence. In 
other words, the fact that ikhtiyar (free-will) itself is governed 
by the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect and 
its existence is necessitated by its cause does not turn it into 
non-ikhtiyar (non-freewill)…Ikhtiyar (free-will) is ikhtiyar 
(free-will) by definition, whatever its cause might be and 
however it is issued from its cause. 
On the basis of the above three points, there is no conflict 
between free-will and the principle of necessity. Although the 
act of the voluntary agent is subject to the principle of 
necessity and the will of the agent becomes necessary after the 
completion of prerequisites, the act of the voluntary agent is 
free because it derives from his will. 
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Objections on the theory of necessity 
a. This theory is counter-intuitive in feeling that both sides of 
the act even after the completion of all prerequisites are still 
equal to us as voluntary agents. We feel no necessity. This can 
be replied by saying that it is indeed an essential feature of 
ikhtiyar (free will) that at no stage the agent feels compelled 
or forced from outside, but this does not mean that his 
decisions are made arbitrarily and are not subject to any 
rational rules. 
b. Saying that our feeling of equality between both sides of the 
act is indeed an essential feature of free will (ikhtiyar), doesn’t 
solve the problem that is the contrast between free will and 
necessity, if our feeling of equality is right then both sides of 
act must be equal for us, but it is opposing the necessity of the 
action. On the other hand if the necessity is ruling our action 
then the equality of the both sides action or non-action is 
really incorrect. 
c. If our will and decision and all prerequisites are subject to 
the principle of cause-effect necessity how can we justify 
Divine reward and punishment. This very known objection is 
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asserted by Imam Fakhr Al Deen Al Razi (Al Razi, 1966, Vol. 1, 
p. 481) 
The answer to this is that in any case our acts are voluntary 
and this is rationally enough to make Divine reward and 
punishment just. There is no evidence in our reason or 
conscience that demands ikhtiyar (free will) itself must be 
voluntary.  
The other way to answer is to say that voluntariness of acts 
depends on their emergence from a voluntary agent (an agent 
that has ikhtiyar –freewill), but voluntariness of ikhtiyar 
(freewill) is essential and cannot be removed. Even if a 
superior cause originates ikhtiyar (free will) it cannot remove 
its voluntariness. Thus, ikhtiyar (free will) is ikhtiyar (free 
will), even if it is necessarily brought into existence by its 
cause. The essence of ikhtiyar (free will) (like any other thing) 
neither can be given to it nor can it be negated. Therefore, a 
voluntary act is voluntary, though all its prerequisites are 
governed by the principle of causal necessity, and has all the 
characteristics of voluntary acts, such as appropriateness of 
reckoning and punishment.  
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But it can be said: although the agent does his action by his 
volition, since it is caused necessarily, the agent has no choice 
to do other option or alternative, then he is not really free and 
can not be responsible for his act. 
 
In other words, if the meaning of Ikhtiyar (free will) is 
selection of an option from other options facing the agent, 
where the selection takes place through the above cause using 
necessitation and causal necessitation, then the responsibility 
of the agent and the value of reward or punishment or 
appraisal or scolding will be of no use.  
And if Ikhtiyar (free will) means only the prerequisites which 
enable the agent to choose one option among a variety of 
options without the special causal necessitation of a particular 
option (i.e. equal contingency of all options until the last 
instant before the existence of the act) then it entails 
abandoning the necessity and returning to other theories such 
as Na’ini or Sadr’s who entirely denied the causal 
necessitation of act of voluntarian agent. 
The causal necessitation of the voluntary act results in the 
offender of the criminal behaviour being dominated by the 
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previous determinant cause which necessitates his criminal 
act. If the previous cause had necessitated the will for good act 
in the offender, decent behaviour would have been the 
resultant of the causal necessitation.  
Now, considering this fact, we are facing one of the following 
two ways to either accept the causal necessitation of 
voluntarian act whether bad or immoral or good or moral, in 
which case the praise or the scolding, if any, will be directed 
towards the above causes and that cause has created the will 
for good act or bad act through causal necessitation in the 
agent and not towards the present agent who had no role but 
the accomplishment of the act. The other way is to abandon 
the causal necessitation of the agent’s will and believe in the 
issue of both “to act” and “not to act”, which results in the 
equal contingency of both “to act” and “not to act”, and thus 
one must think of justifying the issue of the act from the agent 
despite the equal possibilities of both “to act” and “not to act”.  
Tabatabai’s solution to the problem 
To solve the out-world confliction between causal law and 
freedom, Allamah Tabatabai suggests the distinction between 
“relative necessity” and “relative contingency”. He says: 
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“The effect in comparison with its full {complete} cause is 
relative necessary. This relative necessity is the same as causal 
necessity. But the effect is not relative necessary in comparison 
with the partial cause like solely agent cause, because the 
partial cause does not necessitate the effect. When only one part 
of cause (partial cause) is provided without the other parts of 
cause, the effect will not be existed, but if the other parts of 
cause joined it, then it would be existed and if the other parts did 
not join then the effect will not be existed. Consequently man as 
an agent is solely a part of cause for his action, then the relation 
between man and his act is contingent relation, not necessary; 
and because of this reason man feels himself as a free agent 
possessing free will.” (Tabatabai, 1998, pp. 156-158) 
Therefore there is no conflict between necessitation of 
determined causal law and man’s free will, because the 
necessitation of causal law is between full cause and the effect, 
whilst the free will is related to the man who is the agent 
cause which is the partial cause not full cause. The 
philosophical problem of the conflict between the 
necessitation of causal law and the free will of man as an agent 
cause wouldn’t be solved by the above explanation because 
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the problem is between the prior necessity which is the source 
of the agent’s will and his free will, whilst Tabatabai’s 
explanation focused on the later necessity which derived from 
the agent’s will. This suggestion does not imply further than 
the principle of “there is no conflict between necessity which 
is caused by free will (ekhtiar) and the free will (ekhtiar) 
itself” but the main problem here is the confliction between 
agent’s free will on one hand and the prior necessity which 
derived from the preconditioned cause, on the other hand.  
 
Mutahhari’s solution to the problem 
The Martyr Allamah Mutahhari, has suggested another route 
to resolve this complication. The summary of his theory is as 
follows:  
There is a variety of chains of cause and effect, dominated by 
causal determinism. Man has the choice to select over a 
variety of chains of cause and effect. Man can place himself in 
the route of definite chain of cause and effect that will lead to 
good behaviour and consequently worldly prosperity and 
divine rewards. And he can also place himself in the route of a 
chain of cause and effect that will pull him towards bad 
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behaviour, crime and misery, and consequently worldly 
desolation and divine punishment. Therefore despite the 
comprehensiveness of the determined causal law including 
the behaviour of man, it is not in contradiction with the 
Ikhtiyar (free will) and the will power of man, since man is 
facing a variety of choices and options and can mark a suitable 
destiny through choosing any of them. 
Martyr Allamah Mutahhari says:  
“The difference between man and the fire that burns, the water 
that drowns, the plant that grows and even the animal that 
walks is that none of them can choose their act and 
characteristic from a variety. However man can choose. He is 
always facing a number of acts and ways and the certitude of an 
act or way is only dependent upon his personal decision.” 
(Mutahhari, 1966 p.42) 
This saying of the Martyr Allamah Mutahhari is not 
instrumental in solving the conflicting issue due to the fact 
that the complication lies within the choice and Ikhtiyar (free 
will) of man. The question is: is the decision or the agent’s will 
issued by chance and without a determining cause? If this is 
so, then what does the comprehensiveness of determined 
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causal law mean? And if the comprehensiveness of the 
determined causal law and the preponderance without a 
preponderant is definite and without an exception, then man 
is alongside the chain of cause and effect and he is not free in 
what he chooses. In fact, it is a deterministic superior cause 
that will push man towards choosing an option and man 
cannot free himself from the deterministic influence of this 
superior cause and therefore, the freedom of man is nothing 
but a delusion. 
From what was said, all the descriptions and justification 
introduced by all the major philosophers for the theory of 
necessitation to solve the conflict between “freedom” and 
“causality” is not enough since with regards to the 
comprehensiveness and unexceptionable law of the causal 
necessitation and its dominance over the voluntary act over all 
its preparations, there will not be any more justifications for 
the freedom and Ikhtiyar (freewill) of man. As a philosophical 
predicament the problem of the freedom of man is still 
awaiting an acceptable intellectual and philosophical 
justification that can explain the accountability of man and the 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
111 
 
intellectual decency of praise and reward over scolding and 
punishment and criminal offence. 
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B. THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 
(in the interpretation of causality and its relation to free will) 
Mirza Na’ini (d.1935, 1355 ah), one of the founders of modern 
principles of jurisprudence, was the first one to develop and 
defend this theory. According to an exposition of the lectures 
of Na’ini (Ajwad al-Taqrirat), this theory can be traced back to 
Mirza Mohammad Taqi Isfehani (d.1832, 1248 ah) the author 
of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin (a commentary work on Maa’lam 
Al-Usul). After Na’ini, our greater master, the martyr Sadr, 
reconstructed this theory to meet the problems raised against 
the theory and, in an innovative way, developed it and called it 
‘‘the theory of sovereignty’’. In what follows we will briefly 
present the ideas of Na’ini and then will focus on the theory of 
sovereignty (authority). 
Na’ini starts his argument with two common sense laws that 
both can be affirmed after a short reflection: 
First Law: Will (iradah) of the free agent itself is not 
voluntary. Reflecting on the process of decision-making inside 
ourselves, we realise that after conceiving the act and 
affirming its benefit our will automatically comes into 
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existence. Will is an inevitable outcome of conceiving the act 
and affirming its benefit. Na’ini says: 
“Surely, all those qualities that belong to the soul such as will, 
conception and affirmation are not voluntary.” (Al Khoei, 1933, 
Vol. 1, p. 91) 
In respect to God, it can be demonstrated that His will is not 
voluntary, because his essence is simple and free from any 
attribute accidental and additional to it. Therefore, "will" can 
not be accidental to His essence, since it is in conflict with the 
simplicity of the essence. Will of God is identical with His 
essence and this implies that the Divine will is essential and it 
is self-evident that essential attributes are not voluntary. We 
find in an exposition of Na’ini’s lectures that: 
“Surely the will that is the complete cause of the existence of the 
effects is the same as His essence, and self-evidently His essence, 
the Exalted and the Glorified is not voluntary for Him.” (Ibid) 
Second Law: Human soul (mind) has complete sovereignty 
and authority upon its voluntary acts. In other words, man 
always feels very clearly that has complete power to make his 
decisions regarding his voluntary acts. Na’ini says: 
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“Surely, the soul has complete effect and authority on muscles 
without facing any obstacle in exercising its sovereignty.” (Ibid) 
Na’ini concludes that there must be something between the 
will (iradah) and act. He calls this element ‘‘ikhtiyar’’ or 
‘‘talab’’ [to seek]. Ikhtiyar is an act of soul that takes place after 
the formation of iradah (will) and its prerequisites. In this 
way, Na’ini argues for his position and adds that it is the only 
solution for the well-known objection of Fakhr al-Razi, who 
asserted that voluntariness of an act implies its 
involuntariness, since voluntariness of an act means to be 
caused by the will, but the will itself is determined by causes 
that produce it necessarily. Na’ini responds to this objection 
by saying that the voluntary act is not caused by the will; 
rather it is caused by something, which occurs between the 
will and act, i.e. ikhtiyar (or talab) [to seek]. Ikhtiyar is not 
caused by the will: it is originated from the essence of the soul 
(mind). 
Na’ini believes that there is no necessary relation between 
ikhtiyar and the soul. Human soul in making ikhtiyar just 
needs some preponderating factor (the human soul alone is 
insufficient to make ikhtiyar). For this it would suffice that the 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
115 
 
agent pursues an end or goal in the act. (Al khoei, 1933, Vol. 1, 
p. 92) 
There are many objections to Na’ini’s theory. First, the 
difference between iradah (will) and ikhtiyar (to seek) is not 
clear. If the ikhtiyar can escape cause-effect necessity why 
cannot iradah do this?  
Second, Na’ini has not solved the problem in relation to the 
Divine acts, because ikhtiyar also cannot be additional to His 
essence and according to Na’ini himself the Divine essence is 
not voluntary for God. Now the question is: Does Na’ini believe 
that Divine acts are not voluntary?! How does he then treat 
decisive and certain belief in His power and His willingness?  
Third, is ikhtiyar or talab, which is the basis of Na’ini’s theory 
on voluntariness of acts contingent or necessary? Na’ini does 
not accept its necessity and takes it to be contingent. 
Therefore, it must have equal relations to both existence and 
non-existence and according to the law of impossibility of 
preference without a preponderate; it would be impossible for 
ikhtiyar to exist. There is no solution for this problem in 
Na’ini’s account.  
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Sadr and the theory of Sovereignty 
The difficulties in Na’ini’s theory led Sadr to reconstruct the 
theory and revive Na’ini’s claim with a new argument. To 
develop his theory of sovereignty Sadr first mentions some 
premises:  
First premise: Equal relation of act to existence and non-
existence is a clear fact that no argument can disprove. Every 
one of us clearly feels that after the completion of all 
prerequisites he still may or may not act. This is something 
that we understand clearly by our intuition and no argument 
can bring it into question.  
Second premise: Necessity of prerequisites of an act leads to 
denial of free-will (because it implies that the agent hasn’t had 
any choice of his action) and philosophers’ answers are not 
able to solve the problem. Their answers are just some 
linguistic justifications (such as saying that ikhtiyar means the 
agent’s consent or that the voluntary agent is the one that acts 
whenever he is willing and does not act whenever he is willing 
to do so) that cannot solve the conflict between reality of 
necessity and reality of ikhtiyar. Because the truth of this 
conditional proposition (the agent acts whenever he wants, 
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and does not act whenever he doesn’t want) doesn’t lead to 
the freewill of the voluntary agent, what would that lead to is 
the deliverance of the agent’s action or non-action from the 
necessary or determined influence of another factor, which is 
not concluded by the theory of (Necessary). (Al Hashimi, 
1997, Vol. 2, p. 32) 
Third premise: The principle of causality is not demonstrated 
(neither empirically nor rationally)5.  
So it cannot be said that it cannot have any exception, because 
it is rationally proved. This principle is indeed an intuitive and 
evident principle. To find the scope and extent of it we have to 
investigate its origins in our conscience (intuition). (Al 
Hashimi, 1997, Vol. 2, p. 36 & Al Ha’iri handwriting, p. 418) 
Based on the above premises, he argues that rationally any 
contingent being to come into existence needs an external 
factor. This factor can be either a cause that necessitates its 
existence or a voluntary agent that makes the act by his 
sovereignty. Having such an agent besides the act does 
                                                             
5In his book logical foundations of induction he criticised both empirical and rational 
demonstration of the principle of causality. He said: “we suggest that if rationalism is to 
defend the causal principle as a priori, it should claim that the principle is an ultimate 
(initial) proposition in the mind, instead of saying it is logically deduced from ultimate 
(initial) principles” (1993, p. 48) 
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rationally justify its existence. It is certain that the essential 
contingency does not suffice the existence of something. 
However, there might be something other than necessity that 
prefer the existence of a contingent being, such as sovereignty.  
Definition of Sovereignty 
Sovereignty or saltanah is an internal quality that we all 
understand. It is what we know by presence (‘ilm hodhoori). 
To conceptualise it we can use the expression: “The state that 
the agent could act or not act” . There is no necessity to act or 
not to act.  
Sovereignty is similar to any of necessity and contingency 
from one aspect and different from each from the other. 
Sovereignty is similar to necessity in being rationally enough 
to justify the existence of a contingent being and leaving no 
need to look for something else. The difference between 
sovereignty and necessity is that with necessity an act loses its 
equal relations to existence and non-existence and necessity of 
existence takes its place, while with sovereignty the 
contingency remains the same. Necessity consists in the fact 
that the agent has to act or not to act, but sovereignty means 
that the agent may or may not act. 
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In other word: With necessity after the completion of all 
prerequisites the agent has no choice to act or not to act and 
he has to do what the prerequisites result in, whereas with 
sovereignty despite the completion of all prerequisites the 
agent still remains having choice to act or not to act.  
Sovereignty is similar to contingency in preserving the equal 
relations of the contingent to both existence and non-
existence, but sovereignty is different from contingency in 
being rational and sufficient to justify the existence of a 
contingent being while with contingency the questions 
remains why it must come into existence.  
Having known that the sovereignty of the agent may 
substitute necessity and suffice the existence of a voluntary act 
which is the question at issue, reflection on our intuition and 
the way voluntary acts are issued from us shows clearly that 
the relation between us and our voluntary acts is one of 
sovereignty and not necessity. We as voluntary agents find 
that we have sovereignty upon our acts. We clearly 
understand the fact that even in circumstances in which all 
prerequisites and conditions of a voluntary act exist, it is not 
necessary to act. What we find deep in ourselves is this 
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sovereignty upon our acts. It is up to us to act or not to act and 
we are not compelled to do so.  
(Al Hashimi, 1997, Vol. 2, p. 37 & Al Ha’iri handwritings, 
pp.419-420) 
Evaluation 
The theory of Na’ini as explained above seems to suffer fatal 
problems. It seems also that the martyr Sadr’s theory of 
sovereignty despite its beauties and firmness still has very 
important problems. Of course, this does not mean that 
Sadra’s theory of necessity is free from fundamental problems. 
In what follows, I will explain problems of both theories of 
Sadr and Sadra. 
  
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
121 
 
Objections on the Theory of Sovereignty 
a. Granted that Sovereignty suffices the existence of the act, 
would that also suffice its non-existence as well? If so, the 
problem would be that it leads to having both the existence 
and non-existence of the act at the same time. And if not it 
would mean that the non- existence of the act must be 
impossible and its existence must be necessary, because non-
sufficiency of sovereignty for non-existence and its sufficiency 
for existence damage the state of equality of existence and 
non-existence in the essence of the contingent and change 
contingency into the necessity of existence.  
b. To interpret sovereignty as “could act or not act, or may or 
may not act” is just a linguistic account that does not solve the 
real problem. In any case, with sovereignty the existence of the 
act as a contingent effect either remains possible or becomes 
necessary. If it remains possible, the question still remains 
why will it exist? Why did not contingency suffice the 
existence of the act in the first place? If it becomes necessary 
the problem with the theory of necessity would repeat. 
c. The principle of impossibility of preponderance without a 
preponderating factor has no exception because its reason has 
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not any exception. The reason of this impossibility is that the 
essence of every contingent is lack of necessary existence or 
non-existence which is resulted in the essential equality of 
existence and non-existence. Therefore if the sovereignty 
prefers the existence of agent action it would entail its 
inequality which means the necessity of existence, and if it 
does not then the impossibility of preponderance with out a 
preponderating factor makes the existence of agent act 
impossible.  
d. What is the meaning of (sufficiency) in saying that the 
sovereignty is sufficient for the existence of a voluntary act? 
Sadr, uses the expression “could act or not act, or may or may 
not act”. If it means possibility of existence the problem is that 
this is something which has been already there, and if it means 
necessity the problem is that this is the same idea involved in 
the theory of necessity. 
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PART (3)  
FREE WILL AND CAUSALITY in 
CONTEMPORARY WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophical theories in contemporary western thought can be categorised 
in three main currents: 
1- Libertarianism, which is described as incompatibilism for its belief 
that the determination of causal laws negates the freewill meaning 
they are incompatible, and because the free will is a very obvious 
fact it cannot be overcome by determined causal laws. There are 
many explanations of this type of thought in current western 
philosophy, but I have chosen three important theories that I believe 
they provide the best clarification and deduction, they are: 
a. Agent causation or immanent causation that was suggested 
by Rodrick Chisholm, this theory can be compared to the 
theory of sovereignty of Al-Sadr in contemporary Islamic 
philosophy. 
b. Simple indeterminism that was suggested by Carl Ginet, 
which can be compared to the theory of Na’ini in Islamic 
contemporary thought. 
c. Causal indeterminism, suggested by Robert Kane, it can also 
be compared to the mentioned theory of sovereignty. 
2- Hard Determinism which agrees with libertarianism in the 
incompatibility of freewill with causal laws, but opposes it in freewill 
of agents. Hard Determinism believes there is no chance of freewill 
of agents because all agents are governed by determined causal 
factors. Several thinkers and philosophers adapted this kind of 
explanation of relation between causal determined law and human 
will, among them Paul Edwards gave a very clear expression of this 
idea. 
3- Soft Determinism, that disagrees with both libertarianism and Hard 
Determinism, and believes in compatibility of causal determined law 
and freewill and alleges that not only there are not any conflicts 
between causal law and freewill but rather freewill cannot be 
emerged without the comprehensive causal law. Most philosophers 
in both Islamic philosophy and western philosophy inclined to this 
current of thoughts like Farabi, Avecina, Mulla Sadra, Tabatabai in 
Islamic Philosophy, and Thomas Habbes, David Hume, John Stuart 
Mail and A.J. Ayer in western philosophy. Here I chose the 
explanation of Ayer for its demonstrative clearness to show an 
example of this tendency of contemporary western philosophy. 
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The philosophical problem of the contradiction between 
freewill and causation has provided the basis for numerous 
discussions amongst contemporary Western philosophers and 
many efforts to resolve this problem have been attempted. 
The philosophical attempts of Western contemporary 
philosophers pertaining to the philosophical form of the 
contradiction between causation and freewill can be summed 
up within the following three schools:  
1. Determinism 
2. Soft determinism 
3. Indeterminism 
The Indeterminists believe that the deterministic causal nexus 
(necessitiate causation) between cause and effect entails an 
absolute negation of freewill within any free actor – including 
the human being. Rejecting the necessity between cause and 
effect of the free agent provides the only solution for the 
alleged contradiction between causation and freewill. This 
group espoused the same opinion held by Muslim thinkers 
such as the Muslim theologians and the new scientists of the 
Principles of Jurisprudence (New Usooliyyoon), such as the 
late Sayed Muhammad Baqir Al Sadr. 
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As this group of contemporary Western philosophers adopted 
the view of incompatibility between freewill and necessity, 
they became known as the incompatibilists. 
From another angle, those who believed in the necessity 
between cause and effect, i.e. the determinists, are divided into 
two groups:  
1. Hard determinists: They believe that there is absolute 
contradiction between freewill and causal necessity. They 
therefore share the same opinion as the first mentioned group, 
however; they did not reject causal necessity but rejected the 
freewill of a free actor. As this group like the first group (the 
determinists) believe that the causal necessity contradicts the 
absolute freedom of a free actor, they are considered 
incompatibilists. When compared to Islamic thought they 
resemble the Ash’ariites (Al-Asha'erah), who also believed 
that causal necessity negates freewill.  
2. Soft determinists: They believe that there is no 
contradiction between causal necessity and freewill, so these 
concepts are compatible. They believe that, the only reason for 
the assumption of the contradiction between the freedom and 
causal necessity is the misconception of the freedom in one 
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hand, and the causal necessity in the other hand. This group of 
Western philosophers have known as compatibilists.  
According to Robert Kane, the first person who used the term 
‘hard determinism’ and ‘soft determinism’ was William James 
(James, 1956), who lived at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. (2002, p. 22) 
Western compatibilists who espouse the belief that causal 
necessity is compatible with freewill, hold an identical view to 
the Muslim philosophers. This view particularly explained and 
extended in the teachings of Mulla Sadra, the founder of 
modern Islamic philosophy. But the difference is that Mulla 
Sadra has veraciously attempted to distinguish between 
determinism and necessity. He believes that freedom does not 
negate the causal necessity but rather negates determinism, 
and the causal necessity of free actor entails the necessity of 
the effect, but not its determinism. However this does not 
imply that it would be the determinist object. 
As has been elaborated on in the previous chapter, Mulla 
Sadra believed that the non-distinction between the two 
concepts, i.e. determinism and necessity as well as the mixture 
of the two concepts of freedom and contingency provide the 
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main reasons for the adoption of the incompatibility between 
causal necessity and freedom. He emphasised that one should 
distinguish technically between determinism and necessity in 
one hand, and freedom and contingency in the other hand. 
According to Robert Kane, one of the main and most important 
disagreements regarding freedom within Western 
philosophical thought is the disagreement between the 
compatibilisists and the incompatibilisists (Ibid).  
We can summarise the main contemporary Western 
philosophical schools regarding freedom and causal necessity 
as follows:  
1. Libertarianism: A tendency that believed not in 
determinism and causal necessity, and adopted 
incompatibility between freedom and determinism. This 
group are subsumed under the category of the 
incompatibilists.  
2. Compatible determinism: Also known as soft determinism. 
3. Incompatible determinism: Also known as hard 
determinism.,  
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
128 
 
We will now briefly elaborate on and criticise these three 
tendencies comparing them with the mentioned comments of 
Muslim thinkers on this subject.  
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1. Libertarianism Incompatibilism 
Those who have adopted this theory have rejected 
determinism; they are indeterminists and believe that it 
contradicts human freewill, i.e. incompatibilism. They believe 
that human beings are free from any form of determinism and 
causal necessity. One of the most important inclinations of 
contemporary (Western) philosophy, based on modern 
physics, is the rejection of determinism and causal necessity. 
Based on new scientific theories, this inclination holds that no 
absolute or general rules govern the universe, because 
according to what has been proven by modern physics, the 
changes and transformations of the initial elementary 
particles of the universe, particularly the radioactive 
transformations (decay) of atomic nuclei, follow no certain 
rules; they are unpredictable. Considering the fact that the 
world in which we live consists of these atoms, and the origin 
of the transformations and events of the natural world goes 
back to (originates from) the very same changes of radioactive 
atoms, and in fact these atoms and their internal actions and 
reactions form the main foundation of the world, it can be 
concluded that events in the natural world generally do not 
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comply with the rule of determinism and no deterministic 
relationship rules them. (Kane, 2002, p. 22) 
The main problem of this theory is that determinism is not a 
scientific rule to be refuted by experimental and scientific 
methods, rather it is a philosophical and rational rule based on 
certainties, like mathematical laws which cannot be 
questioned or denied. In the previous chapter it was explained 
that necessary determinism originates from the axiom of 
'Impossibility of the preponderance without a preponderant’. 
Its brief content is that any event or phenomenon by itself, 
that is, independent of any other effective or ineffective 
factors, is not attributed to a necessity of existence or non-
existence, and consequently is attributed to a contingency of 
existence or non-existence. This contingency of existence or 
non-existence makes the relation of the nature of that entity 
with existence and non-existence equal. Therefore getting rid 
of the status of equality between existence and non-existence 
is impossible without the necessity of existence or non-
existence arising from an effective external factor. So the 
existence or non-existence of each phenomenon or event not 
necessitated by a cause external to the entity is not 
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conceivable. According to the rational rule of impossibility of 
the preponderance without a preponderant, which results in 
the general rule of causal determinism, the changes and 
transformations at the atomic level definitely follow a certain 
rule that originates from the general rule (of causal 
determinism), although modern physics has not obtained that 
rule at the present time, or may not in the future. 
Inaccessibility to the mystery of the changes inside atoms does 
not mean that they haven't been governed by causal 
determined lows. In addition, various scientific humanities 
mainly confirm that the human behaviour is governed by 
determined lows. And according to Robert Kane: ‘While 
physics of the twentieth century accepted withdrawal of the 
rule of necessity of determinism, it seems to have moved in an 
opposite direction in other scientific fields such as physiology, 
neurology, psychology, psychotherapy, sociology, and 
behaviourism. Scientific developments in the above fields have 
convinced many people more than ever that human behaviour 
is governed and originates/is derived from causes that are 
unknown and out of our control.’ (Ibid, p. 8) 
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Another group of incompatibilists believe that the real liberty 
is not compatible with the determinism, and they are known 
as libertarians in the new sources and references of the 
Western philosophical thought.’ (Ibid, p. 17) 
Libertarianism is based on the three pillars below:  
Incompatibilism 
Liberty really exists and the man is free in his behaviour. 
Negation of the rule of determinism. (Ibid, p. 17) 
Incompatiblists libertarians are not intellectually 
homogenous. Amongst them exist various schools of thought, 
each of which has propounded a different theory to comment 
on the relationship between the liberty of man and causation, 
the most important of these are as follows.  
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a. The theory of agent or immanent causation 
This particular conception of causation supported by thinkers 
such as Professor Roderick Chisholm6.  
He argues, in an article under the title of 'Human Freedom and 
the Self', (Watson, 1982, pp. 24-35 & Kane, 2002, pp. 47-58) 
and explains his theory that freedom is fundamentally 
opposed to both determinism and indeterminism. Accordingly, 
it paves a third direction that has been termed as ‘agent 
causation’. To explain the concept of agent causation he 
divided the causation into two categories.  
First: Transeunt causation, which indicates that the cause’s 
causation is dependent upon a factor other than itself. All 
involuntary causes fall into this category because they have 
received the virtue of causation from beyond (or from 
dynamics outside of) themselves. For example, if fire burns, it 
is not because fire possesses the inherent quality of burning, 
but because it is gained from the cause that brought the fire 
into existence.  
                                                             
6 A professor of philosophy in brown university and was the former chief of philosophical 
committee of America. 
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Second: Immanent or agent causation, which denotes that a 
cause derives it’s causation from itself and not from a factor 
that exists beyond or outside of itself, therefore it is 
considered independent. Voluntary causes belong to this class 
and in particular the human being. For example, a man who 
accomplishes a task has brought about (or caused) the 
accomplishment of that task by his own causation and not 
from a reason beyond him which provides the causation of the 
tasks accomplishment to him. And from this emanates the 
origins of man’s freedom. Chisholm compares this theory of 
inherent causation to the Aristotelian theory of the prime 
mover unmoved and in his commentary on liberty he 
considers the possibility of alternate selection as the main 
condition of liberty.  
He emphasizes that when the action performed by an agent is 
the only choice available and the emanation of another 
possibility or non-emanation of the action is impossible, then 
liberty will be senseless. He presents a definition of liberty 
similar to ideas attributed to theologians in Islamic thought 
who – as we mentioned earlier – disagree with the views of 
philosophers, who consider liberty to be the truth of a 
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conditional proposition (‘if he wills, he does, and if he does not 
will, he will not do’) and do not believe that liberty contradicts 
the necessity of an act emanated from the agent. Theologians 
assert that liberty absolutely negates the necessity of an action 
emanating from the agent. They interpret liberty as the 
possibility of both the manifestation and the abandonment of 
an action.  
On the one hand, Chisholm believes that the theory of agent 
causation has solved the apparent contradiction between 
liberty and the principal of determinism, which is where the 
causation of an agent of a cause beyond its nature falls under 
the ruling of determinism, therefore the agent is incapable of 
adopting another choice (either the non-emanation or 
emanation of the act). This is because the transeunt cause has 
made the manifestation of the action determined and 
therefore the agent has no alternative except to carry out the 
incumbent act. But according to the theory of agent causation, 
the agent is independent from the effect of any transeunt 
causes; so at the same time of an act emanating from him, he 
also has the ability to choose another act or the non-
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emanation of the same act. This is the essence of the liberty 
which we are discussing.  
On the other hand, the indeterminist theory asserts that the 
emanation of an act from the agent will occur by random 
chance, which is incompatible with the concept of liberty 
because the act – although the possibility exists for both its 
emanation and non-emanation – is not based upon the free 
will of the agent to carry it out. For whether the agent wills it 
or does not will, the act will occur according to chance. This 
problem is also addressed by the theory of agent causation, 
which affirms that the act of an agent is not brought about by 
randomness, but by his active and conscious decision. Once 
the preliminaries of the selection of an act in the agent are 
provided, the emanation of the act from the agent cause will 
be indispensable; however, this indispensability rises from the 
agent's internal capacity and has not been imposed to him 
from external factors. 
Thus, the method Chisholm has chosen in the theory of agent 
cause, is neither determinism nor indeterminism, rather, it is a 
third way between these two extremes. 
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From this point of view, it is very similar to the renowned 
Shiite theological theory of "There is no determinism nor is 
there absolute delegation of power (indeterminism), but the 
real position is between these two extremes", the very same 
theory that was mentioned in the previous chapter. 
This theory involves main difficulties. The first one is the 
negation form of indeterminism. As mentioned before, 
determinism is based on a very strong rational principle that 
in no way can be negated and that is the principle of 
impossibility of the preponderance without there being a 
preponderant. Only the two modes below are conceivable for 
the act that is emanated from the voluntary agent:  
To be emanated by chance, in this case as Mr. Chisholm holds, 
liberty will not exist. Furthermore, emanation of an act from 
the agent by chance is incompatible with the principle of 
causation and the impossibility of preponderance without 
there being a preponderant that is an evident and certain 
principle. 
To be emanated from preponderance of a certain 
preponderant; in this case there will no way but determinism.  
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That the causation of agent cause has two types: the causation 
arising from external (transeunt) cause, and the one arising 
from the nature of the agent (agent cause); and that the 
causation in the voluntary agent is of the second type, solves 
no problems in this field. Because the question that arises in 
that if the causation of the voluntary agent to perform an act is 
an essential causation, therefore, the emanation of an act from 
the voluntary agent will be non-optional. In fact, this is the 
very determinism that according to Chisholm is incompatible 
with the liberty of the agent. 
Also if the causation of the voluntary agent is not essential, it 
should have been given to him from outside (external or 
transeunt cause) that – as Chisholm admitted - results in 
determinism, and –subsequently- will not be compatible with 
liberty. 
The second problem that weakens the foundation of this 
theory is that Chisholm gives no clear reason to prove his 
theory; rather to prove his theory he is satisfied that this 
theory is the best way to justify man's responsibility and 
liberty, however it needs definitely logical justification to treat 
man's responsibility and liberty as a given. 
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In case, as mentioned earlier, determinism is proved through 
intellectual proof and if we consider it as incompatible with 
man's liberty, as Mr. Chisholm does, then there will remain no 
way save refutation of liberty and after that, refutation of 
man's responsibility. 
In spite of the similarity between: libertarianism – as Mr. 
Chisholm has propounded in the theory of agent cause – and 
the theory propounded by Muslim theologians, and the new 
experts in the principles of the Islamic jurisprudence 
(Usooliyyoon), in particular, Ayatollah Sadr, with his theory of 
sovereignty, the main distinction between them lies in Sadr's 
attempt through his strong, intellectual reasoning and the 
justification he has given to prove his theory. 
He has expressed, as mentioned earlier, a particular 
intellectual statement by which he has managed to solve both 
of the aforementioned problems:  
- To solve the first problem, that is the impossibility of the 
preponderance without there being a preponderant he has 
analyzed this principle intellectually and stated that the 
preponderant can be one of two: The necessity of the effect or 
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the sovereignty of agent over the act which is suitable with the 
agent's free well. 
- He has solved the second problem in another way. He has 
made it clear that the liberty of a voluntary agent's act was a 
conscious matter and that determinism was not demonstrable. 
However there is another explanation of the theory of agent 
cause that is propounded by Mr. O'Connor. He, while accepting 
the basis of the theory of agent-cause that considers man as 
the end of the line of his behaviour, and recognizing not any 
cause beyond him as being effective in establishment or 
determination of human behaviour, (Kane, 2002, p. 199) he 
attempts to answer the third question that Mr. Chisholm faced 
in the explanation of agent-cause. This is the same question 
we referred to earlier while raising our first objection to Mr. 
Chisholm's theory. In summary this objection is that causation 
of he voluntary agent for the act cannot be by chance, because 
its being by chance is tantamount to the negation of the free 
will from the voluntary agent. Therefore, the question that 
arises is "What is behind the voluntary agent's causation for 
his behaviour?"  
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To answer this question Mr. Chisholm considered the internal 
propensities and beliefs of the agent arising from his natural 
characteristics, to be the cause of the voluntary agent's 
causation for his behaviour. 
He also held that the voluntary agent was similar to the 
Essence of God, the Exalted, in Aristotelian theory of a prime 
mover unmoved. 
But Mr. O'Connor calls this justification into question and 
interprets it as unnecessarily heroic. He considers it 
insufficient to answer this question of how the agent selects 
one out of many acts. He considers the existence of a 
preponderant that makes the agent select a certain act by 
necessity. To answer this question, he maintains that the cause 
of the voluntary agent's causation is formed by the structure 
of the built-in propensities and that this structure draws the 
agent towards a certain act which corresponds with them. But 
O'Connor considers this structure to be an undetermined 
preponderant and believes that in spite of the existence of 
such a structure that results in the agent's behaving in such a 
manner as is appropriate to it, the agent is never obliged to 
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behave that way, and can also behave in another way that is 
inappropriate to that propensity structure.  
He adds, in spite of that propensity structure, I still have the 
free will to behave either according to that structure or 
opposite it. He says: 
“What we need is a way to modify the traditional notion of 
distinctively personal kind of causal capacity and to see it, not 
as utterly unfettered, but as one that comes "structured", in 
the sense of having built-in propensities to act (though ones 
that shift over time in accordance with the agent's changing 
preference).But we must do so in such away that it remains up 
to me to act on these tendencies or not, so that what I do is not 
simply the consequence of the vagaries of "chance-like" 
indeterministic activity, as may be true of microphysical 
quantum phenomena.” (Ibid, p. 204) 
Obviously, the justification Mr. O'Connor suggests for the 
voluntary agent cannot solve the problem of necessity of 
preponderance without there being a preponderant. The 
legitimate challenge to the theory of Mr. Chisholm remains. As 
if the propensity structure is the sufficient cause of the 
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emanation of the act, then the act is determined and there will 
remain no place for free will; if it is not the sufficient cause, 
and as Mr. O'Connor explicitly stated, "In spite of this 
propensity structure, I have the free will to act or not." the 
question remains, "What will change a behaviour that can or 
cannot be (a possibility that means lack of a preponderant and 
equality of the two sides) to a behaviour that must be?" 
Here to take Mr. O'Connor's side, it can be said that the 
structure of the agent's internal propensities is enough for 
preponderating, although this preponderance is an 
unnecessitative one. This is the same theory of preponderance 
propounded by the Muslim theologians, mentioned at the 
beginning of this discussion, and it was severely disapproved 
of by the Muslim philosophers. 
Muslim philosophers have explained that any existing entity 
that remains enjoying non-necessity of existence and non-
necessity of non-existence is not conceivable. For the duration 
of this state, the existence of every being, including the 
voluntary agent, requires that a cause change its non-necessity 
of existence to necessity of existence. Otherwise, not only 
would the discipline of general causation, and, the intellectual 
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rule of impossibility of preponderance without there being a 
preponderant be negated, but also, free will itself will cease to 
exist in case free will is a matter of chance. 
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b. The Theory of Simple Indeterminism 
This theory was explained by Mr. Carl Ginet. In an article 
under the title 'Freedom, Responsibility & Agency' he presents 
another scheme of agent-causation. In common with Chisholm 
and O'Connor he holds that just as determinism is 
incompatible with man's freedom and responsibility, so too is 
indeterminism incompatible with them. Thus, there is no way 
but to select a third way in order to explain man's freedom 
and responsibility. 
While not approving of the scheme explained by Chisholm and 
O'Connor under the title of 'agent-cause', Ginet believes that 
the above scheme cannot solve the problems to be found in 
this issue. 
He first sets out the main problem in this regard. According to 
what Mr. O'Connor has conceived, incompatibility of 
indeterministic causation with freedom arises from this point 
that cannot justify the emanation of a certain act from the 
agent, - despite the possibility of other options. Ginet 
explained: "O'Connor and I agree in rejecting the 
indeterministic-causation account of what it is for an agent to 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
146 
 
her action. O'Connor's dissatisfaction with this view arises 
from his belief that any such account must explain how an 
agent makes one among the competing motives she faces the 
efficacious one, and he doesn't see any way that this can be 
done without resorting to agent-causation. (Kane, 2002, p. 
209) 
According to Mr. Ginet, the disagreement of Mr. O'Connor with 
the theory of indeterministic causation stems from this belief 
that any explanation of the voluntary agent's behaviour should 
answer the question: "How does the agent make effective a 
stimulant or a motivation from among different stimulants 
and motivations?" 
While, as Ginet holds, the problem of indeterministic causation 
is elsewhere, the main problem of this theory is that 
responsibility and freedom require in principle neither the 
relation of causation nor behavioural stimulants; therefore, 
Mr. Ginet raises two major objections against Mr. O'Connor's 
theory:  
- Firstly, if as O'Connor says – a preponderant cause is 
required to make the agent select one of the possible ways, in 
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the event that the preponderant cause is not indeterministic, 
this question will remain: "What is the cause of the agents' 
causation? And what has given the agent the power to control 
and to determine this behaviour?" 
To get rid of this difficulty Mr. Ginet does not deem the 
existence of a preponderant necessary for the voluntary 
agent's act, and holds – as will be explained later on – that the 
agent has the power to control himself although there is no 
preponderant to necessitate a certain act. 
- Secondly, the theory of agent-causation, as depicted by Mr. 
O'Connor can be neither grasped nor proved, because in the 
first place, so long as the agent has not been influenced in the 
causation of his act by any external actor, and at the same time 
all the factors that are considered important in emanation of 
his act, stem from his nature, then the emanation of his act in a 
particular time and under certain conditions remains 
inexplicable. 
What causes the act to come into existence at a certain time 
and not other times and under certain conditions and not 
other ones? 
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In the second place, now that the voluntary agent's causation 
in relation to the act is not the effect of external causes, for 
what reason should we treat the agent as the cause of the act 
itself, and call him the agent cause of the act? 
Why should we not be able to consider the agent as a simple 
subject for a state we call act or free will? 
It is on the same basis that Mr. Ginet does not accept the 
concept of agent causation suggested by Mr. O'Connor, and 
exerts him self to justify the voluntary agent's behaviour on 
the basis of simple determinism in such a way that enjoys the 
two elements of freedom and responsibility without recourse 
to the principles of general causation or to behavioural 
motivations. 
According to what is understood from Mr. Carl Ginet's writing 
under the title of 'Freedom, Responsibility and Agent' the 
theory of simple indeterminism can be summarized as follows:  
1. The voluntary agent's act consists of free will which is either 
a causally simple mental action, or begins with it. 
2. This simple mental action is not the cause of the occurrence 
of other events. 
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3. This simple mental action will be an act only in the state of 
certain intrinsic phenomenal quality. This quality is called 
“actish quality” by Mr. Ginet. This certain intrinsic phenomenal 
quality is a condition that free will or the simple mental action 
can be an act only when conditioned to it.  
Or according to Ginet: “the simple mental action is an act only 
in the event that it possesses an intrinsic phenomenal quality, 
the same quality that I have entitled an “actish quality”, and I 
use the term agent-causation in it only by adding "as if"”. (Ibid)  
To explain the “actish quality” Mr. Ginet adds: “When the 
simple mental action in my free will employs one of my body 
organs by exerting the power, my internal feeling does not judge 
that this mental event has suddenly come into existence without 
any preparations. Rather, a perceptible internal quality in my 
interior creates it in the same way and in the same period of 
time that it happens.” (Ibid) 
4. This simple mental action (free will) that has such a 
perceptible internal quality is sufficient for the existence of an 
act. 
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5. The free will that benefits from a perceptible internal 
quality, does not meet the standpoint of the incompatibilists 
that is based on refutation of any necessitative causation 
between the act and its preliminaries. On the contrary, an act 
is a compound thing that consists of free will or simple mental 
action and the necessitative causal relation numbers among its 
results. When I open the door, my free will causes the motion 
of my hand and arm, and the motion of my hand and arm 
causes the door to open. Here opening the door is the 
necessitated effect of the motion of hand and arm, and the 
motion of hand and arm is the necessitated effect of my free 
will.  
6. Despite the fact that there is a necessitative causal relation 
between my free will and its consequences which result in 
emanation of the act in the external world (as opening the 
door in the aforesaid example), however, there is no causal 
relation between me and my free will, and, naturally, the 
consequences of my free will. It is not true that I am the cause 
of my free will, so this question arises: "What is the cause of 
this causation?" And then the matter culminates in the 
standpoint that a cause beyond my nature becomes the 
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emanation of the free will from me and subsequently the way 
to my freedom is barred. Rather, I am the subject of my free 
will. Free will is inherent to me, and it is the inherency of my 
free will that secures the freedom of the act that emanates 
from me.  
7. So, the emanation of the act from the voluntary agent does 
not require an external cause and for the same reason does 
not require a preponderant, although this preponderant is not 
a necessitative one, because a voluntary agent's act can 
emanate from him without there being any preponderant. 
Once the agent wills the act, the act will emanate from him. 
The agent's free will requires nothing, for it is inherent.  
8. Consequently, the relationship between motivations or 
stimulants and human free will is not a necessitative causal 
nexus, or even nexus of agent-causation, as conceived by Mr. 
O'Connor. Rather, the relationship between motivations and 
stimulants of the behaviour, and the human act is adjusted by 
free will or decision. The following is the content of this free 
will: "This act can meet and satisfy those motivations and 
stimulants." 
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Once within his knowledge and awareness the agent notices 
the fact that this act can meet that motivation or that 
stimulant, free will comes into existence, and he decides to 
perform the act. 
So, there is a difference between a proposition that says, "S 
performs A to satisfy his stimulants and propensities."  
Comparing it with the other proposition that says: “S performs 
A, due to his awareness that A fulfils all the stimulants and 
propensities.”  
In the first proposition the stimulants and motivations are 
introduced as a cause of the act, while in the second 
proposition there is no causal nexus between the stimulants 
and motivations on the one hand, and the act itself on the 
other hand. The only available thing is that within the 
awareness of the agent these stimulants and propensities can 
be satisfied by this act, and, concurrent with this awareness 
the intention, free will, and decision of the agent to perform 
the act appears. 
The theory of simple determinism is very close to the theory of 
Mirza Nayeeni. In particular, the explanation that Mr. Ginet 
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presents about ‘actish quality’ is very close to what Mirza 
Nayeeni expressed as "the attack of the soul" (The instant 
movement of the soul toward the act or the embarking of the 
soul on the act).  
However, as mentioned earlier in relation to Mirza Nayeeni's 
theory and other theories from contemporary Western 
philosophers, the main problem regarding preponderance 
without there being a preponderant will not be solved by 
these explanations and interpretations. Inherency of free will 
– as mentioned by Ginet and insisted upon by Mirza Nayeeni – 
will not solve the following problems: 
If inherency of free will means that it always exists with man, 
it is obviously invalid because the free will of the act is a state 
that comes into existence in the agent's self only before the 
emanation of the act. If it means that it appears without there 
being a cause or preponderant, then it will face the difficulty of 
preponderance without a preponderant and the existence of a 
possible thing without a cause. The other criticism that can be 
drawn to Mr Giant’s theory of “simple indeterminism” is that it 
is not clear why will is an exception from the General Law of 
Causality. If "Will" need not the cause, why then the Agent’s 
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act itself can not exist without cause. If it can be said in 
response that if the Agent’s act is not caused by a cause it 
means that it is out of control and it is incompatible with the 
freedom, why can we not say the same for the will and the 
“Actish quality” accompanied with it? 
The third criticism is that according to the Giant’s there is no 
causal nexus between the stimulants and motivations on the 
one hand and the act itself on the other hand, and the 
awareness of the Agent satisfies his prior stimulants and is 
sufficient for the existence of will and willed act. But the 
question is how this awareness can occur? If in reality there is 
no relationship between the act and prior stimulant how this 
kind of awareness would be possible, and if there is a 
relationship between the act and its prior stimulants dose it 
not means that the prior stimulants are the cause of the 
agent’s will and act?  
 
  
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
155 
 
c. The theory of Causal Indeterminism 
This theory held by Robert Kane in his essay titled ‘Freewill: 
New Directions for an Ancient problem’ which can be 
summarised in the following paragraphs: 
1. The meaning of freedom which should be discussed here is 
(the power to be the ultimate creator and sustainer of one’s 
own ends or purposes) which is incompatible with the 
determinism. But we agree with the compatibilists that there 
are some other meanings of freedom which are compatible 
with the determinism. 
2. The contemporary and past philosophical discussions 
concentrate on the compatibility between determinism and a 
possible alternative act. According to Robert Kane, as there are 
different interpretations of freedom, discussion about the 
possibility of alternative act would make it impossible to 
clarify concepts such as possibility of alternative act, power, 
ability, and freewill. 
The truth is that the question of the compatibility between 
determinism and freedom would not be solely answered by 
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the possibility of the alternative act. Thus, in order to complete 
this answer, it is necessary to think about it in another way.  
3. In solving the problem of compatibility, what is more 
important than the possibility of alternative is the concept of 
“ultimate responsibility of the agent's act”.  
This concept relies on the condition that can be defined as 
“The power of agent to be the final creator of his own 
purposes via his acts” .Or, in simpler terms, to be in control of 
the facts that produce his act. 
4. Although the ultimate responsibility of the agent towards 
his own present act does not depend upon the possibility of 
the present alternative act, but it depends upon the possibility 
of the alternative for the past agent's acts which have taken 
part in formulating his character, that are known as self-
forming actions. In fact the ultimate responsibility of the agent 
for his present act is in need of the possible alternative in his 
own past self-forming actions. 
5. Therefore, some of past agent's acts which are his self-
forming actions must be free from the nexus of complete 
causation and completely influential factors. Otherwise, it 
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entails the negation of possible alternative of the present 
agent's acts and the past agent's acts which were influential on 
him. And this would result in merely determinism. 
6. What is mentioned above is a new way of incompatibility 
between determinism and freedom which stimulates two 
questions:  
First: how could the self forming acts, which are lake of ‘full 
causes and motivations' be free acts, and result in 
responsibility? (The intelligibility question) 
Second: how does this kind of conducts occur in the chain of 
causes of human acts? 
(Existence question) 
7. The reply of the intelligibility question: the problem which 
the incampatiblists were faced with since the early times is 
that as the freedom is incompatible with determinism it also is 
incompatible with indeterminism, because the result of full 
indeterminism is that the man’s action pursuing irrelative 
preliminaries, for example a man pointing a gun towards a 
victim and shooting him from a short distance, but instead of 
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killing him, prolonging his life for another fifty years, which is 
indeed a very irrational strange result.  
The libertarians and incompatibilists in order to find a way 
around this problem and to clarify the fact that freedom does 
not imply indeterminism have referred to a very obscure or 
mysterious forms of causation; Immanuel Kant has suggested 
the noumenal self which is outside space and time, that can 
not be studied in scientific terms, and scientists might think 
about an indeterminacy or a place for causal gaps in the brain, 
but a nonmaterial self or what   John Eccles calls a 
transempirical power centre which would fill the causal gaps 
left by physical causes by intervening in the natural order. 
(Eccles, 1970) And the most popular and renown appeal in 
this regard amongst the contemporary philosophers is a type 
of Agent or immanent Causation, based on which the free and 
responsible acts are not determined by prior events but 
neither do they occur merely by chance.  
Robert Kane called these types of theories which believe the 
free acts to be caused by the non-ordinary Agents, as the 
“extra factor” strategies. Because these theories share a 
common point that since the indeterminism opens the door 
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for agent to choose whatever he wills, then it needs a kind of 
superior causation over the ordinary chain of causes and 
effects, to justify the agent's freewill and power between two 
choices.  
8. But if we want to answer the question on intelligibility of a 
freewill (i.e. the questions related to its concept), and the 
questions of its existence we have to ignore the extra factor 
strategies containing the theory of agent or immanent 
causation, and find a new way of resolving the problem. The 
first step of this new way is to know not all human acts are 
undetermined, rather the only acts which undetermined are 
the acts which could be named as self-forming actions. These 
kinds of acts are formed when the agent confronts two 
conflicting perspectives of what he should do or what can be 
done. In such time person might be torn between two kinds of 
stimulants i.e. ambition or morality, desires or long term goals. 
Robert Kane explains: “There is tension and uncertainty in our 
mind about what to do at such times, I suggest, that is reflected 
in appropriate regions of our brains by movement away from 
thermodynamic equilibrium-in short, a kind of "stirring up of 
chaos" in the brain that makes it sensitive to 
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microindeterminacies at the neuronal level. The uncertainty and 
inner tension we feel at such soul-searching moments of self-
formation is thus reflected in the indeterminacy of our neural 
processes themselves” (Kane, 2002, p.228)  
In this status Agent has been pulled towards unknown and 
uncertain outcomes, and he has been overcome by 
disorganised motivations in his mind causing a neuronal level 
sensitiveness towards uncertain and unknown movements.  
What has been experienced inside of ourselves as an indefinite 
and uncertain process and then been reflected on the 
appropriated physical conduct opens the window of 
opportunity for human to avoid the deterministic influence of 
past status or events upon the present human's conducts.  
Conversely, whenever we do something which is resulting 
from the certain motives and previous formed character, any 
way except the determinism is never left over for us. But when 
we want to decide in the terms of disorganised motivations, its 
result will not be deterministic, because the premises are not 
deterministic. In fact, the previous wills of the agent have been 
divided into two opposed groups, and whenever we choose 
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one of two opposed groups, what is chosen by our will has 
prevailed over the other group, here, we have changed a non-
deterministic effort into one certain choice. 
 
9. Just as the indeterminism is not inconsistent with the 
freedom, it is not inconsistent with the agent’s responsibility 
with regard to his action too. For example, when a person can 
overcome the non-deterministic repressive obstacles with his 
effort and so he does his own desire, although there is no any 
determinism, no any one except the agent himself is 
responsible relative to his action. 
Suppose that a person wants to kill somebody, but his shot 
goes the wrong way because of a non-deterministic event on 
his nervous system; including the muscular contraction or the 
unwittingly movement of his hand. However if he could 
overcome this non-deterministic obstacle and be succeeded in 
his own desire, who will be responsible relative to his action 
except him? 
If he (the murderer) does not encounter with any obstacle 
while performing his own desire, his action or behaviour will 
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not be the self-forming action. The will of the agent may divide 
between two contrary motives in relation to the self-forming 
action such as a merchant who wants to arrive at his own 
appointment for his own business activity, but unfortunately 
he encounters with a person whose life is exposed to danger 
on his way. Here, if this merchant shall pay no attention to him 
and his helping cry, he can arrive at his own appointment and 
meet his own profit; otherwise he must disregard his own 
business income. Here, there are two contrary flows of the 
nervous system in relation to this event. Each one of these two 
contrary flows is effective in the other and is a result of the 
contradicted motivations and desires which reflected on the 
nervous system.  
These two contracted flows in the nervous system constitute 
the complex networks of the nervous connections in our brain. 
They cause to circulate the moving force as a rotational flow 
and in fact, they have been placed in a level upper than the 
ordinary nervous process and its centralized network. Here, in 
this case, we have two moving forces: that which is drawing 
the merchant up on helping that individual who needs it, and 
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the other force which is drawing him up on his own business 
profit. 
These two nervous networks are in contact with each other 
and so they influence upon each other. Here, the agent 
encounters with two contrary calling which each of them will 
be an obstacle against choosing the other way. 
Whenever the agent decides to do one of the two things, he 
resolves the contradiction between two wills and prefers one 
of them against the other one; so the agent himself will be 
responsible in relation to the performed work. In this case, 
despite of the full responsibility of the agent, the action is 
treated not neither as the chance nor as the determined 
action.  
10. When the above – mentioned conditions are made 
available for the self-forming actions, these actions will 
control the agent’s future life and constitute the basic ground 
of the subsequent character and acts. 
On the basis of what was said, the agents will have a numerous 
choices and face many parallel ways. In fact, they can choose 
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and establish each of them by their will and desire without any 
kind of determined forcing cause, mistake and random. 
The above mentioned conditions can be summarized in this 
short sentence: The agents can choose their future wills in that 
manner which they wish. 
On the basis of what we said, the brain is two agents in a 
parallel with each other, it can cause to flow two kinds of 
information (imaginative & affirmative) through the nervous 
canals synchronously. This kind of ability and complexity is 
necessary for the main self-forming actions and freedom of the 
human’s behaviour. 
11. Responsibility ‘luck and chance: 
Does the indeterminism mean chance or random; i.e. 
everything happens by chance? Here, we must look that what 
relationship is there between the indeterminism and the luck 
or chance in order to answer this question. Here, it must be 
said that the indeterminism doesn’t mean the negation of the 
general law of causality. Rather it is a technical term which 
solely means the negation of the indeterministic causality.  
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So, the indeterminism is compatible with the non-
deterministic, contingent and possible cause. 
Of course, there is another root for this mistake; sometimes, it 
is thought that since the agent has not been forced by 
deterministic cause to prefer one from two choices, then there 
is a kind of challenge in relation to choosing one of them inside 
of him and finally he will choose one of them by chance. The 
basis of this mistake is the imagination that “The agent’s effort 
for preferring one way to another one” (for example, that 
merchant in the above mentioned example) and “his or her 
non-deterministic choice” are two separated things; so it is 
supposed that subsequent to the agent's effort to choose one 
of the two ways, suddenly he or she does her or his choice 
accidentally by chance.  
But the fact is that the agent's effort for preferring one way to 
another one is directly producing his choice, in other words, 
indeterminism is not a case separated from his effort for 
overcoming the other reasons or motives. 
In fact, indeterminism and the agent's effort for preferring one 
way to another one is a single compound, in other words, 
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indeterminism is the quality of his effort, not a thing which 
happens before or after it. In such a case, there is no place for 
such assumption of the role of chance or luck. There is a 
complex recurrent neural network that realizes the effort in 
the agent's brain and circulates indeterminate impulses in 
feed back loops. The indeterminacy is a quality of this 
indeterminate circulation. 
However, an effort process for preferring one way to 
another is merely an effort of will and it persists right up to 
the moment when the choice is made, and there is no any 
space or medium – as chance or random- between an effort 
for preferring one way to another "Will" and making a 
choice or decision to act. 
There is the same situation in relation to the luck. If the 
agent succeeded to do what he wished, it could not be said 
that his good luck caused him to reach his own desire and 
therefore he is not responsible for what did he act.  
What the sentence "he was lucky" or "he was prosperous" 
means is that, that success has not been deterministic. In 
other words, in spite of the obstacles and the possibility of 
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failure the agent could obtain his own purpose and do his 
own desire. But it does not mean that it was happened by 
chance, and existed without any cause. 
Here, there is another reason to explain the agent's 
responsibility. That what the agent was succeeded in doing 
is the same thing which he attempted to do and struggled 
for. Further more, he never considers it as a kind of 
chance or an accident; rather, he does consider it as an 
effect of his own will and himself. 
12. Concerning the agent's act or his freewill there is no 
reason that to qualify an action as the agent's action or the 
action by his own free will, it must be deterministic. In fact, 
the responsibility of the agent towards his action is not 
dependent upon the deterministic quality of what he has 
done. 
There is no any determinism or compulsion in that example 
of the murderer who succeeded in doing his own desire, or the 
merchant who attended at his appointment. Because he (the 
agent) did what he wanted in spite of the reversal reasons 
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and the numerous obstacles, so he (the agent) –of course-is 
responsible for what he performed.  
The essence of "choice" is -In fact- to form a decision or an 
intention for doing something, that intention or decision 
which puts an end for and removes any kind of doubt or 
hesitancy in the mind of the agent towards the act. 
According to this account of "choice" it does not need 
causal necessity or determinism. 
When the contrary stimulants and opposed motives leads 
the agent towards the other choice, but he resists all that 
contrary stimulants and opposed motives, and in spite of its 
pressure he makes his preferred will and choice overcoming 
that pressure and finally does his own chosen act, he 
actually bears the full responsibility of what he wills and 
what he acts, because he is who has done this choice, while 
there has not been any determinism or compulsion. 
Of course, indeterminism doesn't mean that there is no 
cause for what has been done.  Although the actions and 
choices are not deterministic, however, they are not lacking 
causes; rather they are due to the agent's previous effort. 
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But it may be said: Although the indeterminism is not 
inconsistent with the principle of choice and any act can be 
contemporaneously a simple choice and not deterministic; 
but the choice to be the agent's choice it must be 
deterministic and therefore, it is not compatible with the 
indeterminism. 
It can be replied: What makes an act or choice an agent's 
act or choice is that it results from his efforts and 
deliberation which in turn are causally resulted from his 
previous motives, reasons and images, so it doesn't need to 
be influenced by deterministic force. 
Therefore, ascribing an act or choice to an agent is due to its 
resulting from his own intention and Decision which is a 
product of his previous reflective effort, and this reflective 
effort is a part of the agent's self-defining motivational 
system.  
Furthermore, the agent confirms that the chosen intention is 
the same as what he wants and makes it as a part of his own 
self - defining motivational system and operates it as an 
effective element for his future life direction and as a self 
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forming action, which is another proof affirming that the 
choice is belonging to the agent and he himself is responsible 
towards it. 
13. After what is explained that the indeterministic and self - 
forming actions are considered as a kind of choice and 
particularly agent's choice, now it is a time to discuss another 
issue that is the extant of the agent's control over his own 
chosen act. How much –in fact- control he has over it?     
Certainly, indeterminism entails a diminution of the agent's 
control over his choice and action, and results in the problem  
often noted by critics of libertarian freedom that the 
indeterminism, wherever it occurs, seems to be an obstacle 
or a hindrance to our realizing our purposes and hence an 
obstacle to freedom. But in the self-forming actions this 
obstacle or hindrance arises from the agent's will itself, not 
from any outside factor or effective agent.     
In the previous example, that merchant who was going to 
attend his own business appointment suddenly encountered 
with the helping cry of that victim, here, it can be said that a 
kind of self - forming action occurs. His will for attending his 
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own business appointment causes to diminish his control 
over helping the victim. On the other hand, his will for 
helping the victim causes to diminish his control over his will 
of attending his own business appointment. Therefore, in 
both sides the indeterminism acts as an inside obstacle 
against the agent's determination and realization of the 
attainment of his own aims and intentions. In another words 
there is a kind of competition between two conflicting 
motives which eventually end in that the agent overcomes 
one side stimuli. 
Although lack of such an inside resistance entails a full 
control of the agent over one of the competing choices, but it 
entails also lack of competition between different stimuli and 
motives, and it results in negation of the freedom of choice 
and action.  
Thus, it can be said that the indeterminism via its result of 
obstacles prevents from agent's realization of obtaining his 
own aims and intentions. Hence it provides a way to the 
possibility of obtaining other aims and intentions that 
resulted from different choices, so the free choice and act has 
been formed.               
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To be the really free agent of our own self - forming actions 
we must in some certain time of our life struggle against such 
obstacles and overcome them to realize that we have attained 
our purpose and done what we wanted.     
14. There is another problem that is since the agent _ 
according to the theory of indeterminism of self-forming 
actions_ does not have full control over the motives and 
preliminaries of his choice, there is a kind of chance or 
arbitrary which constitutes a part of the preliminaries of 
the agent's action. 
According to Mr. Robert Kane, this question indicates an 
important fact in the case of freedom namely the value 
experiment. What is revealed by this fact is that every free 
or indeterministic choice is a beginning point for the 
experiment of value; that are the actions and behaviours 
which can not be justified by the reasons past, because its 
reasons are hidden in the coming events and it will only be 
revealed in the future. 
In making such a choice the agent says himself: 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
173 
 
"Let me try this. It is not required by my past, but it is 
consistent with my past and is one branching pathway my life 
can now meaningfully take. Whether it is the right choice, only 
time will tell. Meanwhile, I am willing to take responsibility for 
it one way or the other." (Kane, 1996, pp. 145-6) 
This kind of choice is not a result of the previous qualities 
or actions, although it is in coordination with them, and it is 
in fact branching a past constituted personality and 
grounding intentionally a new personality which will-only 
in future-be known whether it is  right or wrong. Therefore, 
it can be said that our self-forming actions are compatible 
with the previous actions and states and they create a new 
part of our life routed in our previous character.   
After this quite short explanation of the Robert Kane's 
theory of Causal Indeterminism, now we firstly try to 
compare it with the most important  theories in 
contemporary Islamic philosophy, and secondly to point 
out some critics concerning it.       
In comparison with the contemporary Islamic philosophy 
the theory of causal indeterminism seems to be very close 
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to the sadr's theory of Sovereignty. Because according to 
Kane's the most important condition for the agent's 
ultimate responsibility is "the agent's power to be the 
ultimate creator and sustainer of his own ends or 
purposes" (Kane, 2002, p. 223) which is similar to what Sadr 
called "The sovereignty of the agent".  
But in spite of this similarity there is a very important 
difference here between what Kane called agent's power 
and Sadr's sovereignty, that is -in brief- according to Kane 
the agent's power-as he described –is solely concerning to 
the self-forming actions,  whilst  the next actions are 
necessarily determined by them which means that with the 
exception of the self-forming actions the other actions has 
not been chosen by free will, and as a result the agent has 
not had a directly control over them. But in Sadr's point of 
view the agent's sovereignty is not limited to any part of 
the willed actions. According to Sadr the agent's 
sovereignty is the main source of his control which 
comprehends all the willed agent's actions.          
The other similarity between these two theories is the 
philosophical separation between causality in one hand and 
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causal determinism or causal necessity in the other hand. 
The both philosophers believe that the negation of 
determinism doesn't mean the negation of causality, and 
the affirmation of causality doesn't mean the affirmation of 
determinism. 
But also in this point there is some difference between 
them, for the Sadr's theory of sovereignty attempts to solve 
the problem of the impossibility of preference with out a 
preponderant by a given suggestion of agent's sovereignty 
as an alternative of the preponderant, but it is not clear 
how could the theory of causal indeterminism over come 
this problem.      
To criticise the Kane's theory of causal indeterminism we 
are pointing out some consideration as following:  
1. Grant, that Kane's given explanation of free action which 
refers it to the self-forming actions succeeded in showing 
an acceptable reason for the indeterminism of the agent's 
act, but the question that remains is, in the process of 
occurrence of undetermined self-forming actions, at such a 
difficult time when we are torn between competing visions 
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of what we should do, what makes the agent choose that 
specific action and not the others?      
To say that:" Well, we know that the brain is a parallel 
processor" or "In cases of self-formation (SFAs), agents are 
simultaneously trying to resolve plural and competing 
cognitive tasks" is not sufficient to solve the problem. The 
question still remains that since the agent's choice is not a 
kind of chance, accident or random, what is the real factor 
that makes the agent try one way, and not the other.        
In reply to this objection Kane explained:" What makes an 
act or choice an agent's act or choice is that it is resulted 
from his efforts and deliberation which resulted from its 
previous motives, reasons and images, so it doesn't need to 
be influenced by deterministic force". But the question 
arises again: Since there is more than one flow of previous 
motives and reasons with the equal possibilities of choices, 
what causes only one flow to be chosen by the agent?  
2. In his explanation of the self-forming actions Kane 
emphasized that the agent confronts two conflicting 
perspectives of what he should do or what can be done. In 
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such time as he said person might be torn between two 
kinds of stimulants, and there is uncertainty in his mind 
about what to do at such times, which reflects in the 
indeterminacy of his own neural processes, which causes 
agent to be pulled towards unknown and uncertain 
outcomes.       
This expression contains a premise and a result. The 
premise is in short the complexity of motivations in the 
brain and neural system, and the result - as this theory tries 
to affirm – is the free will and the free act of the agent. But, 
in fact, there is not any logical relevance between these two 
parts of Kane's allegation (the premise and the result), for 
that obviously the premise (which is the complexity of 
stimulants or motivations in the brain and neural system 
and ultimately the uncertainty in the agent's mind about 
what to do or what to choose) does not logically entail or 
result in the freewill nor the free act of the agent. We can't 
understand how the freewill or the power of the agent 
upon his action can be resulted from such kind of 
complexity and uncertainty which logically entails 
perplexity, inability and failure. The reality in such status is 
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that the agent undergoes lack of power to choose, lack of 
power to decide, and lack of power to act. There is not any 
reason – but the chance- for the agent to be pulled towards 
any outcome.         
3. Finally it seems that the theory of Causal Indeterminism 
has not given a clear suggestion to solve the main problem 
of human freewill which derived from the incompatibility 
between general causal law and freewill. For that the basic 
question still remains: How can the general causal law be 
compatible with free choice and action, whilst the causal 
law can not be segregated from necessity and determinism, 
and no way to deny causal law, because it results in chance 
and random and consequently negates freewill and free 
action. 
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2. Compatible determinism soft determinism 
Compatibilists believe that there is no contradiction 
between determinism and freewill. They maintain that 
despite of the comprehensive running general law of causal 
determinism which governs all human acts the human 
possesses a full freewill and bears utter responsibility 
towards his acts.                                                                                                                                                                            
This point of view is close to the philosophical trend of 
Islamic thought particularly the transcendent philosophy of 
Mulla Sadra. As it explained in part 1 of this study Muslim 
philosophers particularly Mulla Sadra persistently believe 
that not only freewill and responsibility are consistent with 
determined causal law, but rather the determined causal 
law is a necessary condition for the freewill and its result of 
responsibility. 
The compatibilists in western philosophy are divided in 
two groups:  
a. The Classical compatibilists: Some very known 
philosophers like Thomas Habbes, David Hume, Jan Stuart 
Mill, A. J. Ayer, Moritz Schilck, G. A. More, Nielsen, and Skinner 
can be counted among them. Classical campatibilism has been 
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an extremely popular view among philosophers and scientists 
in the twentieth century. (Kane, 2002, p. 11) 
b. New Compatibilists. Some famous philosophers such as 
Daniel Dennet, Harry Frankfurt, Susan Wolf, and Gary Watson 
are seen among them. 
We can't discuss all opinions which revealed here by these 
philosophers, and it has not been necessary in such study 
which is focusing on general ideas, but we will be contented 
with a remarkable explanation of each one of these two trends 
of compatibilism. Among the Classical compatibilists we will 
choose the explanation of A. J. Ayer, and among new 
compatibilists we'll choose Harry Frankfurt. 
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A. Classical Compatibilism with the explanation of 
A.J. Ayer 
Alfred Jules Ayer delivered his explanation of compatibilism in 
his essay published under the title of “Freedom and Necessity” 
which can be summarized as follows:   
1. When it said that the agent acted freely it means that he 
could have acted otherwise. If he had more then one choice 
and he could act what he wonted to act it means that he has 
done freely and he bears full responsibility of what he has 
acted. In contrast with that when the agent is fronting just one 
way and there is no more then one choice to act, it means that 
there is no freewill nor freely act and in result the agent bears 
not any responsibility of what he does.    
Therefore, if we believe that all human conduct are governed 
by general causal law then the agent's action wouldn't be 
counted as free action, because according to this assumption 
all human actions are  causally determined then there is no 
any space remained for agent's choice or freewill. It seems 
that there is a very clear contraction between general causal 
law and freewill.  
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2.  The clear feeling that exists in the human beings in relation 
to freedom has obliged     some of the philosophers to not 
include all human acts within the general causal law, and to 
resolve the problem of contradiction between this internal 
feeling and the general causal law by limiting the causal law. 
But the truth is that the feeling of freedom doesn't prove that 
the reality is so. It may not to be true, and in spite of that 
feeling the general causal law may be true. It is probable that 
the agent influenced by some previous causes but he is 
unaware of them.   
In addition, the law of universal causation is not a necessary 
presupposition of scientific explanation of the agent's action. It 
is conceivable that more investigation lead the scientists to 
discover some systematic connection between the agent act 
and some other events, but it is also conceivable that it leads 
them to the negation of any systematic connection between 
the agent's act and all other events.             
 
3. But the negation of general causal law relative to human 
acts can only result in accidental choice or choice by chance. 
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The meaning of the fact that "the human preference of one 
choice over the other has no cause" is that; he has made his 
choice by accident or by chance, in which case the human 
freedom might be reserved. But this kind of freedom will not 
result in human being morally responsible for his acts, 
whereas the objective p of the discussion of human freedom is 
to prove his responsibility in relation to his free acts. 
 
4. It could be said that the preference of one choice by the 
human has not been accidental or by chance and has been 
caused by attributes that have formed the human character. 
And due to the fact that these attributes have come about via 
human choice, human is responsible for his choices due to 
these choices being the result of the attributes of his character 
which have been formed by his decision. 
But this concept dose not resolve anything as we again 
question the choices that have come about via those attributes 
of the character. And the question is that: Are these choices 
caused by determined causes? If they are so then there will be 
a problem of determinism, otherwise they have been caused 
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by chance in which case the moral responsibility is 
unjustifiable. 
 
5. This is where we conclude that there are only two solutions 
to this problem: 
a. We either prove that the moral responsibility does not 
require the freedom of act of man, and that man is able to 
claim moral responsibility for his acts in which case it is 
against the freedom, and is subject to determined cause.  
b. Or else we try to find a way to reconcile human freewill with 
determined cause which would prove that determined cause 
does not obstruct human freedom. 
The first solution does not seem logical. This is due to moral 
responsibility being clearly dependent on human's freedom of 
act. Human under any circumstances can not claim moral 
responsibility for an act in which he had no authority in 
committing and has been inflicted upon him by a determined 
cause. 
The only solution that remains is that, the idea of 
contradiction between determined cause and human freedom 
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to be removed, and to prove that the law of determined cause 
has no inconsistency with human freedom.  
 
6. A number of Philosophers have attempted a specific 
definition of freedom in order to solve the problem of 
contradiction between determined cause and human freedom. 
They defined the freedom as:" The consciousness of 
necessity". In the other word: Freedom means the awareness 
of human of the causal determination of the act that has been 
committed by him. Based on this definition the agent's 
awareness of the necessity of his act is the essence of freedom.      
According to this meaning of freedom not only the determined 
causal law does not contradict agent's freedom, but further it 
is a necessary condition of the agent's free act, and without the 
determined causal law the freedom cannot be conceivable.            
But giving a new meaning of the word "Freedom" does not 
mean that the contradiction between determined cause and 
freedom is solved, because the philosophical argument of the 
problem of compatibility between determined causality and 
freedom comes about the ordinary meaning of freedom which 
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entails the contingency of both to act and not to act, and 
negates compulsion and necessity.     
When I have compelled by someone to do what I dislike, it is 
obvious that I'm not free, despite of my awareness of the 
compulsion and the determined causal law which resulted in 
my action. The fact is that giving the new definition of freedom 
as the awareness of the agent doesn't change what is done in 
reality whether it's been free or not free.   
Probably the reason that led these philosophers to this kind of 
solution is because they suppose that the awareness of 
determined causal law enables a man to overcome the 
determined causes and manage them in the way that he wants. 
But it is just an imaginary assumption, because if the man 
would be able to manage the causes in his wanted direction 
and change them from way to way it means that there is not 
neither compulsion nor necessity.           
 
7. Then to solve the problem there is no way but to focus on 
the ordinary meaning of freedom. Therefore we need – at first 
- to clarify this freedom by pointing out what it is contrasted 
with. This sense of the freedom is not obviously contrasted 
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with the causality, but it is contrasted with constraint. When I 
have said that I was free to act or not to act it does not mean 
that there was not any reason for what I have done and my 
action had not been caused by any determined cause, but it 
means that there was not any external agent that forced and 
constrained me to act.       
8. Now, we have to define the word "constraint" and to explain 
that in what circumstances the agent can be legitimately 
described as a constrained agent?   
The basic criterion of the constraint is that the agent's act 
doesn't arise from deliberated choice of to act or not to act 
which can be called "the process of deciding whether to do or 
not to do".      
The constrained act which is lack of the deliberated choice or 
the process of deciding whether to do or not to do, can be 
derived from the external factor, like a man who forced by 
another one to do some thing. In this case the actor can avoid 
doing what he forced to do, but he believed that if he didn't do 
so he would face a more disadvantageous situation. Also the 
constrained act can be derived from a habitual ascendancy of 
the external factor over the agent. In this case again the agent 
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that induced to act as the other one wanted didn't act by the 
deliberated choice or the process of decision then he was not 
free, nevertheless his act was not necessary.     
Also a kleptomaniac is not a free agent, because he doesn't go 
through the process of deciding whether to do or not to do, 
although his stealing is not necessary.  
 
9. Here a question arises: That if the free agent's act is 
dominated by causal determined law, what is the deference 
between the agent's free act and his constrained act, whilst the 
alternative is impossible for both of them?         
The answer is that the deference between the free act and the 
constrained act is not to be an effect of determined cause or 
not to be so, but the deference is that what kind of cause is the 
cause. The constrained act is which arises from a constraining 
cause which obstructs the process of deciding whether to do 
or not to do, whereas the free act is which arises from a cause 
within that process.    
 
10. One may question again: That since all causes equally 
necessitate the effects how is it possible for a cause to be 
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different from the other in its action? How can conceive the 
difference of consequences between two determined causes 
within same circumstances of necessity and determination? It 
is a kind of arbitrary to say that an action is free when it is 
necessitated in one fashion but not when it is necessitated in 
another. To answer this question we have to point out the 
precise meaning of the word 'necessitate' in proposition of 'all 
causes equally necessitate the effects'. If it is taken as 
equivalent to 'cause' it will be a meaningless tautology, for that 
it is same to say that: 'all causes are causes', but if, as it is 
suitable to the question, it is taken as equivalent to 'constrain' 
or 'compel' then the proposition will not be true. For all that 
needed for one event to be the cause of another is that, in the 
given circumstances, the event which is said to be the effect 
would not have occurred if it had not been for the occurrence 
of the event which is said to be the cause. In one word, there is 
an invariable concomitance between two classes of events, but 
there is no compulsion or constrain. Consequently, an agent's 
action to be under the natural causal law does not follow that 
it is under constraint. 
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11. The conclusion is that, for to say that the agent is free in his 
action, the criterion is: 
Firstly: He could act otherwise, when ever he had so choice. 
Secondly: His being able to act otherwise is not in the sense of 
which the Kleptomaniac is. 
Thirdly: No any external force compels him to do so.  
With these three conditions the action should be described as 
free action, while it isn't a kind of Chance, but an explainable 
act within the chain of causal nexus. 
 
12. In addition to what we explained, the misleading of words 
'determinism' 'necessity' and 'cause' playing a rule in the 
complication of this philosophical problem. They seemed to 
imply that one event is somehow overcomes by another, 
whereas the fact is that they are correlated. The fact is that 
when an event of one type occurs, an event of another type 
occurs also, in a certain temporal relation to the first. The rest 
is only metaphor.    
 
13. But the question that still remains is that: If the postulate 
of determinism adopted then the future will be predictable, 
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which means that what will happen in the future is already 
decided, therefore no any act can be free and the agent will be 
a helpless prisoner of fate, whilst all actions already decided 
and appointed.   
The answer is that, to predict future from the past doesn't 
mean that the agent is lack of power upon his action as the 
prisoner of fate, but it means that it is possible to deduce the 
future from the past according to general laws. In a word: To 
know what you are going to do, doesn't entail that it is not 
your own choice or you are acting under constraint.            
In the end of this summary of Ayer's explanation of Classical 
Compatibilism I try at first- as I did for another western 
theories- to show a short comparison in two points between it 
and Mulla Sadra's theory of Necessity and Sadr's theory of 
Sovereignty the two most important theories in contemporary 
Islamic philosophy. The two points are:   
a. There is a very close similarity between Mulla Sadra's and 
Ayer's opinion in the point of compatibility between causality 
and free act. They both believe that there is no conflict 
between general necessary causal law and the free will or 
choice of the agent, but the conflict is between constraint and 
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free will or choice, and the philosophical problem here arose 
from the complexity of two concepts: necessity, and 
constraint.    
Nevertheless there is a minute deference between them. That 
is the sadra's opinion focused on the criterion of the free act 
and suggested that the criterion of free act is to be derived 
from the agent's consent (R. P.20). But the Ayer's focused on 
the criterion of non-free act and suggested that it is to be 
derived from constraint.     
b. Whilst both Sadra and Ayer insist on the definition of the 
word: Freedom, and its definitely importance in this 
discussion, there is a fundamental variance between two 
definitions of Freedom given by each of them. Sadra 
emphasizes that freedom doesn't entail the contingency of the 
action or the equality of both to act and not to act. The 
Freedom in his view is not but the awareness and consent of 
the agent towards his act, what and why he is going to do, 
while Ayer emphasizes on the ordinary concept of Freedom 
which contains- as he alleges- the equality of both to act and 
not to act. 
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Confronted with both of them: Sadr in his theory of 
sovereignty doesn't believe in the allegation that the problem 
arises from the complexity of necessity and constraint, but he 
insists that there is an essential confliction between general 
causal law which entails necessity of the act, and the freedom 
which can not be existed without the contingency of the action 
or the equality of both to act or not to act. For that he believes 
that there is no way but the exception of general causal law 
and the rule of general necessity in case of the freewill and all 
free actions.              
To criticize the Ayer's explanation of Classical Compatiblism 
I'm putting down the following points:  
1. The central philosophical problem here is that the base of 
the general causal law is that the things- containing the human 
acts- to be existed need a given necessary existence from their 
causes, and given necessary existence negates the equality of 
the existence and non-existence of the act which means its 
determination. The distinction between necessity or causality 
and constraint is not subservient whilst even in the non-
constraint circumstances the cause must be determining its 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
194 
 
effect (i.e. human act), otherwise since both to be or not to be 
are equally possible the effect absolutely will not be existed.        
2. Granted that the criterion of the free action is as Ayer 
mentioned, but the question is that, what is then the different 
between chance and free act, since the chance has got also all 
that criterion attributes?     
3. Since it is postulated that causes necessitate their effects, it 
is not clear how to conceive the difference between two kinds 
of causes: constraining causes and non-constraining causes.  
To say that the non-constraining causes necessitate their 
effects in the sense of correlation doesn’t explain the reason of 
correlation between cause and its effect whilst the assumption 
is that there is no constraint and no any external forcing agent. 
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B. New Compatibilism Harry Frankfurt’s theory 
I will summarise the theory of harry Frankfurt explained in his 
article entitled “free will and the concept of a person” as 
follows: 
1. Human desires are of two kinds: “first-order desire” and 
“second-order desire”. “first-order desires” are those desires 
which the human being is inclined towards but are not 
necessarily performed. “second-order desires” are those 
desires which are performed. 
The meaning of will is that which is performed; therefore, it is 
only the “second-order desires” which form the meaning of 
will. 
“Second-order desire” has two types, which are desiring and 
action, and having the desire for desiring an action; for at 
times it is possible that an individual does not desire the 
action itself, rather he wants only its desire, and at other times 
he wants the action itself without wanting the desire for the 
action. 
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2. The second type of “second-order desire”, which is the 
desire which leads to action, alongside the want for the desire, 
is the defining criterion of the concept of person. 
 
It is possible that a person has the first type of “second-order 
desire”, which means he has the desire to choose one thing 
from a number of things, and to perform it, however, this 
desire and will has not been shaped by his will and desire, 
meaning that it is not the second-order desire or will, such as 
children or at times mature or old people who have no control 
over their desire, for they cannot want what they desire, and 
do not know how to want to perform what they desire; hence, 
these agents are not persons. The term “wanton” can be used 
for these agents. All non-human species and humans who do 
not have control over their will and their actions are subject to 
their “first-order desires”, and their “second-order desire” is 
not subject to their second-order will are wantons. 
3. Lack of reason and reflection does not lie in the meaning of 
wanton. What distinguishes the rational wanton agent from 
the rational person agent, is that the wanton agent does not 
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consider which of its first-order desires is superior to the 
others.  
 
Although the primary element of a person is based on second-
order will and not reason, what makes second-order will and 
its formation possible is rational capacities, and one who does 
not have rational capacities is devoid of personality.  
 
4. It is possible for a person who possesses second-order will, 
reason and reflection, to be incapable of wanting that which 
they identify as good from their first-order desires, and for the 
person to surrender to his other first-order desires in his 
action. However what he has desired in his action and what he 
has performed, is a real desire, and that desire defines his real 
identity and personality. Whereas the wanton never evaluates 
and contemplates between its first-order desires, and cannot 
or does not want to think in regards to which one of its first-
order and conflicting desires wins out and will be actualized. 
Therefore, for the wanton, victory or defeat between its 
conflicting of first-order desires has no meaning.  
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5. Second-order desire is the criterion of freedom of the will. 
Therefore, the individual who can choose between his first-
order desires that which he has identified as the best through 
reflection and evaluation, and actualises it by his second-
order, will has freedom of will. However the individual who 
cannot or does not want to choose the best amongst his first-
order desires, or having found the best cannot actualise and 
perform it, does not have freedom of the second-order will, 
but rather is dominated by an agent which shapes his second-
order will, contrary to what he knows as better, and therefore 
does not have complete freedom of the will, and in reality does 
not possess a complete personality. 
 
This definition of person which is an individual who has such 
freedom of the will, excludes all wanton beings, be they human 
or infrahuman which lack the essential conditions of having 
freedom of the will; furthermore it excludes human beings 
which  have determined free will.      
6. Now the question is that, what kind of freedom is “freedom 
of the will”? 
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In traditional philosophy freedom is defined as such: freedom 
is “to do what one wants to do”. This definition delivers only a 
part of the definition of the “free agent” and does not include 
another special part of the definition of “free agent”.  
 
Animals do what they want to do, therefore “doing what one 
wants to do” is not a sufficient condition for the realisation of 
freedom of the will, it is not even a necessary condition of 
freedom of the will; for in order to deprive an individual of 
freedom of the will in a specific behaviour or action it is not 
necessary to remove freedom from their will. There is no 
difference in the degree of freedom between an agent who 
knows that there are many things that he is not free to do, and 
an agent who is in between same conditions but does not 
know that he is not free. 
7. The primary issue is how freedom of the will to be acquired. 
Here the question is in regard to how will or desire to be 
formed, and not the relationship between desire and action. 
It must be said that the freedom of the will is when an 
individual is free to desire and to will that which he wants; 
this means that he is free in willing what he wills.  
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Therefore, the individual tries out freedom of the will where 
he is sure of the conformity of his will and second-order 
desires, and he tries out The absence of freewill when he finds 
discrepancy between his will and his second-order desires, or 
when he finds a conformity between them, he does not regard 
it as the result of his own attempt, but rather as the result of a 
pleasant coincidence.  
8. Freedom of the individual in doing what he desires, does not 
place the individual in the situation of “freedom of the will”. 
When the individual above in addition to being free in doing 
what he wants to do, is also free in willing what he desires, the 
desirable freedom or the conceivable freedom is realised, and 
it is in this way that he has not lost anything of freedom.  
9. The theories which have been presented in interpreting 
freedom of the will have not been able to clarify the following 
two points; why is freedom of the will desirable, and why 
animals (animals other than human beings) are not 
considered to possess freedom of the will. For example 
according to the theory of Roderick Chisholm which is an 
interesting instance of the doctrine that freedom of will entails 
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an absence of causal determination, whenever a person 
performs a free action, a miracle has occurred, because for 
example when a person moves their hand, this motion of the 
hand is a result of a series of physical causes. However, some 
events in this series presumably occur in the part that is 
related to the brain that are caused by the agent and are not 
caused by the other elements of the series of causes. 
Therefore, the free agent has a prerogative which some would 
attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime 
mover unmoved.  
 
Although by this theory the lack of free will in non-human 
living beings is explained, however it is not clear, that why 
according to this theory the person who is a free agent must 
believe in the possibility of interrupting the chain of causes by 
himself. Chisholm has not explained what reasonable 
difference exists between the person who miraculously and by 
interrupting the chain of causes and effect moves his hand, 
with the individual who moves his hand as part of the chain of 
causes and effects. 
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10. In addition to the two points that we mentioned about 
freedom, a third condition for the reasonable interpretation of 
free will is that it has to be capable of presenting an acceptable 
analysis of “moral responsibility”. It seems that the moral 
responsibility of the individual toward his action does not 
occur only when it is done by free will. A person can be 
morally responsible for his actions even though he does not 
have any freedom of the will. 
 
Although having freedom in making an alternative choice, or 
in other words, the possibility of choosing another option 
from the first-order desires is a condition of freedom of the 
will, it has no relation with moral responsibility. For the 
assumption that the individual is responsible towards the 
action he has performed, does not require the person being 
situated in a condition where he is free in his will and in 
performing the action.  
 
When the person has done what he desired, whether he has 
had another option or not, he has done his own desire and 
acting what he wanted. Therefore, the person cannot claim 
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that he have been forced by an agent outside his essence and 
will to perform the action, or to claim that he has been naught 
but a mere observer. 
 
Under these conditions it is irrelevant in evaluating the 
person’s moral responsibility towards the action they have 
performed, to inquire about other options and to see whether 
they were available to the person or not. 
 
If person does not exist in the wanton agent such as a child or 
an adult whose will is under the hegemony of others, and if in 
the unwilling agent, such as an addict who desires to stop his 
addiction and is discontent with his addiction, but cannot stop 
it, will does not exist, then freedom of the will also does not 
exist, but in another type of agent such as the addict who 
knows that his addiction is damaging to him, and has 
numerous options, and knows that he can opt any of the 
choices that he desires, there is a person possessing will to act 
and intentionally chooses addiction by his own  will, but there 
is no free will. 
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Although the situation of this addict is a situation of over-
determination, for the desire to use drugs has become active 
and irresistible in him, because he is physiologically addicted, 
however despite this irresistible inclination it is his own 
inclination, for he has desired it.  
 
Here although the will of this addict has not been controlled 
by himself, he has desired by his own second-order desire for 
this inclination to be the active and influencing inclination, and 
has allowed this inclination to form and influence his will; 
therefore, he has made the will for the consumption of drugs 
his own will. Hence the willing addict has moral responsibility 
not only towards the influence of his addiction in shaping his 
will towards the consumption of drugs, but also towards the 
act of consumption of drugs itself. 
 
11.  The meaning that I (Harry Frankfurt) presents for 
“freedom of the will”, seems very natural in relation to 
determinism; for it is conceivable that because of causal 
determinism the individual is free to want what he wants. 
Therefore, in this way because of causal determinism the 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
205 
 
individual has freedom of the will. Some individuals having 
freedom of the will because of causal determination, and 
others not having freedom of the will because of the presence 
of the same causal determination is nothing more than the 
appearance of a harmless paradox. 
 
In reality there is no paradox in this proposition, that an agent 
or agents other than the person have the moral responsibility 
of his having or not having freedom of the will. It is completely 
possible that an individual is morally responsible for what he 
has performed by his own free will, and that another 
individual is also morally responsible for what this person has 
performed.  
 
It is also rational that an individual accidentally has freedom 
of the will (not because of causal determinism). Therefore, it is 
conceivable that some individuals accidentally have freedom 
of the will and others accidentally do not.  
 
It is likely that there is a third way for the individual having 
freedom of the will, without it being accidental or through 
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causal determinism and natural series of causes, but a third 
way which also results in freedom of the will.  
 
The aforementioned is a summary of Harry Frankfurt’s theory 
in the explanation and interpretation of freedom of the will. 
The following can be said in the comparison of Harry 
Frankfurt’s theory with the two Islamic theories of freedom of 
the will which were previously mentioned:  
 
1. In the comparison of this theory with Mulla Sadra’s theory, 
the first similarity is that, they both neither regard freedom of 
the will and causal determinism to be contradictory. Another 
similarity between the two theories is that neither regards 
causal determinism and moral responsibility as contradictory, 
and do not consider the presence or lack of presence of 
another option as the primary condition in the moral 
responsibility of the free agent. 
2. In the comparison of this theory with the theory of 
Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sader we witness a clear 
difference between these two theories in both of the 
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aforementioned points. Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sader 
in his theory of Sovereignty, regards freedom of the will as 
completely contradictory to causal determinism; he believes 
that moral responsibility completely dependant on the 
presence of numerous choices for the agent, and is of the 
opinion that freedom of the will is fully related on the one 
hand with the presence of numerous choices, and on the other 
hand with moral responsibility. 
 
The conclusion that was reached in the above comparison is 
very natural; for as we mentioned before Mulla Sadra in the 
theory of causal necessity like Harry Frankfurt falls under the 
category of compatibilsts; whereas Ayatullah Muhammad 
Baqir al-Sader is of the incompatibilists who are opposed to 
the opinion Harry Frankfurt and similar thinkers to him. 
 
The following can be said in a brief critique of Harry 
Frankfurt’s theory: 
 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
208 
 
1. Frankfurt’s theory presents an interesting analysis of the 
concept of person and its relation to freedom of the will, and 
has presented precise points in regards to the nature of 
freedom of the will; however, it has not presented a new 
solution to the problem of the contradiction between freedom 
of the will and causal determinism.  
 
Simply by stating that freedom of the will is compatible with 
causal determinism and that moral responsibility is not 
dependant on the numerousness of choices, without offering a 
philosophical clarification, does not solve why it is so.  
 
If the lack of presence of numerous choices is compatible with 
moral responsibility, therefore why  is it that the rational 
conscience of human beings does not hold a person whose free 
will has been taken by another human being as morally 
responsible; for example in the case of a person who has been 
forced to commit a crime, or a child who has been deceived by 
others to commit a crime, neither is held morally responsible, 
and all the moral responsibility is for the agent who has forced 
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the crime, for he is the real agent of the crime and the primary 
and real criminal.  
 
If causal determinism is compatible with freedom of the will, 
why doesn’t the rational conscience of human beings hold the 
person who because of physiological problems is unable to 
perform some social responsibilities, as guilty for not 
performing them, and does not regard him as equal with a 
person who has full physical health but does not perform his 
social responsibilities. 
 
2. Mr Frunkfurt correctly does not deem the criterion of 
Freedom of the Will as related to the freedom of the will with 
the action arising from it or in other words the freedom of the 
agent in what he desires. Rather he deems the criterion of 
freedom of the will to be the freedom of the will of the agent, 
or as he puts it he deems it in the freedom of the agent in 
desiring what he wants. This issue is what we discussed in the 
beginning of our discussion, where we discussed the primary 
problem of the contradiction between freedom and causality. 
We said there that between the free agent and its 
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introductions there are two relations: 1) the relation of 
freedom with action; 2) the relation of will with its 
introductions. The centre of the primary philosophical 
problem is the second type of relation. 
The primary problem as we previously stated is that if we 
consider will to be subject to causal determination, the 
formation of will, will be according to the “impossibility of 
preponderance without preponderant” and in this case there 
will be no difference between what we term as the “free will” 
and as the “unfree will”; such as the person who is forced into 
performing an act. On the other hand if we do not submit to 
the law of “causal determination” we face the problem of 
violating the “general principle of causality” and the 
acceptance of spontaneous and the accidental phenomena 
without a cause or “preponderance without preponderant”.  
 
In Mr Frankfurt’s theory a solution to this philosophical dead 
end cannot be seen; rather what is seen in this theory is 
submission to the problem, and as a result the acceptance of 
the violation of the “general principle of causality”, and 
submission to the assumption of mere accident, spontaneous 
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and  preponderance without preponderant, or the accidental 
phenomena without a cause.  
 
Here, it is not convenient to argue about the absoluteness of 
the general principle of causality. It suffices to say that by 
refuting the general principle of causality not only will the 
foundation of the sciences fall, but also the foundation of logic 
and logical reasoning will fall, and with the fall of the 
foundations of logic and reasoning the striving of Frankfurt 
and those similar to him for clarifying and reasoning for the 
correctness of their theory and the incorrectness of others’ 
theories will be futile. Thus, as Mr Frankfurt believes in the 
correctness of his theory, he proves it through reasoning, and 
this shows that he has accepted the “general principle of 
causality”. He has vanished the accidental phenomena that is 
without a cause, or the “preponderance without 
preponderant” from his set of probabilities. Therefore the 
philosophical problem of the contradiction between the 
general principle of causality and freedom of the will remains 
unanswered by Mr Frankfurt. 
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Here our discussion about Harry Frankfurt’s theory which is 
an example of new compatibilists ends. Therefore our 
discussion about the second school of the three western 
philosophical schools about freedom and causality or free will 
and determinism also ends. 
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3. Incompatible Determinism 
This school is also known as the school of “Hard determinism”; 
for contrary to the school of “Compatibilist determinists” 
which is also referred to as “soft determinists”, for although 
they believe in the principle of causal determinism they 
consider it as compatible with freedom of the will, and believe 
in the compatibility of those two  with the free agent, 
Incompatibilist determinists  or Hard determinists do not 
believe in the compatibility of freedom of the will with causal 
determinism, and deem the human being’s will as subject to 
the principle of causal determinism and do not believe in the 
freedom of the human being’s will. 
One of the most distinguished philosophers who defends this 
way of thinking is Professor Paul Edwards from New York 
University, and the general editor of the Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (published in 1967). In a work published under 
the name “Hard and Soft Determinism” he explains this theory 
and defends it. Here we present a summary of this theory as 
stated in the mentioned work: 
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1. Although William James in his essay “The Dilemma of 
Determinism” has rejected both the approach of “Hard 
Determinism” and “Soft Determinism” he still mentions Hard 
Determinism with respect, whereas he considers Soft 
Determinism as a kind of “quagmire of evasion”. (James, 1956) 
 
The theory of  Moderate Determinism which James calls soft 
determinism , especially the variety of it which is accepted and 
supported by Hume, Mill and Schlick has had many supporters 
in the past 25 years. This is while in these years very few 
people have defended Hard Determinism. I (Paul Edwards) 
will argue for this theory here, and will strive to speak on 
behalf of the supporters of this philosophical school. 
 
2. First it is necessary to clearly explain the main contentions 
of the supporters of Soft Determinism. Since the most 
dominant form of this school is that which is explained by 
Hume, Mill and Schlick, I will make it the axis of my talk. 
According to this theory there is no contradiction between 
Determinism and the proposition that human beings are 
sometimes free agents. When we call an action “free” it does 
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not all mean that it is free from the principle of “causality” and 
is outside its rule, and it is because of this that we make moral 
judgements about some actions. 
 
Although at times outside causes impose a certain action on 
the “agent” or the “agent” looses its freedom of action under 
the influence of some causes. However, in most circumstances 
the “agent” acts with complete freedom and rational desires, 
in a way that nothing has taken away the free will of the agent, 
and the agent has chosen an action by his own absolute free 
will.  
 
The rule of the principle of causality on these two types of 
action, “the free act and the unfree act” is equal. What 
distinguishes these two actions from each other is not 
whether they are subjected or not subjected to the principle of 
causality, rather what distinguishes these two types of act is 
the “type of cause” in each of these two acts. 
3. Secondly there is no antithesis between “Determinism” and 
“Moral Responsibility”. When we consider a person morally 
responsible for a certain act, it means that we have had the 
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presupposition that he is a “free agent”. This freedom is in no 
way contracausal freedom. In this free act there is nothing by 
the ability of the agent to do what it wants or desires. Since 
Determinism is compatible with freedom in this meaning, it 
will also be compatible with moral responsibility.  
 
Mill who can be considered as the greatest moraliser has paid 
special attention to one class of human desires. He believes 
that not only some lowly desires – such as my desire to have a 
new car can influence my actions. But also my desire to virtue 
can influence my action and push me towards virtuous 
behaviour. In order to change my character to the desired 
character, I can choose a hard work and actions which are 
compatible with the virtuous desire. 
 
Suppose that I am faced with two contradicting desires; on the 
one hand an intense desire for fame, and on the other hand an 
intense desire to serve people without being known. 
Furthermore suppose that I have come to know a therapy that 
can transform my character to a fame seeking character or 
virtuous and fame indifferent character, and all the necessary 
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conditions and tools for choosing either of these two 
characters and creating the necessary transformation is 
present for me. In the opinion of Mill choosing either of these 
two ways is possible for me. 
Therefore, based on the theory of Mill, we can build our 
personality the way we desire and not only is determinism in 
accordance with the moral obligations but it also concords 
with moral judgements about the personality of man despite 
the restrictions.  
3- Nevertheless the saying of Mill when explaining soft 
determinism as a kind of “quagmire of evasion” seems 
exaggerated; it does not seem far from reality. This is because 
hard determinists were never influenced by the desires and 
did not deny effort and the decision of the agent in the 
“behavioural incident”. Therefore the main conflict between 
the hard determinists and the soft determinists has not been 
the influence of desire and the decision of agent in formation 
of the behaviour.  
The conflicting issue originates from the human will and 
desire which are the source of emergence decision and will 
and also the supplier. In response to the description Hume and 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
218 
 
Mill have given regarding the “Voluntary behaviour” the hard 
determinists can say: we accept that the desire and will and 
the decision of man will shape his voluntary behaviour, 
however, the issue is that what is the origin of this decision 
and will and desire that are beyond the decision and will?  
In any case, the desires, the will and the decisions of the agent 
as well as his personal structure are all rooted in the 
hereditary factors and originate from there and glaringly man 
has no role in the origination and creation of these hereditary 
factors and his first growing environment. In his famous 
quote, schopenhauer says: 
"A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot 
determine what he wills."(Kane, 2002, p. 62)  
For example, imagine two people who are suffering extreme 
nervous breakdown and as a result of this are lacking balance 
in their personality and are entangled in involuntary nervous 
behaviour. There is a suitable cure for this problem which can 
change their personality and turn it into a healthy and 
balanced one. However, this cure needs extreme motivations 
and high levels of energy. One of these two, e.g. person A, 
benefits from enough whereas the other, person B, is lacking 
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that energy and motivation. As a result, the treatment of A will 
be successful and he will enjoy suitable behaviour and 
personality whereas the second person, B, will remain with 
the same behaviour and the unbalanced personality.  
Here, although the behaviour and personality of A will be 
different to that of B, where this difference is rooted in the 
decision and will of each of them, A was able to choose the 
treatment and B was not able to opt for it and thus unable to 
change his behaviour and personality. This is the consequence 
of the conditions and factors that were not in control of either 
of them and neither had any role in creating those conditions 
and factors being the motivation and the necessary energy for 
the treatment and somewhat the motivation and the necessary 
energy for the treatment resulted in the environment and the 
dominant hereditary conditions of the personality of each of 
them and naturally they did not have any role in creating that 
environment or the hereditary factors.  
4- the soft determinists do not deny the fact that the 
personality and the will and decision of man all originate from 
external factors and they do not disregard the external factors 
that influence the personality and decision of man when 
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justifying the moral obligations of human behaviour. In fact 
there are no disagreements between the hard determinists 
and the soft determinists on the objective incidents and 
realities related to behaviour and both groups agree that the 
behaviours originate from the will and personality of man and 
man’s personality and will is influenced by the external 
factors. The main difference between these two is in the 
manner of interpretations and conclusions from these 
objective realities. The conclusion of some of the hard 
determinists is that therefore, man has no moral obligation 
towards whatever behaviour he shows whereas the soft 
determinists do not make such a conclusion from these 
objective realities and rather consider man morally 
responsible towards his behaviour despite the objective 
realities.  
Here we are trying to explicate the conclusion of the hard 
determinists and explain its reason and justify and interpret 
their conclusion from these objective realities.  
5- For this purpose, I shall employ the difference Mr Campbell 
(1951, Vol. LX, No. 240) has considered between the two 
"moral obligation concepts" in his valuable journal titled “is 
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free will a Pseudo Problem?” He says: two different groups of 
people need two different set of conditions to act upon "moral 
responsibility" in their behaviour. 
The first group are normal people who are unaware and 
ignorant of scientific and philosophical and religious thoughts. 
When such people see the behaviour of a man accompanied by 
compulsion and stress, they will exempt the agent from moral 
responsibility and once they see a behaviour in accordance 
with sane desires and wishes of the agent, they find this to be 
from his decision, they will consider him responsible towards 
his behaviour and consider his behaviour to benefit from 
moral responsibility. Therefore, based on this view, these 
people consider the only condition for moral behavioural 
responsibility is for the behaviour to originate from his will 
and desire and has not been issued by compulsion or any 
other factor.  
In the view of such people the fact that the agent is not the 
final creator and determinative of his personality and 
characteristics and features is not an obstacle in moral 
judgement and bearing the responsibility of his behaviour.  
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The second types of people are those who benefit from a 
comparatively high level of intellect who consider the world to 
be dominated by the comprehensive causality law, 
scientifically or from philosophical aspect, they believe in 
philosophies that consider the world to be dominated by a 
superior unified principle or from religious aspect. They 
believe that the world has been created and maintained and is 
under the control and command and governance of a single 
being whom benefits from Absolute power and endless 
knowledge. 
In order to act upon moral responsibility of man for his 
behaviour, this group of people need another condition in 
addition to the previously mentioned condition- the condition 
of origination of behaviour from will and desire of the agent 
without the compulsion of an external factor- and consider 
necessary the benefiting of the agent from other alternatives 
in addition to the mentioned condition for his behaviour.  
I prefer to interpret this additional condition of the intellectual 
individual necessary for moral obligation (apart from what is 
in Mr Campbell's statement) in another way. I prefer to say 
that for moral behavioural responsibility of man, in addition to 
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the condition of origination from desire and will of agent and 
absence of external compulsive factors, the intellectual 
individual considers necessary the personality and behaviour 
of the agent to have been chosen and shaped by the will of the 
agent himself.  
Campbell concludes that determinism is in accordance with 
the understanding of non intellectuals of the moral 
responsibility and is in no contradiction. However, it does not 
correspond with the understanding or the second group of 
people (the intellectuals) and is fully contradicting.  
6- Although I do not agree with the negation of determinism of 
Mr Campbell, however, I do agree with the basis of the 
analysis he has offered in different terms. 
I do not think that the problem is in the difference in the 
understanding and usage of the term moral responsibility by 
the non intellectual and the intellectual. Whether an individual 
benefits from knowledge or not, he will make use of this term 
in one place on an occasion to give the first meaning and in 
another place to give another meaning.  
Irrespective of the level of benefit from scientific and 
philosophical or religious resources, all people will use the 
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term moral responsibility with the first meaning when they 
are influenced by extreme feelings such as anger or hatred 
especially where they suffer and are hurt, the understanding 
that as Mr Campbell interprets as being used by the 
improvident and non intellectuals. And when they are in 
normal and calm situations, they will judge a behaviour with 
intellect and thought and in calmness and pay heed to the fact 
that the agent of mentioned behaviour has not created and 
shaped his characteristic and personality and will use the 
meaning of moral responsibility that is used by the wise and 
intellectuals.  
Clarence Darrow in his known defence before the Jury often 
utilised the above issue, addressing the Jury: If anyone 
amongst you, had grown in the same social and family 
environment as that of the defendant, he would be now 
standing in the same place as the defendant. This assertion 
was almost convincing the Jury that the defendant should not 
be held responsible towards his behaviour.  
 
7. I must mention a point to prevent any misunderstanding of 
my purpose. The fact which I explained that the individual is 
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not the ultimate creator of his personality and characteristic, 
results in negation of one’s moral responsibility towards his 
behaviour. 
 
My purpose is not to remind people to reduce their sense of 
vengeance and to increase their sense of Public spirit, however 
this result may occur, but my purpose is that, this sequence 
will result from that premise, same as any result which 
derived from previous premises in any reasoning deduction.                              
 
Comparison and Valuation 
In comparison between the above theory and the previous 
theories of Islamic philosophy in the point of the relation 
between men’s will and the determined causal law it can be 
stated: that hard determinism which is supported by Paul 
Edwards, is in correspondence with the Mulla Sadra’s theory 
of necessity, and in confliction with the Sadr’s theory of 
sovereignty, but in consideration of domination of causal law 
upon the agent’s will, which means absolute determinism and 
negation of men’s free will according to hard determinism, and 
consequently negation of men’s moral responsibility, is in 
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confliction with both the theory of necessity and the theory of 
sovereignty. 
 
The main criticism of hard determinism is the incompatibility 
between hard determinism and men’s empirical and 
conscientious feeling of free will. We feel by our conscience 
and clearly sense in our practice that we are free to chose 
what we want to do, and we are facing variety of choices with 
out any external force compels  us to do a particular given 
option.  
 
Based on the mentioned clear sense of men’s power of free 
will, we see that the intellect believe in the men’s 
responsibility towards his behaviour, and they believe that 
family circumstances, social environment, hereditary 
characteristics and other external factors do not compel men 
to act what he does act, and they do not excuse any criminal 
agent for his crime due to external compulsion derived from 
outside factors like that of heredity, social environment and 
others. 
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PART (4) 
THE THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION 
(MORAL NECESSITY) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In my view, it is possible to solve the problem of the 
relationship between freedom and causality through the 
theory of moral obligation or constraints. While accepting the 
law on the impossibility of “preponderance without a 
The basis of causal law is the rational principle of “impossibility of 
preponderant without preponderance” which means that no possible 
thing can exist without the reason that makes its existence to be 
necessitated, or determined. 
In the theory of moral, I suggest that in the field of free acts the 
necessity or determination of cause is not like the necessity or 
determination of natural actions i.e. “the changes of weather, water, 
dust, stone and others”. The necessity of free action is a special kind 
of necessity which I call “moral necessity or moral obligation”. Every 
free actor is free only when he deliberates and reflects on what he is 
going to act, and on the basis of his previous beliefs of goodness or 
badness, right or wrong, nice or nasty, he will choose and make a 
decision to act or not to act. 
The real free will is that which is derived from the reflection and 
deliberation on the basis of knowledge about what is good, and what 
is bad which means that the real individual and social freedom is only 
achieved by two very important factors: 
1- Right and correct education that teaches human the true 
goodness and badness 
2- The healthy environment of reflection which provides an 
adequate opportunity for people to scale and deliberate 
between different choices to choose the best one. 
Therefore the criminals are not the only ones responsible for the 
wrong deeds which they are involved in, but also the society 
including, political, educational, economical systems and its 
management are also responsible. 
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preponderant” (without a criterion for the preference) which 
forms the basis and foundation of the general causality law, 
through dissociation of the theoretical intellect field from the 
practical intellect field, this theory stresses upon the reality 
that the preponderant in the theoretical intellect field is 
different to that of the practical intellect field. The 
preponderant in the theoretical intellect field is “existential 
obligation” which means a Necessary Being whereas the 
preponderant in the practical intellect field is moral 
necessitation which suggests legislative constraint.  Also the 
problem in the relationship between freedom and causality 
arises and originates from the confusion between the two 
theoretical and practical fields and judgement in each of the 
two fields with the criterions related to the other field.  
I shall clarify the theory of moral obligation (constraint) in two 
main parts: 
In part one, I shall explain the generalities attributed to the 
theory of “moral obligation” and elucidate and solve the 
problems (with regards to the relationship between causality 
and freedom).  
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In part two; I will discuss the conformity of this theory with 1- 
The Will and the acts of the Almighty, 2- The will and 
behaviour of human individual, 3- The will and behaviour of 
man in a community or the human society, 4- The moral 
responsibilities of the human individual towards his 
behaviour, 5- The moral responsibilities of the society towards 
the social and individual behaviour. 6- The moral 
responsibilities of the Prophets, the parents, the teachers and 
mentors towards the personality and behaviour of man, 7- The 
changeability of the personality of man. 
 
Part one: the generalities of the theory of moral 
obligations or constraints. 
I shall explain the generalities of the moral obligations or 
constraints with regards to the freedom of man in the 
philosophical prospective through answering a number of 
fundamental questions: 
First it is necessary to point out the area of disagreement. As it 
was clarified in the previous discussions, the pivotal point of 
the philosophical criticism is not in the behaviour arising from 
the will, desire and tendency. This is because of the fact that 
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the behaviour of man or any other voluntary agent arises from 
his will, desires and tendencies as well as the fact that the 
deterministic nature of the relationship between the will of 
the voluntary agent and his acts are not in contradiction with 
the free will of the voluntary agent and certainly there is no 
conflict between the necessity derived from freewill and the 
free will itself. This matter is rather considered as the main 
subject and its validity is assumed certain. The centre of 
discussion is in the origin and source of origination of what is 
defined as “will” or “determination” in the connection between 
“will or determination” with that “origin and source”.   
Here, three basic questions exist:  
1- The first question is whether “the will and 
determination of the act” has any reason and cause in the 
voluntary agent or does it come into existence without any 
cause and reason? Is will and determination, which is the 
origin of the issue and emergence of the “voluntary act”, 
dominated by the “law of deterministic causality”? Or does the 
“law of deterministic causality” not include origination of “will 
and determinism of an act” in the voluntary agent and as a 
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result, has the general causality law considered the origin of 
the act of the voluntary agent as an exception?  
2- The second question is: assuming there is no exception 
in the “general causality law” and considering that it includes 
the “act of the voluntary agent”, of what form will its 
comprehensiveness and incorporation be?  Is it possible to 
suppose the incorporation of the general causality law with 
regards to the act of the voluntary agent in a way that the 
voluntary nature of the act will not be altered? If it is possible, 
then how? 
3- The third question is: assuming that it is possible to 
demonstrate an intellectual impression of the compliance and 
compatibility between the sovereignty of the general causality 
law and the voluntary nature of the act of the voluntary agent; 
is this compliance and compatibility enough for solving the 
problems originating from withdrawing will from the agent? 
Will problems such as those arising from withdrawing moral 
responsibilities in “rejection of entitlement to the 
punishments and rewards of this world and those pertaining 
to the afterlife” and “the equality between the righteous and 
the felon (offender) in the values of moral criterions” be 
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solved with the compliant demonstration of the causality law 
and the voluntary nature of the voluntary agent?  
To answer these three questions, I shall first explain the 
passage of formation of the voluntary act and then separately 
explain and analyse in detail the answer to each question. 
As it was quoted in the previous discussions from the Islamic 
and eastern philosophers, it is possible to summarize the 
meaning of a “free agent” or “voluntary agent” in this 
conditional clause: 
“ "لعفي مل ءاشي مل نا و لعف ءاش نا  
Translation: “He will do it if he wants to, and he will not do it if 
he does not want to”.  
The main topic of discussion is how the condition in this 
clause, “if he wants to” is accomplished? Is this condition 
dominated by the deterministic causality law so the will and 
decision of man will be dictated to him as a result of the above 
cause and man will be subjugated to the above deterministic 
reason in his decision? In this case, the moral responsibility of 
man will be questioned, or the mentioned decision is free from 
the deterministic causality law and will come into existence 
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accidentally, which will create problems in the 
comprehensiveness of the deterministic causality law. 
According to the theory I shall demonstrate here, the 
mentioned condition which is “decision” will be accomplished 
in a way that is not in contradiction with the 
comprehensiveness of the causality law and neither will it 
reject the moral responsibilities of man towards his 
behaviour. 
“Decision” or the will of man is a command that is issued by 
the soul of man to the organs and powers in his body. This 
command is a natural and engendering one and its inseparable 
effect is the movement of the human organs and powers to 
perform the behaviour that is the command of soul. Therefore, 
the relationship between the will of man and his behaviour is 
one which acts upon the basis of the causality law.  
The “will of man” is the very command of soul, and forms from 
the belief of man in the obligation of certain behaviour.  This 
belief in certain behaviour is what we define as “moral 
preponderant”. It is on the basis of this belief or “moral 
preponderant” that the command of soul is formed and then 
the behaviour is accomplished. The existence of the “moral 
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preponderant” is inherent. The potential talent for 
understanding this moral preponderant exists in the 
primordial intellect of man. The Prophets have come to 
actualize this talent and to awaken and guide this primordial 
intellect and to prevent its errors. In this direction, through 
the guidance and programmes they brought, they have 
enacted a very good role. This kind of moral obligation which 
benefits from the support of primordial intellect and Prophetic 
guidance is the “true moral preponderant”. 
In majority of cases, humans replace true moral preponderant 
with false moral beliefs based on the inclinations of soul. They 
will place these false beliefs or “false preponderant” and lies as 
the bases of their “will” and as a result choose their 
behaviours based on “false preponderant”. This “false 
preponderant” is the very baseless “musts” that are in 
opposition with the true beliefs and preponderant based on 
logical reasoning. The only foundation for these false 
preponderants and beliefs is the inclinations and whims of 
soul. 
Therefore the foundation of “freedom of behaviour” is the 
“freedom of will” and the foundation for the “freedom of will” 
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is the power of man over choosing the “moral preponderant” 
on the basis of which the soul of man will decide. 
This moral determinism is enough for preponderance of the 
existence of “will” and in the general causality law which is 
firm on the principle of impossibility of “preponderance 
without a preponderant” this amount of preponderant is 
enough for coming into existence of will and it fulfils the need 
“contingent” to the “preponderant”.  
After this introduction I shall engage in answering the 
questions I raised: 
The answer to the first question; I shall answer the first 
question in several stages: 
Stage one; in this stage I shall explicate the relationship 
between the act of the voluntary agent and the will of the 
agent. The general causality law is not exceptionable. The 
principle of the impossibility of “preponderance without a 
preponderant” is comprehensive and includes any contingent 
being. In order for any being that is contingent in itself, that is, 
it does not have existence or non-existence in its essence, to 
come into existence it must leave its contingency state- i.e. the 
unnecessity of non-existence and existence- through the agent 
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of its essence. Leaving the contingency state - that is the 
unnecessity of non-existence and existence - means creating 
the necessity of existence in the object. 
This general principle will also include our voluntary acts. As 
long as the act emanated from the voluntary agent is not made 
obligatory through the agent, it will not come into existence. 
This is because the act is a contingent affair and does not own 
necessity of existence and non-existence in its essence. By the 
condition of insufficient cause for existence, non-existence is 
necessary, and by the condition of sufficient cause of 
existence, the existence in necessary. As it is not possible to 
imagine more than two states of existence or non-existence for 
the act, as long as sufficient cause for the existence of the act 
are not brought about then the act of voluntary agent will not 
be achievable. It is through achievement of the condition of 
sufficient cause for the existence of that act that will make its 
existence necessary. 
If all the other arrangements for the existence of the act have 
been made, the will of the agent will be the adequate condition 
for the existence of the act and will cause the necessitation of 
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the act of the agent and then its existence and emanation of 
that act by the agent. 
 There are four groups of oppositions towards the 
generalization of the causal necessity to the voluntary agent; 
the first group are people such as Hume who is one of the 
western philosophers that basically does not believe in the 
causal necessity relationship between the cause and the 
caused and refers them to the habit of mind or the association 
of the ideas of mind. The second group are people such as the 
Asharites who are among the Islamic intellectuals that 
interpret the relationship between the cause and the caused as 
divine habit in the involuntary agent and as acquisition in the 
voluntary agent. The third group are the speculative 
theologians other than the Asharites, who are Mu’tazila and 
the Imamiyah and they consider the essential preponderance 
of the existence to be enough for the existence of the caused. 
The fourth group are the Usooliyyoon (the scholars of the 
principles of jurisprudence) such as Muhaqiq Na’ini and the 
martyred master Sadr who with regard to the voluntary agent, 
reject the necessity relationship between the efficient cause 
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and the caused. They consider the sovereignty of the agent 
over the existence of the act to be adequate for its existence. 
In previous discussions, in response to these oppositions, I 
pointed out two main reasons: 
First reason; after will of the agent and preparing other 
arrangements for the existence of the act, if the non-existence 
of the act of the voluntary agent is still possible, this will mean 
that the possible contingency in itself is enough for its 
existence. This suggests the contingency of absolute chance 
and coincidence and the possibility of existence of object 
without a cause, the nullity of which is obvious and 
manifested.  
If the description of “the contingency of the existence and the 
non-existence” no longer applies to the act of the voluntary 
agent, it will mean the necessity of existence and the 
impossibility of its non-existence. 
Previously, in response to these oppositions who consider the 
non-existence of the necessity of the cause despite the 
prepared complete sufficient cause, we pointed out two main 
arguments: 
First argument; this is what the oppositions claim:  
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Despite the prepared sufficient cause with all its components 
including the perfect volition of the sufficient cause, the 
existence of the causes is still non-essential and its non-
existence is still possible. This matter necessitates rejection of 
the power and freedom of choice in the voluntary agent which 
is a manifested and presumed absurdity.    
Regardless of the will of the agent and the preparation of all 
the arrangements for the existence of the act, if the existence 
of the act is not certain and essential and similar to its 
existence, its non-existence is contingent, this will mean that 
the voluntary agent does not have the power to create since no 
matter how much he tries and whatever effort he puts on the 
preparation of the arrangement of the act, the existence of the 
act is only contingent just as its non-existence is. As long as it 
only possess the possibility of certainty, the non-existence of 
the act is possible just as its existence is. There is no reason for 
its existence to be achieved and its non-existence not 
achieved. 
 
Second argument; according to the claim of the oppositions 
the complete cause will not cause the necessity of the 
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existence of the caused neither on the assumption of the 
existence of the caused will its existence be evident from the 
sufficient cause nor on the assumption of its non-existence, its 
non-existence will be evident from the non-existence of the 
sufficient cause. The conclusion is the existence and non-
existence of the object is possible and achievable without a 
cause and through a coincidence which will necessitate the 
rejection of the definite causality law and annihilation of the 
basis of science and the destruction of the foundation of the 
human intellect and reasoning. 
Explanation; based on the negation of the necessity of the 
caused through the cause (rejection of the causal necessity), if 
we assume a natural phenomenon comes into existence or the 
involuntary agent shows a certain behaviour, there is no 
reason for us to base this behaviour or phenomena on this 
cause and say this phenomena or the agent of that certain 
behaviour are the origin of the advent of it. This is because 
after the emergence of the cause, the existence of that 
phenomena or behaviour will not find necessity through that 
cause but rather only benefit from the possibility, and the 
possibility of the existence of that behaviour or phenomena 
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was achieved before the emergence of the cause, and so there 
is no need for the cause because of this achievement. 
If we assume that phenomena or behaviour will not come into 
existence after the emergence of the complete cause, clearly 
this non-existence of achievement is not based on the non-
existence of the cause since we are assuming that the cause 
has been achieved.  
 
From what was said, it is well clear that in order to explicate 
the relationship between act of the voluntary agent and the 
free will of the agent, there is no other way but to admit to the 
“causal necessity” and that the free will of the agent – in case 
of achievement of other conditions and arrangement- will 
make the existence of the act obligatory. Since the obligation 
of the act originates from the free will of the agent, not only 
does it not contradict with freedom of choice and free will, it 
also does not make sense without the freedom of choice of the 
act of the agent.  
Stage two; in this stage I shall explicate the relationship 
between freewill of the voluntary agent and the arrangements 
of its emergence: 
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This stage is the most difficult stage of our discussion and this 
is where the root of the problem in the relationship between 
freedom and causality lies. 
The choice of the act is analysed and explicated in any manner 
through the agent of the choice. A phenomenon is a contingent 
being and similar to other contingent beings it needs a cause 
for its emergence. In other words, it is dominated by the 
general causality law. Therefore the question raised here is 
that despite the existence of general causality law and its 
dominance over the free will of the agent, how can one assume 
the freedom of choice of the act of the voluntary agent?  
To answer this, we need to first explain a number of different 
issues: 
First issue; the principle of the impossibility of 
“preponderance without a preponderant” which is the base 
and foundation of the principle of general causality has a 
definition in the field of the involuntary phenomena and 
behaviours. The interpretation I have demonstrated from the 
principle of the impossibility of “preponderance without a 
preponderant” is one that is compatible with the meaning of 
this definition in the field of involuntary and non-volitional 
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behaviours whereas the rational meaning of this principle in 
the voluntary and volitional behaviours is another meaning. 
The meaning of this principle in the field of voluntary and 
volitional field is that any voluntary behaviour originates from 
a “command or order” of the agent itself. This command or 
order is a consequent of the belief of the agent in the 
preference and superiority of what he commands to. 
Therefore wherever a voluntary act is achieved, two main 
rudiments are present: 
The first rudiment is the confession of the agent to the 
superiority and preference of the existence of the act over its 
non-existence. This superiority and preference is what we 
define as preponderance. Here preponderance means the 
reason for the superiority of the act over its non-existence. 
The confession of the agent to the superiority of the act arises 
from the reason that is enough in the view of the agent for 
confession to this superiority. 
The second rudiment; after the confession of the agent to the 
preference and superiority of the act, the “command or order” 
is shaped inside the agent by his “soul”. This order is issued 
from the soul of voluntary agent such as man to the organs 
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and forces under his power. After the issue of the “command 
or order” from the “soul” of the agent, his organs and forces 
immediately carry out his order, unless the power of the act 
has been taken away from them through an external cause. 
However, despite the power and the conditions for 
achievement of the act, the emanation of the act by the agent 
after the issue of the “command or order” is definite and 
infrangible.  
The preponderance we pointed out in the first rudiment which 
is followed by the “command or order” of the soul of the agent 
to his organs and forces, is a moral preponderance. This 
means a preponderance which persuades the soul to the 
obligation of that behaviour and the issue of the command and 
order to the organs and forces for the purpose of its 
performance. 
The moral preponderance through which soul commands the 
necessity of issue of certain behaviour can be comprehended 
by the functional or practical intellect of man.  
The practical or functional intellect is the intellect through 
which the agent distinguishes the superiority and necessity of 
the act.  The functional or practical intellect may weaken or 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
245 
 
encounter misleading recognition. Naturally in this case, the 
command issued by the soul based on its recognition, 
corresponds to the weakness and diversion that the practical 
intellect is encountering. This meaning of “preponderance” is 
different to the theoretical meaning of preponderance in the 
field of involuntary behaviours and phenomena. Reminiscent 
of what was clarified by the above explanations, the purpose 
of preponderance here is “moral preponderance” or the 
criterion for the judgement of the practical intellect based on 
which it issues verdicts to the superiority and necessity of the 
act and following this, the command or order for the 
origination of that act  is issued by the soul. 
According to what was said, after the formation of the first 
rudiment of the voluntary act, the order of the soul (which is 
related to the formation of the command and order of the soul 
to the organs and forces for performing the action) is 
emanated. Here, the command of soul is an engendering 
command and thus the issue of the command by the soul to 
the forces and organs for the purpose of emanation of the act, 
is the preponderance for the existence and achievement of the 
act. The preponderance here is an engendering 
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preponderance or the very preponderance that means “the 
necessity of existence”.  
The command of soul to the forces and organs will make the 
emanation of the act by the forces and organs obligatory. By 
means of the preponderance the act is achieved. The meaning 
of preponderance here is the previous meaning of it present in 
the principle of the impossibility of “preponderance without a 
preponderant” which is the foundation of the principle of 
general causality. 
Therefore, there are two preponderances in the cases of 
achievement of the act of the voluntary agent: 
1- Moral preponderance which will not cause the negation 
of contingency and causation of the existence. Rather it is 
nothing other than the judgement of the practical or functional 
intellect to the superiority and preference of the act with 
respect to its non-existence. 
2- Engendering preponderance which is the very order by 
the soul followed by the necessitation of the act. The 
engendering preponderance is related to the stage of existence 
of the act. In this stage, the law of causal necessity based on 
the impossibility “preponderance without a preponderant” 
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results in the necessity of existence of object before its 
existence. In the vein of clarity, the existence of the contingent 
object is based on the existence of this preponderant and 
without this engendering preponderant the existence of the 
contingent object is not rational. However the emergence of 
this engendering preponderant that is the “command and 
order of the soul to the emanation of that act” is dependent 
upon the first type of preponderant which was the very moral 
preponderant. This means in order for the soul to issue the 
command for existentiation of the act through the forces of 
power of man, it is necessary for the moral preponderant to 
convince and persuade the soul regarding the necessity of 
issuing the command. The persuasion of the soul is only 
possible through the moral preponderant.  
Through the admissible beliefs that the soul regards as the 
criterions for moral preponderance, it approves of certain 
behaviour as the “superior behaviour” and believes their 
superiority.  As a result of this belief, an inclination towards 
this behaviour is created in the soul. There may be other 
opposing inclinations confronting this inclination in the soul of 
man but in the rivalry field, contradicting inclinations of this 
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idea and belief towards the superiority and preference of 
inclinations are what compels the soul towards the issue of 
the command for origination of the suitable behaviour for this 
inclination.  
Therefore the role of the moral preponderant is origination of 
inclination towards certain behaviour or a superior tendency 
towards a certain behaviour in the cases where contradicting 
desires exist, and as a result convincing the soul of the 
“necessity of emanation of the act” followed by the order and 
command to his organs and forces for the origination of that 
act.   
It is necessary to point out that the soul may commit errors in 
its moral judgements. This means it may reckon what is not 
superior as superior and think of what is bad as good. It is also 
sometimes possible for the soul to encounter deceit and 
delusion. Also sometimes the soul may deceive itself which 
means it may presume what is bad as the superior i.e. close its 
eye over the atrocity of behaviour and falsely assign it as good 
(“false moral preponderant”) and in conclusion it assumes an 
indecent behaviour as decent. That is to say whatever he 
believes in his primary instinct to be wicked and foul, will 
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suppose as good and appropriate and show affections towards 
it. However he will never be exempted from the rule that says 
his behaviour is arising from the “command of his soul” where 
this command is shaped from believing in the “moral 
preference” of this behaviour and the desire evolving from it.    
In the religious culture, “Satan” has been introduced as the 
“origin of errors and deceits” in the moral beliefs of the soul. 
On the opposite side, the Prophets have been introduced as a 
secure shelter for rescue from this deceit and their leadership 
and guidance as concrete and firm assurance in the beliefs and 
judgements and as the criterion for distinguishing right from 
wrong.  
The second issue; the meaning of “freedom of choice in act” or 
so to say “freedom of behaviour” was clarified from what we 
said in the first issue. Free behaviour is one that originates and 
arises from the command of soul which emerges from the 
moral preponderant of soul and the convincing of it to the 
necessitation of the act. 
Therefore the criterion in the “freedom of behaviour” is one 
which has emanated from the command of the soul, the 
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command which originates from convincing the soul of the 
necessity of the act.  
Based on this definition, since the behaviour that has 
emanated because of ignorance and lack of heed of the soul, is 
not originated from the moral preponderant, it cannot be 
recognized as a free behaviour. The behaviour of the skilled 
criminals, even if crime has turned into a natural habit, is a 
free behaviour since it has originated from moral 
preponderant and to say the least, their behaviour at the 
beginning and before it had turned into a natural habit was a 
free behaviour. This transformation has taken place with their 
choice and the moral preponderant of their soul. On this basis 
also the behaviour of people such as an addict person or a 
thief, who is identified as a thief by nature even though we do 
not belief in the existence of a thief by nature and it is better 
not to characterize such a person as a habitual thief, (the 
testimonial explanation of the argument of this preponderant 
is not possible here) is a free behaviour. In reality, the 
behaviour of such people in spite of the apparent basis which 
shows occurrence without thinking and contemplation, is not 
so. This group of people decide upon committing a wrong act 
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based on a false moral judgement. This is firstly because; the 
transformation of this criminal act to a natural habit has taken 
place with their choice and secondly as a result of their wrong 
behaviour transforming into a habit and second nature, their 
moral judgement of their error has also turned into a second 
nature and is acting automatically. 
The third issue; the fact that the agent is showing certain 
behaviours based on a moral preponderant means that the 
agent is accepting the moral responsibility originating from it, 
and this is regardless of whether the moral preponderant of 
the agent (on the basis of which he has caused the origination 
of a behaviour) is the right and well founded preponderant or 
the wrong and unjust one.  
Explanation; according to what we said, before origination of 
the act, the agent will morally judge certain behaviour and 
prefer that behaviour and based upon this preference he will 
obligate himself to its performance. Therefore, in the cases 
where certain behaviour has been condemned with 
wickedness and preference of non-existence, and regardless of 
this, the agent decides upon its origination and commits it, he 
has placed himself prone to moral conviction by his own 
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choice. Thus naturally his behaviour is morally condemned 
and is worthy of any form of punishment originating from the 
moral responsibility of his mentioned behaviour. 
After clarifying the threesome issues, I shall now answer the 
second stage question: 
The question was; how is the act of the voluntary agent 
presumed despite the existence of the general causality law 
and its dominance over the will of the agent? 
Based on the explanation given in the threesome issues, the 
answer to this question will become clear. 
It is the existence of the behaviour of the agent which is a 
contingent-being phenomenon that is dominated by the 
general causality law. Based on the general causality law, this 
needs a justifiable cause which means a cause that will give 
necessity of existence and then existence. The cause that will 
grant the existing “free behaviour” existence, is the moral 
preponderant through the achievement of which, the soul will 
“oblige” itself to the issue of command to the organs and 
forces. By issuing of the command of the soul to the organs 
and forces, the existence of the act will become necessary and 
its existence will be achieved. 
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The first preponderant is the preponderant of practical 
intellect or the moral preponderant which means the cause 
that convinces the soul of “the necessity of existence of the 
act”. Consequently, the soul will find itself – in the prospective 
of the logic of practical intellect- obliged to originate the act 
and issue the command for it to the forces and organs. 
This “moral preponderant” is enough for obliging the soul and 
rather there is no other way for “obliging the soul” to issue the 
command of origination of the act to the force and organs 
other than this “moral preponderant”.  This moral 
preponderant which means the “the reason for convincing the 
soul of the necessitation of emanation of an act” is in no way in 
contradiction with the “freedom in behaviour” and rather the 
“freedom in behaviour” is not rational in any way other than 
this. 
It is the “free behaviour” that benefits from moral 
responsibility that is emanated from the “faith and belief of the 
soul in the necessitation of the act” and then the “command to 
the forces and organs concerning the origination of the act.” 
The second preponderant, is the preponderant that is known 
as the origination of existence. After the acceptance of the 
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necessity of emanation of the act by the soul through the 
moral preponderant, it will issue “origination order” to its 
forces and organs. This command is similar to switching on 
the light key, the pressing of which (as long as the other 
arrangements for switching on the light are in order including 
connection to the mother board and the functionality of it and 
the functionality of the bulb) makes the switching on of light 
definite and necessary. 
Therefore, all the arrangements for the emergence of the 
volition of the act which are the very command of soul are 
necessary arrangements. However those arrangements 
related to the first preponderant are those which create the 
“moral obligation” and the arrangements related to the 
“second preponderant” are those arrangements which make 
the “necessitation of the act”. 
Not only this kind of necessitation which originates from “the 
moral necessitation and obligation” is not in contradiction 
with “freedom in behaviour”, but also the “freedom in 
behaviour” is subsistent on these two types of arrangements. 
Negating any of these two will make the “freedom in 
behaviour” impossible and irrational. Negation of the “moral 
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preponderant” will make the issue of the command of soul or 
the will impossible. The negation of the “origination 
preponderant” or the necessity of the existence of the act after 
the will and issue of the soul, will cut the connection between 
the agent itself and the will emanated from him, despite the 
external achievement of the act, on the other side and will 
destroy the power of the agent over the origination of the act.  
The compatibility of “freedom in action and behaviour” with 
the general causality law was made clear through what was 
said. The causality law means the impossibility of the 
preponderance without the preponderant and through the 
picture that was demonstrated from “free will and behaviour” 
it is obvious that not only “free will and behaviour” is not in 
contradiction with the law of impossibility of the 
preponderance without the preponderant but the 
achievement of “free will and behaviour” is not rational 
without this law. 
Stage three; in this stage I shall explain the relationship 
between the will and the voluntary agent: 
In the second stage and up to now, it is comprehensible that 
the “will of the volitional act” means the issue of “the 
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origination order” by the soul to the forces and organs 
concerning the origination of the act. It was also made clear 
that this “command or will of the soul” arises from the belief of 
the soul in the necessitation of origination of the act and stems 
from the “moral preponderant”. 
Now I will be discussing how this “moral preponderant” is 
brought into existence and what is the source of its 
origination? 
There are two kinds of discussion here: 
First discussion; this is talking about whether in reality there 
are any moral preponderants before the stage of 
comprehension and recognition of man? In other words, can 
the actions and behaviours be intrinsically described by 
characters such as good or bad, decent or indecent, ugly or 
beautiful, in the stage before the cognition of man akin to how 
each worldly creatures benefit from intrinsic characters and 
descriptions? Or are the “moral preponderants” the product 
and outcome of the mind and does the mind of man play the 
role of creator and originator of goodness and wickedness of 
things, and not only the passive role of discoverer and 
discerner?  
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During this discussion, other subjects such as; the 
presumption of the authenticity of the moral preponderants, 
the manner of their essential and real existence and their main 
criterion and standard are put forward. In this written work, 
there is no time to engage in these topics and they are beyond 
our topic of discussion. 
The second discussion; how does man’s recognition of moral 
preponderants come into being? What is meant by this 
question is that does the belief of man in these moral 
preponderants benefit from specific logical regulations or 
does the emergence of belief in these moral preponderants 
originate from coincidental causes that are not based on logic 
and principles? 
The reality is that all the beliefs of man, whether the moral 
beliefs which are related to the field of “practical intellect” or 
the scientific beliefs which are related to the field of 
“theoretical intellect”, are logically admissible, that is, they are 
examinable and assessable with the logical reasoning 
criterions. 
Naturally, the assessment criterions in the conceptual or 
scientific beliefs are different to the assessment criterions in 
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the moral and functional beliefs. In the conceptual or scientific 
beliefs the assessment criterions are the scientific and 
conceptual evidences and certainties and in the moral and 
functional beliefs the assessment criterions are the moral and 
functional evidences and certainties.  
Therefore in response to the question; “how does man’s 
recognition of moral preponderants come into existence?” it 
must be said; in his moral beliefs, man can accept his moral 
beliefs through logical methods and choose his moral beliefs 
without observing logical methods. Man is responsible 
towards his choice in this field and all the consequences that 
follows it. The conscious of man makes clear judgement that 
man should observe logical criterions in the acceptance of 
moral beliefs and must admit to moral beliefs based on logical 
methods. This means he must assess the moral propositions 
and admit to those propositions concluded and compatible 
with principles of logical deductions driven from the evident 
and certain moral beliefs. He must reject those propositions 
which have not been driven by the method of logical 
deduction originated from the certain and definite basic moral 
criterions and not compatible with the main moral criterions 
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which are the very moral certainties and not admit to them. In 
my view, recognition of moral certainties and evidences is not 
a difficult task and engaging in discussing them is out of the 
boundaries of our topic here. However I shall point out that 
one of the most logical and simple ways of accessing true 
moral criterions is; after proving the existence of the most 
perfect and the absolute Just and true God and the claim of the 
Prophets for being sent from the Just and most Perfect lord; in 
all aspects, one of the best criterions for distinguishing the 
moral propositions is the teachings the Prophets have offered 
to man from Allah. These teachings can be a very fine support 
from the logical prospective, for distinguishing the good and 
bad, the ugly and the beautiful, the decent and indecent, for all 
the issues and propositions man will face.  
The answer to the first question was clarified from what I said. 
This is what the first question was:  
Does the will and determination of the act come into existence 
without a cause or is it dominated by the general causality 
law? It is understandable from the previous discussions that; 
the will and determination of the voluntary agent which is the 
very “origination order of the soul” is dominated by the 
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general causality law. The reason for the issue of the 
origination order of the soul or the will of the agent is the 
belief that is formed in the soul of the agent regarding the 
“moral necessity” of the act, which was previously described. 
It was also made clear that the belief of the soul in the moral 
necessity also takes place in accordance to the causality law 
which means the soul of man can place the logical criterions as 
the base for his moral beliefs and as a result form the “moral 
preponderants” in his mind and soul based on the “moral 
beliefs”. He can also submit to illogical issues and place the 
illogical causes as the base for formation of his moral beliefs 
and preponderants which are the source of origination of his 
will. 
Based on what was said, the behaviour of man and his will are 
dominated by the causality law and by the explanations given, 
it was made clear that not only this causality is compatible 
with the free will and desire of man but it is necessary and 
obligatory for the rationality of the will and desire of man as 
well as his moral responsibility towards his will and 
behaviour. 
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The answer to the second question: 
This is what the answer to the second question was; according 
to the inclusion of the act of the voluntary agent in the general 
causality law, how is the compatibility of it with the freedom 
of choice of the act of the voluntary agent assumed? 
The following is the answer: 
As it was made clear in the answer to the first question, the act 
of the voluntary agent is emanated from his will which is the 
very command of the soul and this emanation is dominated by 
the causality law. It was also clarified that the will or the 
command of soul originates from “the moral preponderant” 
and this moral preponderant is the caused by the reason that 
is based on the agent of the “moral preponderant” who has 
accepted the goodness and decency and the necessity of 
binding act. 
Up to here, it is clear that the chain of the reasons continues 
and the law of caused determinism is dominant among the 
parts of this chain of causes and every cause will necessitate 
its caused thing necessarily and every caused thing will 
necessarily be issued from its cause. 
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Based on what we said, the last loop of the chain of the causes 
of voluntary behaviour are the “moral preponderants”, the 
base of which is “faith” or confession and submission of man 
to the criterions that specify the good and bad, decency and 
indecency of the behaviour.     
Here we must add that the personality and identity of man is 
formed through these moral criterions which are the base of 
formation of the “moral preponderants” and then the will of 
the soul. 
As Mowlawi says regarding the individual personality of man: 
 یا هشير و ناوختسا کي نیمه ین      یا هشيدنا نیمه وت ردارب یا 
Translation: Oh brother, you are merely a thought, not just 
bones and roots. 
It seems that what is meant by thought is the functional 
intellect of man in which the moral beliefs are formed.  
Also as the Arab poet says: 
ناف     تیعب ام قلاحلاا مملاا امنا و اوبهذ مهقلاخا تبهذ  
Translation: the nations are nothing but their behaviour, by 
destruction of their morals and moral values, the existence of 
the nations will also be destroyed.  
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
263 
 
This human identity and personality is formed by the accepted 
moral values and beliefs and man will shape and form his 
identity and personality through accepting these moral values 
and beliefs. This power of creation which is the very power of 
soul and the organs and forces is the exclusively incomparable 
character of man and it is this character that has got man to 
the status of “divine vicegerence”. 
Here I am slightly getting close to the theory of Mr Chisholm 
and its completion by Mr O’Connor differing in the fact that I 
have described the chain of causes until the existence of the 
personality of man in a different way. I also regarded the 
existence of the personality of man to be the caused thing of 
the free will of man which is dominated by the “will of God” 
which means man receives his creational powers from “God” 
and it is through the divine will that “man” is capable of 
shaping his identity and personality and choosing the moral 
beliefs and values desirable to him which are the base of 
formation of his voluntary behaviour.  
On the other side, I got slightly close to the “theory of 
sovereignty” of the martyred master Sadr as I considered the 
“moral preponderance” to be enough for the emergence of 
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“free will and action”. However the difference between my 
theory and the “theory of sovereignty” of the martyred master 
is that I regarded the generality of the causality law and the 
impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant and 
included the “free will and behaviour” with it, giving the 
explanation of ‘considering the preponderant’ in the will and 
action of the voluntary agent, to be a moral preponderant, 
where this moral preponderant is regarded as the origin of the 
existence of will and obligation of free action. Therefore it’s 
the moral preponderant that fills the existential need 
originated from the “existential possibility” in the possible 
essence and prepares enough intellectual justification for the 
preference of the pan of its existence over its non-existence 
and makes its existence a necessity and obligation. 
Therefore I agree to the “theory of sovereignty” of the 
martyred master Sadr on the grounds that “will of the agent” is 
not dominated by determinism in the voluntary agent. 
However the indeterminism does not mean “not obligatory” 
and thus I do not agree with the “theory of sovereignty” of the 
martyred master Sadr in this ground and agree to the “theory 
of necessity” of Mulla Sadra in which “necessity” does not 
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mean “determinism”. Thus we believe that it is the “moral 
preponderant” that convinces the soul of the necessity of the 
act and on this basis the issuing of “will or order” by the soul 
becomes obligatory. However since this obligation has 
originated from moral preponderant, it does not mean 
“determinism”.  
Therefore the deterministic emergence of “will”, meaning the 
above cause will obligate and force the soul to “choose” one 
option, is most certainly annihilated since this is similar to 
when a person forces another person to choose a specific 
behaviour using the threat of a weapon. The conscious 
internal feeling testifies that there is no such compulsion force 
involved and on the other side the “choice” will not take place 
without rules. The “choice” of the soul is formed based on the 
convincing “moral preponderant” of the soul, and by accepting 
the “moral preponderant” and the convincing of soul upon it, 
the issue of “will” and the command of the soul becomes 
certain. 
From what I said it is clear that man can always change his 
route of choice and selection by changing the “moral 
criterions” which are acceptable to him, since it is these 
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accepted moral criterions which are the base for convincing 
the soul of deciding the will of behaviour. 
The capability of changing the “moral criterions” acceptable to 
the soul is an essential character of the soul. Accepting a moral 
criterion means submission of soul to that moral criterion and 
showing abasement and obeying it. There are no external 
causes that force the soul to submission and humility towards 
a moral criterion. The external causes can play the contriving 
or encouraging role for the soul of man to choose and submit 
towards a moral criterion. But the deciding role here is 
exclusive to the soul of man. 
According to what can be obtained from reflection into the 
inner conscious of man, and what is approved by religious 
sources and experience, there are two essential inclinations 
inside man, one is towards “the innate moral criterion” where 
the intellectual logic testifies to its truth and reality, and the 
other inclination is towards the opposite of these criterions 
that is the false and forged moral criterions, and man can 
choose to which group of these moral criterions he wants to 
submit to. Each of these two groups of moral criterions benefit 
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from special support and incentives, that will help man make 
his final decision of submission. 
 
The answer to the third question; it is well clear from what I 
said in the answer to the first and second questions that the 
procurement of the will of man is in his hands and it is him 
who decides upon his obligation of “wanting”. Therefore he 
takes the responsibility for his acts. When man takes full 
responsibility of his acts, it does not mean other causes which 
prepare the ground or encourage and help in directing the will 
of man are free from responsibility, rather other causes such 
as parents or teachers or the social environment or the mass 
media or any other cause that can play the role of orienting 
and encouraging and preparing the grounds for choosing a 
moral belief will have a share in the responsibility originating 
from the behaviour and the will emerging from that moral 
belief. 
The responsibility of other causes is because of the role they 
play in levelling the way of “desire or will” and this levelling 
and preparation of grounds is an influential support that 
encourages man in the direction of submission and humility 
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towards “moral criterion”. In places where the moral criterion 
is a true moral criterion and in agreement with natural and 
intellectual reasons and coherent with the guidance of the 
divine Prophets, the involvement of the causes for preparation 
of grounds, is a positive involvement and is worthy of praise 
and applaud. In places where the criterions involved are false 
and forged ones, the involvement of the causes for preparation 
of grounds is one that fits scolding and reprimand and it is 
rather worthy of discipline and punishment.  
Based on what was said, “The voluntary agent” is in no way 
divested of authority so problems regarding the tolerance of 
the moral responsibility of his behaviour or the eligibility for 
punishment are intervened.  
Now after explaining the generalities of the theory of “moral 
necessity or obligation” it is time to engage in the second part 
that is adjusting this theory with the seven cases we put 
forward previously: 
Part two; adjusting the theory of “moral obligation or 
necessity”: 
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Previously I said that I will engage in adjusting the theory of 
moral obligation or necessity with the cases that are discussed 
among the western philosophers, in part two: 
The first adjustment; is adjusting the mentioned theory to the 
will and action of the essence of the Almighty creator. Since 
the essence of the Almighty creator is the very truth, 
righteousness, virtue and perfectness, thus the main origin of 
the “true moral criterions” is the essence of the Almighty. It is 
on this basis that the “true moral criterions” are not merely a 
collection of abstract and mind thoughts. Rather they benefit 
from a real and true assistance which is the very “true essence 
of the Almighty”.  
Here I am not trying to argue the existence of such an essence, 
I shall only point out that it is only on the assumption of 
existence of such a being that the authenticity and stability of 
the true moral criterions will be guaranteed. On the 
presumption of rejecting the existence of such an essence the 
true moral criterions will be deprived of this real and true 
assistance. This way, the route for hesitation in the actual 
existence of true moral criterions or mistaking between the 
true and false moral criterions will be levelled.  
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According to the theory of moral obligation or necessity, any 
voluntary act originates from a “command” or a “will” where 
that command or will has risen from a “moral preponderant”. 
Based on what was said, the true moral criterions originate 
from the Essence of the Almighty, thus the “true moral 
preponderants” are a sparkle of the Essence of the Almighty 
and in fact united with the Essence of the Almighty. 
Nevertheless, considering the fact that the Essence of the 
Almighty is an eternal essence, the true moral preponderants 
will also be a sparkle of his everlasting Essence and it is these 
everlasting moral preponderants that will be the foundation of 
his everlasting will. It is on this basis that the Holy Quran has 
given the title “Unique command” to the command issued by 
the Essence of the Almighty: 
“And our command is but one, as the twinkling of an eye” The 
Holy Quran, Chapter 54, verse 50 
This Unique order is the very eternal and everlasting order of 
God which has originated from eternal and everlasting moral 
preponderants united with the Essence of the Almighty. 
On this basis, it is possible to say that any will that is formed in 
the soul of man, if it has not risen from the true moral 
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preponderants, it means humiliation of the human soul 
towards the will of the Essence of the Almighty and if it 
originates from false moral preponderants, it will indicate 
disobedience towards the Essence of the Almighty and step 
over the boundaries of the order and command. 
 
The second adjustment: Adjusting the theory of moral 
obligation and necessity to the behaviour of human individual. 
Previously I said that the identity and personality of the 
human individual are shaped by the moral criterions accepted 
by him. This is because the accepted moral criterions will form 
the will of the individual and his will is followed by his 
behaviour and by repetition of the behaviour (that has risen 
from a certain moral belief) and the personality of man is 
shaped. 
Therefore, it is not only the “will” of the human individual and 
the behaviour that emerges from that will, that have risen 
from the “moral preponderants” or in other words from the 
“accepted moral beliefs”, but also his individual identity and 
personality also originate from this source. 
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The individual man must first receive his moral beliefs from 
his parents and then as a result of intermixture in social 
paragons such as school, media, friends and relatives and etc., 
thus he will start changing, bolstering and stabilizing those 
moral beliefs. By bolstering and stabilizing these moral 
criterions in the nature of the individual human, the human 
personality and identity is shaped and becomes solid. 
Stabilizing the individual behaviours that have originated 
from these moral criterions and beliefs are the foundation of 
the formation and bolstering of the individual personality.  
Therefore, not only is the individual man responsible towards 
his behaviour, but he is also responsible for shaping his moral 
personality and characteristics and dispositions.  
The third adjustment: adjusting the mentioned theory to the 
will and behaviour of human in the society or the human 
society. 
When a group of humans have gathered around one another, 
imperatively their behaviours will slowly harmonize. The 
harmonized behaviours resulted from moral beliefs are in 
harmony. The harmony of moral beliefs means the unity of 
moral beliefs that direct the will of men.  The unity of moral 
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beliefs will instigate the emergence of the group will, and the 
emergence of group will is the origin of the emergence of 
group identity and personality. For this reason the 
harmonized societies benefit from group will and a united 
group personality. This group personality is responsible for 
the group behaviours that originate from the group will. 
From what I said above it is clear that the process of free 
group behaviour is similar to the process of individual free 
behaviour. Just as how the individual man is responsible 
towards the “true moral criterions” (which means his 
functional intellect and moral conscious and “God”, who is the 
real source of true moral criterions, will obligate man to 
submit towards the moral criterions) the human society who 
benefits from a united social personality is also responsible 
towards the “true moral criterions”, and is duty-bound in the 
court of functional intellect and the moral conscious, as well as 
towards “God”, to get orders from the true moral criterions in 
his group will, and the behaviours that originate from it and 
not to submit to false moral criterions. 
The personality of the human individual is first shaped in the 
family environment and once he steps into the society and 
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starts his social life at school and other social environments, 
he becomes familiar with the social personality of his society. 
If the social personality of the society was in harmony and the 
same direction as the individual personality, that is if the 
atmosphere of the social personality was dominated by the 
accepted personal criterions in the atmosphere of the 
individual personality which is the foundation of the shaping 
the individual personality, and the group will of the society 
was getting orders from the same moral beliefs, then the 
individual personality of man will ablate in his social 
personality and he will benefit from a strong personality that 
is bound by the moral criterions ruling the society. 
If not, that is if the personality of the society is at discord with 
the individual personality and the criterions governing the 
individual personality are in contradiction with the criterions 
governing the personality of the society, there are three ways 
in front of man; the first is to insist upon his individual 
personality and remain loyal to the decisive moral criterions 
that are the base of the formation of his individual personality. 
In this way he is imposed to resist the personality of the 
society and gradually turn into an objecting person to the 
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social moral beliefs and the group will and personality. The 
second way is to abandon his individual personality and turn 
away from his previous moral beliefs and harmonize his 
individual personality with the social spirit of the society and 
the group will arising from it and submit to the governing 
moral beliefs of the social personality of the society. 
There is also a third way that  is selected by a few individuals 
which is to choose a contradicting and binary personality, 
which is; when in the society environment, the individual will 
choose behaviours in agreement with the governing moral 
criterions in the society and show a personality that is in 
harmony with the social personality and when in his inner 
environment, he will remain loyal to his individual personality 
and moral criterions and choose his private conducts based 
upon his personal beliefs. 
The individual living in the society has these three ways facing 
him and choosing any of these threesome options is only 
dependent upon his decision and determination and it is for 
this reason that he will be responsible towards the moral 
consequences resulting from this choice. This means as a 
result of his choice, he will act upon the behaviour suitable to 
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that option and gradually achieve the identity and personality 
appropriate to that option. If the chosen option is in harmony 
with the true moral criterions, it would be worthy of praise 
and applaud and reward. If the chosen option does not 
correspond to the true moral criterions and is secured over 
false and forged moral criterions, he will bear the 
consequences resulting from it and become worthy of scolding 
and reprimanding and in some cases discipline and 
punishment.  
The fourth adjustment: it is clear from what I said in the 
previous discussions that the individual man is fully 
responsible towards the behaviour he shows as well as the 
personality and identity that is shaped in his being as a result 
of this behaviour. This is because, even though in the family 
environment, the inheritance causes and the behaviour of the 
parents play an important role in dictating the acceptable and 
decent moral criterions, but when facing this group of causes, 
the functional intellect and the inner moral conscious of man 
on one side and the divine Prophets and their guidance and 
enlightenments and messages and teachings on the other side 
will level the way for the judgement and choice of man and if 
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the individual is forced to choose the false moral criterions 
under the pressure of the moral environment of the family, no 
matter how substantial this pressure is, it will not be enough 
to completely turn off the inner call of the moral conscious and 
the functional intellect and the outer call of the Prophets and 
their followers. As a result, man is always facing two calls; the 
call of the false moral criterions which takes place through the 
family pressure causes and the call of the true moral criterions 
that takes place by the functional intellect and moral 
conscious as well as the divine Prophets. It is up to man to 
accept one of these two calls using his judgement and give a 
positive response and submit himself, and thus it is also him 
who has to answer for this choice and tolerate the moral 
consequences arising from this choice.  
Here I must point to the responsibility of man towards his 
identity and personality. From what was said in the third 
adjustment it is clear that man has three options towards his 
social personality and identity and it is his decision that will 
write his destiny with each of the three options. Thus he will 
take the responsibility for the consequences surging from 
choosing one of these three options.  
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The fifth adjustment: the responsibility of the society towards 
the social and individual behaviour. 
I conclude from the previous discussions that the social 
personality of every society will be responsible for the social 
behaviour of that society. This does not mean the social 
personality of the society is not responsible for the individual 
behaviour of man but rather the social personality of the 
society is responsible for the individual behaviour in 
accordance with the social personality.  
The explanation to this is that as I said, the social personality 
of the society can influence the individual personality of man 
and force him to accept the social personality and submit to 
the moral criterions and values that are the basis of the 
formation of that social personality.  
When man submits to the decisive social values and moral 
beliefs of the society which shape the foundation of identity 
and personality of that society, he will choose those criterions 
for sculpting his individual personality and not only is he 
responsible toward this choice and the consequence rising 
from it, but the society is also responsible. What is meant by 
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society is; all the social and individual organs that have a share 
in shaping the social personality of the society. The organs and 
the people who have shaped a suitable social personality by 
accepting a type of moral criterion are all responsible towards 
the consequences arising from this, including the individual 
behaviour following this social personality. 
 
The sixth adjustment: based on what was said in the fifth 
adjustment, all individuals who influence the shaping of the 
social personality of humans are responsible towards it, to the 
degree of the capability and level of influence they have on 
shaping the social and individual personality. The Prophets 
are responsible to explain the divine teachings that have been 
revealed to them and encourage people to bind by the true 
moral criterions. The teachers, coaches, parents, the political, 
the economical, and cultural influential authorities are 
responsible to rise for supporting the divine Prophets and 
show their utmost effort and endeavour in obeying them and 
directing and familiarising people with true moral criterions 
and shaping their social and individual personality based on 
those criterions and preventing confusion between true and 
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false moral criterions, and protecting the boundaries between 
them, and encouraging people to bind by the true moral 
criterions, although as I said in the previous discussion, the 
final decision on accepting or not accepting the true moral 
criterions is owned by the individuals. However, if the 
influential elements in the shaping of the individual or social 
personality, show any negligence or fault or betrayal which 
would result in the individual or the human society choosing 
the wrong path, and thus resulting in the personality being 
shaped on the basis of corruption, oppression, betrayal and 
crime, in the same way that the personality itself is 
responsible towards its betrayal, oppression and crime, the 
influential elements will also be responsible in this regard, as 
they have levelled the way for the formation of this corrupt 
and felon character and his criminal and oppressive 
behaviours, by showing negligence and betrayal.   
The seventh adjustment: shaping of the individual and social 
personality of man based on a type of decisive moral criterions 
does not mean man will always remain submitted towards 
these criterions and it does not mean that the doors of 
changing the route of his life and making another choice are 
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM  2012
 
281 
 
always closed to him. At any instance in life, man can be 
someone he was not a minute ago, despite all the internal and 
external causes that have encouraged him to submit to a 
collection of moral beliefs, and the personality he has built and 
tended to, based on those criterions. He can change his 
decisive moral criterions and beliefs and resist submitting to 
the previous moral criterions that are the foundation of 
forming his character, and turn away from those criterions 
and turn towards new criterions and show submission 
towards them and choose a new personality and behaviour 
based on the new moral criterions.  
Not only has this reality been proven in social and individual 
experiences, but rather it is possible to realize this conscious 
reality with only a slight reflection. The salubrious man 
always, very clearly, feels the reality in his inner self that he 
has the power to change his way of life and transform his 
behaviour and personality, it is only his decision that is the 
final determinative in this regard. 
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